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ABSTRACT 
This thesis establishes a comprehensive understanding of the 
contemporary exercise of tino rangatiratanga by Ngai Tahu. This 
is achieved by examining Ngai Tahu's approach to, and internal 
expression of, tino rangatiratanga. 
In 1996 the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act was passed. This, for 
the first time since the Treaty of Waitangi and Pakeha 
colonisation, legally recognised an organisational structure that 
was tribally derived and, in turn, allowed for a new degree of 
self-determination. This qualitative research provides an insight 
into the directions Ngai Tahu is embarking upon under its new 
administration in the attainment of tino rangatiratanga. 
Ngai Tahu's new organisational structure, since its formal 
inception, has not operated without its problems. These arise 
from a transitional phase which indicates a shift in paradigm 
from grievance mode to development mode. Internally, this has 
created a time of tension. Some runanga struggle to reaffirm 
their rangatiratanga in the wake of its tribal collectivisation 
represented in Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu. During this phase, 
communication throughout the organisational structure is 
paramount. This will ensure the recognition of rangatiratanga at 
all its levels and, thus, maintain tribal cohesion. 
Within Ngai Tahu, tino rangatiratanga is approached differently 
by its beneficiaries depending upon what element of the tribal 
make-up is being emphasised. For some, tino rangatiratanga is 
that expressed by the administrative structure, where it is 
translated into the notion of achieving economic sovereignty for 
the iwi. For others, it is derived from an individual's whakapapa 
(genealogy), with its collective expression revolving around the 
hapu and runanga only. With knowledge of these two divergent 
approaches to tino rangatiratanga, Ngai Tahu can negotiate a 
course of future development that embraces both the tribal, 
runanga and individual elements inherent in them both. 
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Tino rangatiratanga can often be a mystifying term to those unaware that it 
carries with it concepts dependent upon the context in which it is used. Tino 
rangatiratanga's definition for groups such as T e Ahi Kaa refers largely to 
absolute Maori sovereignty in New Zealand society. It is the seeming reverse 
Maori option of that desired by white supremacists, involving the simplistic 
notion of one race's domination of all others within a nation. Absolute Maori 
sovereignty entails the gaining of all forms of sovereignty - territorial, economic, 
political and cultural radically redesigning New Zealand's social order along 
racial lines which is underpinned by Maori domination. Justification for such an 
agenda arises in that, prior to Pakeha colonisation and the Treaty of Waitangi, 
Maori hapu and iwi of New Zealand were the dominant sovereigns. 
The tino rangatiratanga referred to above is not equivalent to the predominant 
definition given to it by Ngai Tahu. In this thesis I argue that Ngai Tahu's 
approach to tino rangatiratanga, and thus its definition, refers largely to the 
achievement of economic sovereignty within the realms of New Zealand's 
already established social order. In other words, it involves the achievement of 
economic self-determination via the ownership of assets within the status quo of 
New Zealand's society. Absolute and indivisible sovereignty over New Zealand's 
territory, government and law that established a certain social order (society) 
belongs to the Crown. In analysing Ngai Tahu's approach to tino rangatiratanga, 
Ngai Tahu's internal expression of rangatiratanga in the organisational structure 
will also be considered. 
The methods employed in this research have been primarily threefold and co-
dependent. First, research commenced with the analysis of relevant literature 
such as Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Annual Reports, a Te Runanga 0 Ngai 
Tahu Annual Report (at the time of this research there was only one), issues of 
the Ngai Tahu magazine Te Karaka, previous theses discussing Ngai Tahu, 
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articles written by Ngai Tahu spokespersons, and articles concerning tino 
rangatiratanga itself. 
Second, my research involved hours of participant observation throughout 1996 
in various forums. These included attendance at Te Runanga hui, Ngai Tuahuriri 
runanga meetings and associated hui, a history honours course co-lectured by 
Sir Tipene O'Regan (Principal Negotiator for Ngai Tahu) and Dr Anne 
Parsonson, a public meeting held by the Office for Treaty Settlements (the 
Crown) regarding the Ngai Tahu settlement, and the 1996 Hui-a-Tau which is an 
annual gathering of the Ngai Tahu Whanui,l 
Third, I conducted three interviews in 1997 with members of the Ngai Tahu 
Whanui to help enlarge on the issues identified by the two previous research 
methods. The interview technique employed was semi-structured. This allowed 
for a degree of flexibility within the topic areas whilst at the same time giving an 
overall focus and structure. Interviewees were asked largely the same basic 
questions with additional material depending on the natural flow of the interview 
and the role of the person interviewed. 
I intentionally approached three individuals who occupied different roles within 
Ngai Tahu's organisational structure in order to get a reasonable spread of 
opinion. Primarily, the information I sought was how these members of the Ngai 
Tahu Whanui perceive the concept of tino rangatiratanga at individual, hapu and 
iwi levels. I expected that individual perceptions would vary according to the 
different sections of Ngai Tahu's organisational structure in which they operated. 
However, they were remarkably similar, especially at the individual and hapu 
levels. The individuals interviewed were Mahara Te Aika, former treasurer of 
Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga; Te Maire Tau, Director of Ngai Tahu Research Centre; 
1Whanui refers to the collective of Ngai Tahu individuals linked by whakapapa, or genealogy. 
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and Rakiihia Tau, former Principal Negotiator for Ngai Tahu, Upoko (head) of 
Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga (hapu council), Chairperson and Director of Ngai Tahu 
Development Corporation and the person who brought the Ngai Tahu Claim 
before the Waitangi Tribunal in 1987. Reasons for the similarities can be 
speculated upon, such as that, they all hailed from the same hapu and the Tau's 
are father and son. 
Such similarities in interviewees perceptions indicate that a methodological 
improvement to this research would be to interview further individuals from 
different runanga throughout the Ngai Tahu rohe, or territory, and be a 
participant observer at other runanga meetings as well. However, working within 
a framework of limited time, not to mention money, meant that this was not 
possible. However, focusing on individuals hailing from one runanga, and 
attending only that runanga's meetings meant that I could devote more time to 
familiarising myself with the views expressed. Concentrating on Ngai Tuahuriri 
runanga proved to be an extremely important point of focus for this thesis. Some 
of its beneficiaries adhere to an alternative perspective of tino rangatiratanga to 
that which predominates in Ngai Tahu. This perspective highlights a division 
within the tribe which is the focus of Chapter 6. The gap between these two 
perspectives has widened. It was at the heart of legal action sought against the 
proposed Ngai Tahu settlement which occurred soon after this research's 
completion. The moves for an interim injunction in the High Court were promptly 
withdrawn soon after for reasons as yet unknown. This occurred almost on the 
eve of the signing of an historic Ngai Tahu settlement which took place on the 
November 21 1997. 
Furthermore, the similarity in perspective of the interviewees towards tino 
rangatiratanga had an important impact on this research. For instance, the most 
outspoken and widely known of the three, R. Tau, naturally provided the key 
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interview that was utilised the most for supplying quotations. This is not to 
downplay the importance of the other two in supporting, by way of their 
interviews, many of the opinions of R. Tau, as well as expressing their own. 
However, for reasons discussed below, R. Tau's interview became predominant. 
This being the case, the question arises: how valid are the data gained from 
these interviews? I argue that they are extremely valid. The interview data not 
only complement to the information gathered from the other research methods 
employed, documentary research and participant observation, but they are used 
as a 'strategy for discovery', as is common in qualitative research.2 All three 
interviews were intended to find out 'what kind of things are happening rather 
than to determine the frequency of predetermined kinds of things that the 
researcher already believes can happen. 03 This is why only three interviews 
nevertheless are valuable for this research, especially when the interviewees 
have different roles in the Ngai Tahu organisational structure. 
It also indicates why R. Tau's interview is centrally important to this research. By 
virtue of his numerous roles, authority and experience in the Ngai Tahu 
organisational structure, his overall perspective can be cast quite widely. Thus, 
his interview was most valuable for fathoming the kind of things that are 
happening and have happened within the structure. Furthermore, his 
perspective, particularly of tribally expressed tino rangatiratanga, fell into 
opposition to that of O'Regan. These two men have similar roles, status and 
experience in Ngai Tahu's organisational structure, hence the natural 
juxtaposition. 
2Fielding, 1993: 136 
3lbid: 137 
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Early in this research experience I undertook beginners classes in te reo Maori. 
The reason for this was that I was acutely aware of my inadequacies in 
pronunciation and knowledge of te reo and was somewhat embarrassed about 
it. This was especially the case when entering Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu hui on 
the pretext that I am Ngai Tahu, and when dealing with Ngai Tahu members 
quite accomplished in te reo. Furthermore, although the predominant language 
for Ngai Tahu is still English, getting to grips with pronunciation of te reo, as well 
as understanding a few common Maori expressions and words, denotes a 
respect and empathy for Ngai T ahu and Maori culture in general. This, I believe, 
helped me establish a rapport in interview settings and informal gatherings at 
hui. Beginning te reo was beneficial not only for this research, but for my 
existence within an increasingly bicultural society. 
In dealing with initial access aspects of this research, at runanga and Te 
Runanga hui particularly, I had to ensure that I was not there under false 
pretences. Though I am Ngai Tahu and have a right to be present at Ngai Tahu 
hui by virtue of my genealogy, I was still required to make my research 
intentions known to the directors of Te Runanga. This was to assure all that the 
purpose of my research was, in fact, honourable and not for some sort of smear 
campaign. 
I know of only one non-Ngai Tahu researcher at present with access to Te 
Runanga hui. Though she has been involved in things Ngai Tahu for 
approximately seven years, she is still denied access to some runanga hui. I am 
unsure of how my research intentions would have been received at any hui had I 
not been Ngai Tahu. It is evident that people who come to Ngai Tahu from 
outside the whakapapa net, especially if research is involved, are still treated 
with some suspicion. One common question asked by many Ngai Tahu people 
is whether he/she is Ngai Tahu in order to establish the subject's credentials of 
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either being one of 'us' (Ngai Tahu) or one of 'them' (Pakeha). This is not to say 
that many Pakeha are not held in high esteem, for some of Ngai Tahu's key 
positions within the organisational structure are held by Pakeha, but that, for 
many Ngai Tahu, erring on the side of caution is wisest. 
The suspicion harboured by many Ngai Tahu has historical foundations, I 
believe, arising from the Crown breaching the Treaty of Waitangi and 
conducting fraudulent land deals. The outcome for Ngai Tahu, and Maori iwi in 
general, was economic, social and cultural dislocation. The legacy of this is still 
evident today, manifesting as chronic mistrust and suspicion in tribal affairs of 
both an internal and external nature. Not only are external researchers regarded 
with suspicion, but internally and beneath the surface, Ngai Tahu's 
administrative structure is not completely trusted by many of its own Whanui.4 
Chapter Two of this thesis is an introductory chapter. It contextualises tino 
rangatiratanga, discussing its meaning and its politicisation in the debate over 
indigenous rights. Ngai Tahu's location in this debate is outlined, illustrating how 
it impacts on the Ngai Tahu/Crown relationship. The future development of 
indigenous rights in New Zealand is also examined. This chapter serves the 
important function of placing the material of this thesis within the context of New 
Zealand society as a whole so that the Ngai Tahu settlement can be seen not as 
some isolated event with no relevance to those other than Ngai Tahu, but as an 
event with implications for all New Zealanders. 
Chapter Three imparts to the reader knowledge which gives a depth of 
understanding of the elements which have been in the Ngai Tahu 'collective 
consciousness' for generations, namely, the Crown land purchases of the 
4Evidence of this occurs in the discussion of the negotiations surrounding the Heads of 
Agreement for an eventual settlement, especially Chapters 5 and 6. 
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nineteenth century leading to the Ngai Tahu Claim, Te Kereeme. Such an 
understanding is necessary to appreciate how historic events impact on the 
present directions of Te Runanga with regards to the attainment of tino 
rangatiratanga. To study contemporary Ngai Tahu devoid of any discussion of 
such historical events, which have so profoundly impacted on the iwi, would be 
superficial, if not impossible. 
Chapter Four analyses the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act (1996) and its 
significance to the tino rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu. This chapter begins, again, 
historically discussing how the Crown via numerous pieces of legislation 
delegalised the Ngai Tahu as Treaty partner. Tino rangatiratanga was destroyed 
not only by the loss of land as Chapter Two illustrates, but also by pieces of 
legislation specifically designed to do so. This chapter then moves on to discuss 
how Ngai Tahu legalised itself by embodying its own unique identity into an item 
of legislation. In doing so, Ngai Tahu iwi, through crafting its own organisational 
structure, recaptured a degree of self-determination, an important element of 
tino rangatiratanga. 
Chapter Five endeavours to illustrate the mechanics of Ngai Tahu's 
organisational structure initiated by the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act (1996). 
This turns the focus of the inquiry inward on Ngai Tahu to establish how 
rangatiratanga is internally expressed. The internal dynamics of the 
organisational structure both in theory and in practice are examined. The 
implications of these dynamics on the expression of tino rangatiratanga in the 
Ngai Tahu organisational structure are discussed. This indicates that a 
renegotiation of rangatiratanga, between runanga and Te Runanga, is taking 
place. 
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The renegotiation of rangatiratanga leads into Chapter Six, which enters into an 
investigation of two dominant approaches within Ngai Tahu to tina 
rangatiratanga. The 1996 Heads of Agreement, setting out in principle matters 
agreed to between Ngai Tahu and Crown negotiators to settle the Ngai Tahu 
Claim, acts as the catalyst highlighting these two approaches. This chapter 
illustrates how the negotiation camp's approach to tino rangatiratanga, which is 
translated into the achievement of economic sovereignty of the iwi, is at odds 
with the alternative perspective presented by the litigation camp that focuses on 
the individual and hapu. 
Finally, I wish to draw the readers attention to Appendix 5 which was a 
serendipitous outcome of this research. Appendix 5 is a chapter in itself which 
provides a discussion of notions of Crown sovereignty in New Zealand society 
today against the backdrop of the Treaty of Waitangi. Due to the indirect 
relationship to the examination of Ngai Tahu's approach to tino rangatiratanga 
this chapter has been placed in the appendix. 
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Tino Rangatiratanga - The Concept: 
With increasing frequency over the past 20 years middle New Zealand, via the 
six o'clock news, newspapers and magazines, has been confronted with the 
expression "tino rangatiratanga". This chapter considers what lies behind this 
expression, which is oftentimes used as a symbol of Maori assertiveness. The 
aim is to contextualise tino rangatiratanga, its meaning as a concept and its 
politicisation as the catch-cry for the recognition of indigenous rights in New 
Zealand. In doing so, Ngai Tahu's approach to tino rangatiratanga is located 
within the discourse on indigenous rights. From here, the discussion turns to the 
Maori/Crown relationship, and how the principle of partnership enshrined in the 
Treaty, entails greater recognition of tino rangatiratanga in the machinery of the 
state. 
The concept of tino rangatiratanga is an intangible quality, such as power or 
love, and hence will frustrate any attempt to be defined simply.l English 
translations of tino rangatiratanga are numerous and oftentimes diminish the full 
appreciation of the concept or emphasise only one element of it. Definitions 
include: Maori sovereignty, Maori autonomy, tribal autonomy, and full power and 
control? Kawharu, in his translation of the Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
describes it as meaning 'the unqualified exercise of ... chieftainship.'3 The 
Waitangi Tribunal in the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report speaks of the tribal 
right of 'self-regulation or self-management...[as an] inherent element of tino 
rangatiratanga. '4 The concept of tino rangatiratanga is considerably widened by 
the Maori Congress, which recognises that it encapsulates four fundamental 
elements: 
~~--~ ~-- - -----~--
1 Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 8 
2Durie, 1995: 3.5 
3Kawharu, 1989: 321 
4Wai-27, 1992: 69 
mana wairua - a spiritual dimension relevant to all aspects of 
Maori life and organisation; 
mana whenua, mana rangatira - the security of relationships with 
the land and other physical resources and the authority of tribes 
to exercise control over their own resources; 
mana tangata - individual well being, citizenship rights and 
freedom from financial dependence on governments. 
mana Ariki - the authority of Ariki [paramount tribal leaders] to 
lead and guide their own and other peoples.5 
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The definition of tino rangatiratanga has also evolved over time, its largest 
influence being the Treaty of Waitangi and notions of constitutional sovereignty. 
As Kawharu explains, pre-contact and 'the sort of rangatiratanga that would 
have been understood by the Maori of 1840' was 'rangatiratanga (being derived 
from rangatira: chief) meaning evidence of breeding and greatness. '6 The 
evidence needed lay in the ability of a rangatira to successfully negotiate 
between the sacred and the secular worlds influencing Maori life. Thus, it is 
understandable that various authors have found definitional precision allusive. 
To add to these numerous definitions of tino rangatiratanga are the varying 
interpretations. Tino rangatiratanga translated into notions of Maori sovereignty 
can be expressed on a continuum ranging from conservative to liberal to radical 
agendas. A conservative agenda is characterised here as one that wishes to 
advance the best interests of a Maori organisation, such as an iwi, working with 
the established institutions of society. Tribal self-determination and development 
50urie, 1995: 3.8 
6Kawharu, 1989: xix 
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of such an organisation occurs with the control of assets in their own territory as 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi. A liberal agenda proposes to restructure 
New Zealand's given institutions so that Maori organisations have a degree of 
power-sharing within them, and hence, in society at large. Such a position 
derives from the principle of partnership formalised by the Treaty of Waitangi. 
This perspective also develops the possibility for specifically created Maori 
institutions. 7 A radical agenda adheres to an extreme position of Maori 
organisations having complete control of all of New Zealand's institutions and 
resources by virtue of being Aotearoa's original inhabitants. 
One element common to all these definitions and interpretations of tino 
rangatiratanga is the power of self-determination. This implies active 'Maori 
ownership and control over the future ... which can be applied at iwi and hapu 
levels as well as to all Maori people collectively.'8 
By no means has the call for Maori self-determination, captured by the 
expression "tino rangatiratanga", been confined to New Zealand. Worldwide, 
'indigenous peoples in the white settler dominions of Canada, Australia and 
Aotearoa New Zealand are becoming increasingly politicised in the hopes of 
repriming their relationship with society at large.'9 The notion of absolute and 
indivisible sovereignty of white settler nations-states appears to be unravelling. 
Such moves towards self-determination have arisen from a sense of alienation 
and marginalisation in their own land, indigenous peoples are 'redefining their 
basis of belonging.'l0 
7 Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 5 
8Wai-27, 1992: 69 
9Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 3 
10lbid. 
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Te Tiriti 0 WaitangilThe Treaty of Waitangi: 
In 1840 the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi brought tino rangatiratanga into the 
context of safeguarding Maori resources. Hence, is now pivotal in legitimising 
and justifying calls for the recognition and exercise of indigenous rights. 
The Treaty of Waitangi, a contract between British, or Pakeha (also means non-
Maori), colonisers and numerous sovereign Maori tribes, had both an English 
and a Maori text. These two texts had unequivalent language, which forged two 
divergent understandings of the Treaty contract and, thus, a different belief in 
the role either ethnie would play in New Zealand's development. The Treaty was 
divided into three articles or sections. I I 
In Article One, the English words civil government and sovereignty were 
translated and defined by one word, kawanatanga. I2 The familiar word for Maori 
at the time was kawana, or governor, which had associations with Roman 
governors in the bible and governors in Australia such as Governor Gipps.13 
Orange states that a kawana represented 'authority in the abstract rather than a 
concrete sense.'14 This was the only cultural precedent to date. The land and 
other resource guarantees in Article Two involving full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession was translated to mean tino rangatiratanga. For Maori, 
however, tino rangatiratanga involved far more than mere possession but chiefly 
power, authority and jurisdiction including the practical, physical and spiritual 
dimensions of it. Tino rangatiratanga more closely translated to the English 
concept of sovereignty, far more so than kawanatanga. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that Maori, at the time, assumed that their concept of sovereign rights 
were being confirmed rather than denied. After all, the Confederated rangatira 
11 See Appendix 1 for the full text of the Treaty including a translation of the Maori text. 
120range, 1987: 39 
13lbid. 
14lbid: 41 
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had rangatiratanga translated to mean independence in the Declaration of 
Independence 1835. 15 In the final article, Article Three, Maori were guaranteed 
the same rights of citizenship as British subjects. 
The key understandings arising out of the Treaty for Maori was that it 
represented the will of the two ethnies to share power. Maori tino rangatiratanga 
rights over their land and resources which they wished to keep were reaffirmed, 
and Pakeha were accorded the powers of governorship to make laws that 
protected both Maori and Pakeha ways of life. For Pakeha, however, the Treaty 
symbolised a definite transfer of power from Maori to Pakeha enabling the 
institution of absolute and indivisible British sovereignty. In turn, this legitimised 
the carrying out of the British programme of colonisation of New Zealand. 16 
The fundamental differences of understanding concerning the Treaty between 
Maori and Pakeha inevitably led to conflict. Fraudulent Crown land deals, 
unlawful land confiscations by the Crown, as well as confiscations effected by 
newly created colonial law, culminated in bloody confrontations. 17 Other 
bloodless confrontations featured petitions and protracted legal battles lasting 
throughout the twentieth century. In all instances of dispute, however, the 
common outcome became 'chronic mistrust' between the two ethnie. ls 
Notwithstanding this less than peaceful beginning, the predominant historical 
interpretation of British settlement in New Zealand characterised it as a success 
story. A story of how both Maori and Pakeha 'had been brought together in a 
single political community [throughout which] Maori enjoyed formal equality with 
Pakeha.'19 The popularly held belief by many New Zealanders was both 
15lbid. 
16Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 6 
17lbid: 6; Oliver, 1995: 19 
18Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 6 
19Renwick, 1993: 29 
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assimilationist and ethnocentric, it was believed that Maori cultural difference 
would eventually (and voluntarily) disappear.2o 
Maori Political Renaissance: 
With the arrival of the 1960s, a decade characterised by global political change, 
debates on Maori self-determination and a Maori interpretation of the Treaty 
began to surface.21 Such debates were 'deeply controversial', as they 
challenged and destabilised popularly held beliefs regarding New Zealand's 
'equitable' past.22 
During the 1970s there was 'the increasingly belligerent assertion of Maori 
political and cultural self-determination.'23 Those perceived to be young 'radicals' 
and the respected face of Maoridom, the tribal elders, were united in 'making the 
point that the broken promises of the Treaty were at the heart of grievances that 
Maori had long harboured.'24 Waitangi Day, New Zealand's national day, 
became the focus of Maori protest. Agendas adhering to conservative, liberal 
and radical approaches to tino rangatiratanga were evident in this unified claim. 
The Treaty's tino rangatiratanga emerged not only as the concept into which 
indigenous rights were conflated, but also as a symbol for many Maori against 
the continued assertion of absolute and indivisible Crown sovereignty.25 Whilst 
the majority of Maori protesters were in the position of struggling for the redress 
of their historic grievances, many also wanted to initiate dialogue concerning the 
distribution of power in New Zealand. 
20lbid. 
21 lbid: 30 
22 lbid. 
23Kelsey, 1996: 179 
24Renwick, 1993: 30 
25Exactly who and what constitutes the Crown is discussed at length in Appendix 5. Briefly, 
however, the Crown is a term used to describe the combination of the three major institutions of 
government - the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 
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Since the 1970s, in response to Maori calls for change, government policies on 
Maori and Treaty issues have gradually reacted. These accumulated reactions 
are pessimistically characterised by Kelsey as 'a continuum moving from naive 
paternalism to ad hoc crisis control to cynical strategies driven by short-term 
political goals.'26 Optimistically, however, Renwick would rather think of past 
Maori and Treaty policy as cautious, piecemeal attempts at 'rehabilitating' the 
Treaty, denoting New Zealand's 'bicultural progress.'27 
Government policy significant to broaching the issue of indigenous rights was 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975). This policy conceded to address historic 
grievances in relation to resource claims, but did not go as far as to open 
discussions between Maori and the Crown on the distribution of state power and 
authority. For the Crown, there was little or no political will existing at the time for 
such a dialogue. 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act set up the Waitangi Tribunal, a bicultural body 
empowered to investigate Maori grievances under the Treaty with regards to 
Crown action or inaction, as the case may be. Maori now had a forum in which 
to seek formal redress for resource claims against the Crown. Renwick states 
that this act gave 'a small opening to the future', where there is the growing 
potential for tino rangatiratanga to be addressed not only in relation to tribal 
resources, but also political power.28 Detractors of this policy have questioned 
the efficacy a Crown created tribunal could have and saw it as merely 'pivotal to 
the appeasement process' of the government. 29 
26Kelsey, 1996: 179 
27Renwick, 1993: 31 
28 lbid: 32 
29Kelsey, 1996: 183 
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The act promised much but so far has delivered mixed results as it struggles 
with imposed limitations. Rather than enacting the Treaty itself, the act 
maintained the Crown should perform consistently with its principles as 
determined by the Tribunal. Kelsey argues that, throughout the Tribunal's 
lifetime, members have often been appointed for 'political reasons rather than 
genuine expertise. '30 If this is the case, politically motivated agendas may have 
had an undue influence within the tribunal at the expense of cases receiving a 
full and fair hearing. 
Another limitation was that initially, only Crown infringements of the Treaty 
occurring after October 10 1975 could be investigated. The bulk of Maori 
grievances against the Crown derived from the nineteenth century. Furthermore, 
the tribunal had no powers of enforcement. It could only recommend the 
appropriate actions for the Crown to take to resolve a case, which in turn could 
be accepted or rejected by the Crown. 
Ten years later, in 1985, Maori protest activity reached 'unprecedented levels. '31 
In response to this, and as part of the Labour Party's re-election manifesto, the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act was amended to increase the Tribunal's jurisdiction 
retrospectively to 1840. This enabled large claims by Ngai Tahu, Waikato and 
Taranaki iwi to be lodged and eventually heard by the Tribunal. However, a 
chronic lack of funds from the time of the Tribunal's implementation meant that 
this measure swamped an already increasing backlog of claims. By 1987 the 
backlog was approaching 200.32 
For the claims that have been heard by the Tribunal, its recommendations have 
formed the backbone of negotiations between iwi and the Crown for a 
30lbid. 
31 Renwick, 1993: 35 
32Kelsey, 1996: 183 
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settlement of historical grievances over resources held by Maori. Such 
recommendations, the Tribunal claims, adheres to the Treaty's intent 'to 
harmonise the interests of two people of different cultures in a new enterprise. '33 
Thus, the Tribunal's recognition of the interface between tino rangatiratanga and 
sovereignty works within the context of resolving grievances over resources and 
not over direct state power. 
In 1987 the Court of Appeal pushed the parameters for the recognition of tino 
rangatiratanga in a landmark case known as the New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney-General. In this case the Court of Appeal confirmed that 'the Treaty is 
to be read as a solemn compact signifying a partnership between races. '34 This 
hinted at an evolving partnership between Maori and the Crown not only in 
terms of resource distribution, but power distribution. 
Tina Rangatiratanga and the New Zealand Nation-State: 
Undoubtedly, then, there is a growing acceptance by state institutions that Maori 
are not just a disadvantaged minority with outstanding historical grievances but 
partners in New Zealand's development as a nation-state. In turn, with the 
courts articulating the principle of partnership, there is a gradual acceptance 
from the public at large that Maori are in contract with the Crown on Treaty 
issues. 35 Therefore, the Crown and Maori must find constructive solutions not 
only to Maori resource claims, but to the negotiation of the role of partners in a 
nation. Constructive solutions means bringing rangatiratanga out of the realms 
of ideological discourse and into practice. 
One solution arrived at in 1992 was the Sealord Deal, which was formalised in 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act (1992). It was a unique 
33Renwick, 1993: 35 
34lbid: 38 
35lbid: 39 
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settlement in that these negotiations were pan-Maori and resolved to end fully 
and finally multi-tribal fisheries claims. 36 Some would argue, however, that this 
'unique' aspect of the settlement was its flaw, whereby the government 
purposefully, in a 'divide and rule' measure, redirected the 'discussion of tino 
rangatiratanga away from the issue of Maori control over the fisheries resource, 
and instead to a potentially bitter inter-iwi struggle for a share of the Crown-
defined Maori share of the resource.'37 Furthermore, a full and final settlement 
would relinquish the Crown once and for all from entering lengthy, not to 
mention expensive, Treaty negotiations over fisheries with Maori. 
The deal involved a government-financed purchase of half of a privately owned 
fishing company known as Sealord Products Ltd. on behalf of Maori. Along with 
partnership in New Zealand's largest fishing company, the Settlement Act 'gave 
Maori interests control over 23% of the national offshore fisheries, a substantial 
asset consisting of 57,000 tonnes of fish quota and 30 million in cash.'38 
Furthermore, it resolved to settle tribal fisheries claims fully and finally. This 
asset is currently managed by the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (Te 
Ohu Kaimoana - TOKM) until an allocation system has been decided upon. 
In developing an allocation system, iwi and Urban Maori Authorities (UMAs) 
have illustrated differing and conflicting interpretations of tino rangatiratanga. 39 
Coastal tribes have argued for assets to be allocated in proportion to the amount 
of coastline contained within their traditional rohe, or territory. Proponents have 
argued that this view is consistent with Treaty guarantees of tino rangatiratanga 
over tribal property.40 Inland tribes have argued for an allocation system 
according to modern tribal populations, in an adaptation of tino rangatiratanga 
36Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 10 
37 Kelsey, 1996: 193 
38Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 10 
39lbid. 
400 'Regan, 1994: 50 
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not necessarily dependent on the Treaty. Adding a further dimension to this 
debate are the UMAs in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. They represent 
a percentage of the urban Maori population who can not, or do not, wish to 
affiliate to an iwi. The UMAs claim a proportion of the settlement assets by right 
of the populations they represent. 
By 1996 the negotiations for an allocation system had become deadlocked. With 
the government's threat of imposing a solution, in 1997, the TOKM announced a 
60% coastline and 40% population system of allocation. However, with court 
appeals looming from at least one iwi and the UMAs, the fisheries settlement is 
still far from being fully and finally resolved. As Fleras and Maaka suggest, 'the 
fisheries debate illustrates that tino rangatiratanga is contestable and is being 
redefined internally according to Maori social circumstances. '41 Tino 
rangatiratanga, in terms of its tribal expression, is capable of being evolved. 
Other solutions worked on individually between iwi and the Crown have been 
settlements of Treaty claims relating to land and its intendant resources. This 
thesis is devoted entirely to Ngai Tahu's progress in negotiating such a 
settlement, its likely form and the internal problems arising from it. 
For Ngai Tahu, an impending settlement with the Crown has not only involved 
substantial redress for economic loss but also the acknowledgment and 
affirmation of Ngai Tahu's 'mana as a people, and ... mana over the landscape 
and resources of Te Waipounamu.'42 This cultural redress, in brief, involves co-
management initiatives with the Crown over natural resources significant to the 
tribe, and enhanced access to mahinga kai resources. 43 
41 Flearas and Maaka, 1997: 10 
420 'Regan, 1997: 6; Te Waipounamu is Ngai Tahu's traditional rohe, or territory, and includes 
the majority of the South Island from Kahurangi Point to Rotaroa to Te Parinuiowhiti. 
43Mahinga kai areas are traditional sites for food production and procurement. Chapter 6 gives 
an overview of the Heads of Agreement which sets out the principles agreed to between Ngai 
22 
However, a key element to not only Ngai Tahu's, but other iwi settlements has 
been the enhancement of economic resources as part of the Crown's 
compensation for breaches of the Treaty, and land sale contracts in the last 
century. The motive behind this measure is that an economic base can be 
developed and grown, both benefiting the people of the iwi and increasing iwi 
involvement in the economy. Thus, tino rangatiratanga, in terms of Crown 
settlement packages, is translated into the enhancement of the economic 
sovereignty of an iwi. As Oliver points out, the gaining of economic resources is 
desirable for iwi in so far as it 'is a way for getting into a position to bid for a 
share of political power - anyone who has muscle within the economy will enjoy, 
even if informally, a share of power within state institutions.'44 From economic 
sovereignty, then, comes the development of informal iwi political power and, 
internally, the development of its people both socially and culturally. 
Tino Rangatiratanga and Sovereignty - The Interface: 
Therefore, Crown settlements work within the context of recognising 
rangatiratanga rights in market terms, and within the status quo of New 
Zealand's already established state institutions. As referred to above, iwi 
acceptance of Crown settlement packages gives an example of the adherence 
to a conservative agenda. The conservative agenda receives support not only 
from the iwi concerned, but the Crown. Out of the three agendas mentioned 
above, this is the only one that receives Crown support. One reason for this is 
that the status quo is preserved by a conservative agenda. Calls for the Crown 
to more comprehensively, and formally, address rangatiratanga rights within the 
machinery of the state are deflected. The Hobbesian notion of absolute and 
indivisible sovereignty of the Crown remains unscathed.45 A liberal agenda, on 
Tahu and the Crown for the impending settlement. 
4401iver, 1995: 19 
45Appendix 5 elaborates on the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty 
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the other hand, proposes reform of the established norms surrounding Crown 
sovereignty making it divisible. A radical agenda calls for a complete change of 
sovereigns. 
Yet to come into prominence in the Maori/Crown relationship is a discourse on 
the reform of the surrounding circumstances, or colonialist arrangements, 
whence the power and authority within New Zealand state institutions derive. 
State institutions have remained largely unaffected by the principle of 
partnership inherent in the Treaty, although Crown settlement packages for iwi 
do make some headway towards Treaty partnership values and power-sharing, 
however meagre. As pointed out above, components of iwi settlements, for Ngai 
Tahu at least, involve co-management initiatives in areas of 'high historical, 
cultural and conservation value' such as Whenua Hou (Codfish Island) and the 
Crown Titi Islands.46 Optimistically, such measures may be a positive beginning 
for future state reforms on a grander scale. 
Currently, in state institutions that wield supreme power in New Zealand, such 
as parliament, power-sharing still remains unrecognised. Some regard such 
measures to be faulty. For example, with equal power-sharing in parliament, 
Sharp asserts that electorally a Maori vote would be approximately ten times 
more valuable than a Pakeha vote as Maori are a minority population.47 Others 
point to the converse, where the Pakeha majority in New Zealand continue to 
prevail at the expense of its Treaty partners. This highlights the 'inherent flaw in 
democracy identified a century ago by Alexis de Tocqueville as the 'tyranny of 
the majority. '48 Constitutional reform, such as the entrenchment of the Treaty as 
discussed in Appendix 5, is still to be fully explored. 
---------------------
460 'Regan, 1997: 7; Both islands mentioned, but primarily the Crown Titi, were significant in 
Nfai Tahu's traditional economy for the seasonal harvest of titi or muttonbirds. 
4 Sharp, 1990: 234 
48Walker, 1996: 75 
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It is highlighted by Fleras and Maaka that white settler dominions such as New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada 'remain suspicious of any fundamental 
restructuring, preferring instead to ... [recognise indigenous rights and tino 
rangatiratanga] through capitalist penetration' such as with settlement 
packages.49 Such suspicion stems from the notion of 'universal rights rather 
than the recognition of ... indigenous rights', where all are equal before the law.50 
This is the prevailing view amongst many, particularly Pakeha, New 
Zealanders. 51 However, there is a gradual shift away from this position, 
rethinking the rights of Pakeha and Maori New Zealanders as illustrated by the 
Minister of Treaty Negotiations and Justice, Doug Graham. He recently 
differentiated between the rights of Pakeha and Maori in a bold statement 
claiming Maori 'have certain customary rights which have not been extinguished. 
We [non-Maori] don't have them.'52 This may seem like political suicide in a 
nation which in the past, at least, has fiercely clung to the notion of 
egalitarianism amongst all New Zealanders. However, if such a statement has a 
bearing on the future of New Zealand, there is still room for the continued 
negotiation of tino rangatiratanga, the rights it imparts to the indigenous 
population and its integral and evolving role in the nation's development. 
49Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 11 
50lbid. 
51 Renwick, 1993: 40 
52Fleras and Maaka, 1997: 6 quoting from the New Zealand Herald May 31 1997. 
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The following chapter illustrates the nineteenth century's Crown land purchases 
from the Ngai Tahu and the successive whittling away of Ngai Tahu 
manawhenua, an integral part of rangatiratanga. 1 The objective of this chapter is 
to provide a brief history which discusses how Ngai Tahu's tino rangatiratanga, 
which imparts powers of self-determination, was destroyed. Knowing this part of 
Ngai T ahu's history provides the necessary understanding as to why throughout 
the twentieth century they have been continually struggling for the redress of 
these historic grievances. This chapter also gives a metaphorical springboard 
into the rest of this thesis. Through discussing Ngai Tahu's losses we are 
prepared to explore how Ngai Tahu have reorganised themselves in a bid to 
restore self-determination and, thus, enhance their capabilities of achieving tino 
rangatiratanga. 
The Motives: 
Ngai Tahu's tribal rohe, subject to the Crown land purchases, covered the 
greater part of Te Waipounamu, or the South Island, and stretched from 
Kahurangi Point, near Nelson, and to Rotoroa and then T e Parinuiowhiti (White 
Bluffs) on the east coast. 2 Above this boundary line are the customary tribal 
lands of iwi from the Nelson, Marlborough areas and the North Island. These iwi 
are Rangitane, Ngati Rarua, Ngati Koata, Ngati Tama, Ngati Maru and Ngati 
Toa. 3 
Motivations to purchase Ngai Tahu lands included the objective of the Crown to 
finance the fledgling New Zealand economy through the monopoly on the sale of . 
land to British settlers. The New Zealand Land Claims Act (1841) established 
this objective. This act articulated a pre-emptive clause as used in the Treaty of 
-~----------~--
1 Manawhenua is the customary right of ownership, and thus authority, of a hapu or iwi to a 
certain area of land. 
2Evison, 1993: 490 
30 'Regan, 1989:240 
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Waitangi. Solely the Crown could purchase land from the Maori. The act also 
required that all 'unappropriated lands' in New Zealand now become Crown 
domain lands to be disposed of at the Crown's discretion. Here the use of the 
waste lands principle was applied by the Crown whereby all land that was not 
cultivated by the Maori was regarded as unappropriated land, and thus waste 
land. This impacted on Ngai Tahu hapu severely as for centuries mahinga kai, 
or places of food production and procurement, and kai nohoanga, seasonal 
camps for food gathering, had been relied on for food resources. These food 
sources were in areas not necessarily cultivated. Hence, Crown law demanded 
that this land be appropriated. In Kaikoura, via the Crown Waste Lands 
Regulations of 1853 Crown 'waste land' was sold to European settlers for ten 
shillings an acre. 4 
Thus, Maori ownership of their land was taken through legislation. Maori rights 
to the land still existed, however, by virtue of the doctrine of aboriginal title 
(customary indigenous rights), but these rights could be extinguished by a 
formal land purchase deed. 5 This is what occurred in the ten purchases in Te 
Waipounamu of Ngai Tahu land. 
As we shall see in the following discussion, land was purchased from Ngai Tahu 
for, as Governor Grey maintained, a 'trifling consideration', in other words, for a 
pittance.6 Reasons given were threefold. First, the Government and the New 
Zealand Company's token prices paid for Maori land were justified because the 
reserves made for the Maori population would greatly increase in capital value 
4Evison, 1993: 353 
5The doctrine of aboriginal title is a common law notion whereby the sovereign is 'technically 
the ultimate owner of all land in its territory, but that ownership is subject to indigenous title' 
(Parsonson, 1992: 193). Indigenous title can be extinguished only by the free consent of, in Te 
Waipounamu's case, the Ngai Tahu. For Ngai Tahu, their free consent relied on the provision 
of adequate resources for the support of present and future generations. However, Ngai Tahu 
consent was oftentimes subject to Crown fraud and blackmail. 
6Evison, 1993: 254 
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once settlers arrived and competed for land. Second, all land, when applying the 
doctrine of aboriginal title, was already legally the Crown's, so land 'purchases' 
were not really purchases as such but only compensation. Hence, this gave a 
discretionary element to Crown land deals with Ngai Tahu and the justification 
for keeping compensation payments low. Third, Maori would be compensated, 
not through money, but through the benefits of 'civilisation' brought to them by 
the Crown and settlers through the purchase of their land. Civilising Maori 
included Christian education and use as wage labour. This 'civilising' process of 
the Maori was to be funded partly by the sale of their lands. 
For Ngai Tahu hapu, key motivating factors for the participation in land sales 
with the Crown was primarily a chance to consolidate manawhenua, and thus, 
enhance their rangatiratanga over their takiwa, or district, from external threat 
posed by Ngati Toa and Pakeha squatters. Another consideration was that, via 
land sales, the opportunity arose for Ngai Tahu to participate in the new market 
economy. Trade would be possible with Pakeha settlements in the Ngai Tahu 
rohe as well as land sale capital used for investment in farming. 
The Purchases: 
The 1844 Otago Purchase was the first purchase of Ngai Tahu land. Here 
motivations for Otakou Ngai Tahu selling parts of their land were the new 
commercial opportunities a New Zealand Company Settlement in their takiwa 
would offer, and the formal recognition, and thus, safeguard of their 
manawhenua. T e Rauparaha's threat to their manawhenua was still being felt. 
Approximately 162,000 hectares (Ha) were purchased for a token payment of 
£2400 on the pretext that the Otakou Ngai Tahu would be reserved every tenth 
section surveyed of both rural and urban land. Promises of 'Tenths' were agreed 
to 'orally ... but did not appear on the written Otago Deed of Purchase.'7 When 
70'Regan, 1989:247 
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the New Zealand Company referred the matter of 'Tenths' to the Government, 
no action was ever taken. Otakou Ngai Tahu not only lost access mahinga kai, 
but also manawhenua within their takiwa. 
The second purchase of Ngai Tahu land by the Crown was Kemp's Purchase in 
1848. Reasons motivating this sale were first, the chance to formally assert Ngai 
Tuahuriri manawhenua which had been 'usurped on paper' by Ngati Toa via the 
Wairau Deed of 1847. This deed sold Ngai Tahu land as far south as AkaiOa to 
the Crown for £3000. As stated by O'Regan, Ngati Toa had been driven from 
the Ngai Tahu rohe well before 1840 so did not have the mana, authority, to sell 
the land. Ahi Kaa, or land occupation, whereby constant occupation for a 
substantial amount of time is required by one to forfeit another's right to the land, 
had not been achieved by Ngati Toa. 8 Second, Ngai Tuahuriri welcomed the 
possibility of having a Pakeha settlement in their takiwa with which to trade and 
capital to invest in farming. 
Kemp's Purchase acquired for the Crown 1.3 miliionHa of land for £2000. 9 As a 
result, boundary disputes with the Crown manifested. Ngai Tahu argued that 
Kemp's boundary 'comprised the lands stretching from the coast inland to the 
foothills along a line from Maukatere (Mount Grey) to Maukaatua (South of 
Dunedin).'10 The Crown argued the boundary was from Kaiapoi Pa to the south 
of Dunedin and stretched to the West Coast. The Kaiapoi Reserve allotted to 
Ngai Tahu covered by Kemp's Purchase was about 100th the size of the 
reserve requested. The reserve lacked mahinga kai access. Manawhenua, and 
its customary entitlements, had to be abandoned. 
8lbid: 246 
9Tau (1996) in Te Karaka maintains it was 20,000,000 acres (pi 0). 
i00 'Regan,1989:246 
30 
The North Canterbury Purchase of 1857, the Kaikoura Purchase of 1859, and 
the Banks Peninsula purchases at Akaroa, Port Cooper and Port Levy of 1845 
and 1849, all had a common theme. Apart from the boundary disputes and 
inadequate reserves lacking mahinga kai access, they were subject to the Ngati 
Toa's 1847 Wairau Deed. As stated by O'Regan, Ngai Tahu regard all these 
purchases as 'forced sales' where the Crown employed the Wairau Deed as a 
source of blackmail to enforce its own terms.lI During the land purchase 
negotiations Ngai Tahu hapu were evidently threatened with the non-recognition 
of their manawhenua within their takiwa. 12 This gave the Crown leverage for 
insisting upon meagre reserves, and in some cases none, as with the North 
Canterbury Purchase. The Crown also demanded Ngai Tahu accept little 
compensation. 13 Manawhenua was lost, not to Ngati Toa, but to the Crown. 
Concerns for the Murihiku Ngai Tahu which lead to the Murihiku Purchase of 
1853 was the invasion of Pakeha squatters within their takiwa. 14 A confirmation 
of Murihiku Ngai Tahu manawhenua was sought via a land purchase deed with 
the Crown. The outcome of this purchase was again, inadequate reserves and 
yet another boundary dispute. The key point, for Ngai Tahu, was that the 
Murihiku Purchase only extended as far south as the Waiau River. Thus, kept 
from the purchase was Te Whakatakanga 0 Te Karehu 0 Tamatea (Fiordland) 
in the western corner of the region. The Crown argued that Fiordland was 
included in the sale. O'Regan states Fiordland was and still is 'one of the cradles 
of Ngai Tahu mythology and tradition, and there is a deep resentment amongst 
Ngai Tahu at the regions 'cultural capture.'15 
11 lbid. 
12lbid. Also discussed by at length Evison (1993). 
13See Appendix 2 for a map summary of these and all other purchases of Ngai Tahu land. 
14Evison, 1993: 349 
150 'Regan, 1989:245 
31 
The outcome of the Arahura Purchase had much in common with the other 
purchases. The Crown failed to set aside adequate reserves and there was a 
lack of mahinga kai access. The Poutini Ngai Tahu of the West Coast wanted to 
protect their mana over pounamu, or greenstone, from the Arahura River. This 
was agreed to with the Crown orally, but was not written into the deed of 
purchase. Hence Poutini Ngai Tahu's right to ownership over pounamu was later 
disputed by the Crown. 
Apart from the above points of dispute, other grievances related to the 'unilateral 
imposition by the Crown of perpetual leasehold over Poutini land.'16 Pakeha 
flooded into the West Coast in the 1860's, and on to Poutini lands, due to the 
discovery of gold. A motivation for Poutini Ngai Tahu signing the Arahura 
Purchase Deed was to secure their manawhenua over their land. 17 Poutini Ngai 
Tahu accommodated the influx of Pakeha by leasing their reserved land around 
Mawhera (Greymouth) to the new settlers. However, soon there was pressure 
from the lessees on the Government and local Maori to acquire the land 
freehold. In the 1870's this pressure succeeded. The Government passed a law 
which placed all 'land reserved from the 1860 purchase into trusteeship, and 
conveyed to the lessees the right to renew their leases in perpetuity - a form of 
"disguised" freehold.'18 The law set the rent at an artificially low level. Thus, 'the 
Poutini Ngai Tahu were effectively landless, subsisting on hand-outs ... whilst 
those around them, living on their lands, prospered.'19 
The final purchase of Ngai Tahu land was the 1864 Stewart Island Purchase. 
Rakiura (Stewart Island) was an important mahinga kai resource for many Ngai 
Tahu as it was the nesting ground for titi or muttonbirds. The swelling Pakeha 
------------------
16lbid: 248 
17 Evison, 1993: 388 
180'Regan, 1989: 249 
19lbid. 
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population arriving at nearby areas, due to the discovery of gold, potentially 
threatened mahinga kai on Rakiura. In an effort to secure manawhenua on 
Rakiura, Murihiku Ngai Tahu entered into a purchase deed with the Crown. This 
deed was the only place in the Ngai Tahu rohe to reserve exclusive mahinga kai 
rights for Ngai Tahu. 
The Loss of Rangatiratanga and Its Impact: 
The tino rangatiratanga of the hapu and rangatira over 'their lands, estates, 
forests, fisheries and other properties', as guaranteed by Article Two of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, seemed no more than pure deception for Ngai Tahu by the 
conclusion of the land purchases. The Crown land purchasers did not once refer 
to the guarantees made in the Treaty. Once the British had proclaimed 
sovereignty in 1840 it was absolute, all were bound by it and there was no 
question of it being qualified in any way by the Maori Treaty partner. The Treaty 
'Principle of Partnership' which the Court of Appeal held to be 'at the heart of the 
Treaty' had no influence over Crown dealings with Ngai Tahu. 20 
The Crown showed that no guarantees solemnly made with the Maori were 
going to be heeded legally or morally. The purchase of Ngai Tahu land was 
simply a matter of accomplishing the Crown agenda of generating revenue and 
opening up Maori land to Pakeha settlement regardless of what the Ngai Tahu 
requested. 
In all of the purchases an overriding theme motivating Ngai Tahu into land sale 
contracts were the preservation of hapu manawhenua within their takiwa. 
Recognition of manawhenua was to take place via the actual deed and the 
reserves requested. Rangatiratanga, or absolute authority in this context, over 
prized hapu resources, such as mahinga kai access, depended on this. 
20lbid: 246 
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However, the Crown's policy to reserve allocation was highlighted by Evison 
who stated that 'if reserves requested by Ngai Tahu were at places suitable for 
European settlement they were refused. If reserves wanted were too large they 
were reduced.'2l In all land purchases not one reserve was either the size or 
situation requested by Ngai Tahu but inadequate Crown impositions instead. 
This destroyed manawhenua and to the largest extent put an end to Ngai Tahu 
rangatiratanga, including territorial and economic sovereignty. Furthermore, it 
was clearly inconsistent with the Treaty. Article Two's guarantee of Maori 
retaining possession over land they wished to keep was ignored. Instead the 
Crown employed a strategy whereby the entire title to an area of land was 
gained via the purchase contracts. Reserves could then be sectioned off at the 
Crown's discretion and to the detriment of Ngai Tahu.22 
In some cases discussed, such as the Otago Purchase, Kemp's Purchase and 
Arahura Purchase, Ngai Tahu displayed a willingness to adapt aspects of their 
rangatiratanga to new economic opportunities offered by Pakeha settlements. 
Opportunities consisted of trade, farming and leasing property. However, after 
the Crown land purchases Ngai Tahu not only had an inadequate amount of 
land for survival, but they were also devoid of capital. Token prices paid for vast 
tracts of land ensured this. This precluded Ngai T ahu from taking advantage of 
any economic opportunities. 
Therefore, as a result of the Crown land purchases, Ngai Tahu without access 
to traditional food resources and land and capital for involvement in the 
burgeoning economy, were pushed into marginalisation and poverty in New 
Zealand society. Tino rangatiratanga, over individual, over hapu, and thus, over 
iwi future destiny was severely impaired. 
21 Evison, 1993: 349 
220 'Regan, 1989:246 
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The following chapter discusses the significance of the Te Runanga 0 Ngai 
Tahu Act (1996) on Ngai Tahu's tino rangatiratanga. It begins with a brief 
overview of the Crown's nineteenth century efforts that removed Ngai Tahu's 
legal identity as a Treaty partner. This continued on from the fraudulent Crown 
land purchases outlined in Chapter Two. The suppression of Ngai Tahu's legal 
identity carried through to the twentieth century with the imposition of the Crown 
created Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. The rebuilding of tribal self-determination 
was denied by this structure's existence. In 1992 Ngai Tahu introduced a private 
members bill, the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Bill, into parliament which proposed 
the establishment of a runanga-based authority and a tribally determined 
organisational structure. This structure gave back to Ngai Tahu a legal identity, 
accountability to its own people, the power of self-determination and the 
potential to capture tribal tino rangatiratanga. 
The Delegaiisation of Ngai Tahu: 
Last century, the dominant thought in New Zealand with the arrival of Christian 
Missionaries in 1840 was to 'discourage tribal activity in favour of individualism.' I 
Most fervent in imparting their belief in the virtues of individual industry to Maori 
were the Protestant missionaries. For Ngai Tahu, a veritable tidal wave of 
missionaries had arrived within their rohe: the Wesleyan's Watkin and Creed at 
Waikouaiti, the Lutheran Wohlers at Ruapuke and the Anglican Stack at 
Kaiapoi. '2 These missionaries preached an ideology which focused on the 
virtues of a social system governed by individualism as opposed to 
communalism which was present in Maori society. The missionaries argued that 
individualism is necessary to adopt in order to progress from 'savagery' to 
'civilisation' and henceforth to salvation. 3 
1 Evison, 1987: 58 
2lbid. 
3lbid . 
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During the 1850's, as the inadequacy of reserves allocated by the Crown to 
sustain Ngai Tahu livelihoods became evident, the missionaries were quick to 
blame the so-called inefficiencies deriving from 'native communism.'4 Ngai Tahu, 
now suffering from poverty manifesting from inadequate reserve sizes, were 
susceptible to such missionary influence. The Kaiapoi Reserve created out of 
Kemp's Purchase by Walter Mantell was partitioned into individual holdings in 
1860 by Walter Buller, the Commissioner for Native Reserves. Buller was the 
son of a Wesleyan Missionary. 
With the individualisation of land at Kaiapoi, traditional concepts of land 
ownership such as manawhenua, the customary right of ownership to an area of 
land, had to be abandoned. Various reasons for Ngai Tahu's acceptance of land 
individualisation are offered. Te Maire Tau, Director of Ngai Tahu Research 
Centre, points out that the Waitangi Tribunal argued that land individualisation 
was consented to by Ngai Tahu, implying that Ngai Tahu simply opted for a 
superior alternative of land management. T.M. Tau, however, maintains that this 
observation is 'superficial when one considers that the Crown's failure to set 
aside enough land for Ngai Tahu meant that individualization was the only real 
economic option available.'5 Furthermore, because the Kaiapoi Reserve was so 
small to begin with, many individuals went without private holdings. Those with 
private holdings often found that they were too small to adequately support 
themselves on anyway. Thus, many Maori holdings were turned over to 
European leaseholders.6 
Buller's scheme to individualise land in the Kaiapoi Reserve was a successful 
experiment from the Crown's perspective, whose agenda included freeing up as 
much Maori land as possible for European settlement. Buller's scheme led the 
4lbid. 
5T.M. Tau, 1992: 319 
6Evison, 1987: 58 
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way for formal legislation to individualise Maori reserve land. Legislation 
throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century not only reflected missionary 
attitudes and the Crown agenda of land acquisition but also had assimilationist 
goals. The best example of this was the Native Land Act (1865). This Act was 
the second amendment in a series of further amendments to this Act, which led 
it to be 'confusing and sometimes conflicting legislation.'7 It helped to whittle 
away, not only Ngai Tahu, but other tribes' existence as a legal entity which 
derived from the Treaty of Waitangi partnership. The objectives of the Native 
Land Act (1865) are commented on by Henry Sewell, the Attorney-General at 
the. time and the Minister of Justice in 1870. An oft quoted extract, provides a 
fine example of colonialist ethnocentrism: 
The object of the Native Land Act was two-fold: to bring the 
great bulk of the lands of the Northern Island which belonged to 
the natives, and which before the passing of the Act, were extra 
commercium [beyond the bonds of commerce] - except through 
the means of the old purchase system, which had entirely broken 
down, within the reach of colonization. The other great object 
was the detribalization of the Natives - to destroy, if it were 
possible, the principle of communism which ran through the 
whole of their institutions, upon which their social system was 
based, and which stood as a barrier in the way of all attempts to 
amalgamate the Native race into our own social and political 
system. It was hoped by the individualization of titles to land, 
giving them individual ownership which we ourselves 
possessed, they would lose their communistic character, and 
that their social status would become assimilated to our own.8 
7lbid. 
8Hist. 624 Reading/NZPD, 1870: 254 
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Under this Act, pakeha judges of a Native Land Court were appointed to decide 
on the legal title of all claimants to land. Legal title could be granted to only ten 
claimants according to their customary usage of the land area. They were the 
sole legal owners of the land and could dispose of it how they saw fit. 9 As an 
outcome of this policy, many rightful owners were dispossessed. 10 
For Ngai Tahu, as a Treaty partner, the primary contract within the Treaty was 
that 'Ngai Tahu is bound ... to recognise the Crown's sovereignty, and the Crown 
is bound to recognise and protect Ngai Tahu tino rangatiratanga.'ll In that acts 
such as the Native Land Act (1865) were designed by Parliament and 
consented to by the Crown with the object of smashing not only Ngai Tahu, but 
Maori ways of life in general, the Crown 'deliberately subverted Ngai Tahu 
rangatiratanga ... and specifically intended to do so.'12 
The Establishment of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board: 
From as early as the 1840's Ngai Tahu petitioned the Crown over their 
grievances regarding the Crown land purchases. These grievances collectively 
became known as Te Kereeme, or The Claim. T.M. Tau comments on how The 
Claim, and the struggle for an eventual settlement, became like the 'Holy Grail' 
for Ngai Tahu. 13 The Claim functioned as a vehicle to unite the tribe in a 
common cause. 14 
In 1921 a Royal Commission was appointed to investigate Kemp's Purchase. It 
concluded that reserves awarded by Mantell were in fact inadequate as were 
9Evison, 1987: 59 
10,bid. 
11 O'Regan, 1991: 270 
12'bid. 
13T.M. Tau, 1992:346 
14'bid. 
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the Land Court proceedings awarding private holdings to selected owners. It 
was recommended that Ngai Tahu receive £354,000 as compensation. 
However, for twenty years following the Royal Commission's recommendations, 
'despite diligent lobbying and petitioning, the Ngai Tahu Claim made no 
headway.'IS Evison remarks that at the time, just after World War One, the 
Crown and much of New Zealand society was far too preoccupied with the 
virtues of being part of the British Empire to take Maori claims seriously.16 
The first Labour Government made the first concession to the Ngai Tahu Claim 
in 1944. A revisitation of the 1921 Royal Commission Report produced the Ngai 
Tahu Claim Settlement Act (1944). This act purported to release the Crown from 
'any claims or demands which hereafter be made on it in respect of, or arising 
out of, the purchase of certain lands in the South Island belonging to the Ngai 
Tahu tribe.'17 
In order to achieve 'round figures', the Crown adjusted the Royal Commission's 
recommendation of compensation down from £354,000 to £300, 000. 18 £10, 000 
or $20,000 was to be paid to Ngai Tahu each year for thirty years. The 
Settlement Act made no mention of the Treaty of Waitangi and its intendant 
rights and obligations for both Ngai Tahu and the Crown with regard to the ten 
deeds of purchase. 19 According to Evison and T.M. Tau, the Settlement Act was 
decided upon unilaterally by the government without seeking the prior 
agreement of Ngai Tahu. Furthermore, even the parliamentary representative 
for Southern Maori, Eruera Tirikatene, was not consulted. In the 1996 Heads of 
Agreement (see Chapter 6), which layed down principles agreed to in 
negotiation for a settlement between the Crown and Ngai Tahu, it was conceded 
15Evison, 1993: 485 
16lbid: 483 
17T.M. Tau, 1992:399 
18Evison, 1993: 486 
19lbid. 
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that 'the Crown accepts Ngai Tahu grievances were not remedied. In particular, 
the Ngaitahu Claim Settlement Act 1944 was enacted without prior consultation 
with the tribe.'2o 
Amongst Ngai Tahu there was a general acceptance of the Settlement Act on 
the grounds that "something is better than nothing", or, as Evison points out, 
"half a loaf is better than none."2} There was, however, opposition to this Act. 
T. M. Tau states that Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga passed a resolution in 1945 
opposing the act and maintaining that the compensation amount was 
inadequate and that there was no prior consultation by the government.22 
By the time the Settlement Act expired - in 1974 - the third Labour Government 
converted the $20,000 into a perpetual payment. However, by this time 'its value 
had been reduced by inflation whilst the land it represented had been increasing 
in value. '23 
From the Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act sprang a further act pertaining to Ngai 
Tahu, the Ngai Tahu Trust Board Act (1946). Through the passing of this act, 
the Ngai Tahu Trust Board became the vehicle authorised by the Crown to 
administer the funds deriving from the Settlement Act in the interests of Ngai 
Tahu beneficiaries. 
The Crown notion of Trust Boards came from the Maori Social and Economic 
Advancement Act (1945), which legalised tribal executives allowing for Maori to 
have extremely limited powers of local government within their iwi. 24 The Ngai 
20Heads of Agreement, 1996: 4 
21 T. M Tau, 1992: 401 quoting Marewa McConnel of Rapaki. Evison, 1993: 487 quoting W. D. 
Barrett of Tuahiwi, 1948. 
22T.M. Tau, 1992:400 
230'Regan, 1989:259 
24Kelly, 1991: 32 
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Tahu Trust Board was elected by beneficiaries, thus becoming the statutory 
representative of the iwi even though the Crown had brought it into existence. 
The Ngai Tahu Trust Board can be characterised as the Crown's paternalistic 
attempt to 'appease the Maori leadership and the wider Maori population without 
having to make complete compensation.'25 
In 1955 the Ngai Tahu Trust Board Act (1946) was repealed. In its place was yet 
another Crown creation, the Maori Trust Boards Act (1955). This act, rather than 
being specifically aimed at Ngai Tahu, incorporated other tribes into a Trust 
Board structure. The Ngai Tahu Trust Board became the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust 
Board. Again, elected by beneficiaries to be representative of Ngai Tahu. After 
delegalising Ngai Tahu and other Maori Treaty partners via legislation in the 
nineteenth century, Trust Boards can be seen as a Crown convenience where 
Crown entities are created 'which might in some circumstances and for some 
purposes, be said to be representative of Ngai Tahu and those other tribes in 
their dealings with the Crown.'26 Through the existence of Trust Boards, the 
Crown does not have to forfeit the ultimate say in Maori affairs with regards to 
each iwi. Maori tino rangatiratanga over their assets as guaranteed by the 
Treaty is still denied by this structure. 
Eight Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board members were elected to represent various 
districts throughout the Ngai Tahu rohe. The districts and their Trust Board 
representatives for the final 1996 year were: Te Ika a Maui (representative of 
beneficiaries who reside outside the Ngai Tahu rohe) - Sir Tipene O'Regan 
(Chairman); Mahaanui (Kaiapoi and North Canterbury) - Henare Rakiihia Tau 
(Deputy Chairman); Akaroa (Banks Peninsula and Christchurch) - Monty 
Daniels; Kaikoura (Marlborough and Nelson) - Wiremu Te Haere Solomon; Te 
25Kelly, 1991: 33 
260 'Regan, 1989:259 
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Tai Poutini (West Coast) - Maire Antoinette Forsyth; Arowhenua (Timaru, 
Ashburton and North Otago) - Elizabeth Anne Stevenson; Araiteuru (Otago) -
Kuao Edmond Langsbury; and Murihiku (Southland) - Jane Ruby Davis.27 
Since 1955, when the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was legislated into 
existence, its functions were considerably extended by the tribe to do more than 
merely administer the yearly $20,000 payment. A permissive clause in the Maori 
Trust Boards Act enabled Ngai Tahu to 'undertake actions they consider to be in 
the interests of beneficiaries as a whole.'28 The Trust Board exploited this 
loophole to its fullest potential, investing in tribally owned and subsidiary 
companies in the areas of property, fishing, tourism, trade and marketing. These 
investments formed the primary source of income for the tribe. 
Below is a hierarchical diagram of Ngai Tahu's organisational structure during 
the majority of the forty years the Trust Board structure was in place. The point 
of this diagram is to show that within the hierarchy the Crown is the dominant 
party to which the Trust Board was legally accountable and not the Ngai Tahu 
Whanui which includes the Papatipu Runanga.29 
27Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Annual Report, 1995: 47 
28lbid. 
29papatipu Runanga are the traditional marae-based councils of Ngai Tahu. 
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Figure 1. The Structure of Legally Recognised Authority as it Pertained to 
the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, 1955-1996: 
The Crown 
~ 
The Government 
~ 
Minister for Maori Affairs 
~ 
Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board 
~ 
(Te Runanganui 0 Tahu, 1989-1995) 
(Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Ltd., 1995 .. 1996) 
~ 
Ngai Tahu Whanui and Papatipu Runanga 
Note: The two-way arrow denotes the Trust Board's accountability back to 
the Minister for Maori Affairs rather than to the Ngai Tahu Whanui. 
The Establishment of Ngai Tahu's Legal Identity: 
It was argued by the Hon. Mrs Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, representative for 
Southern Maori and a Ngai Tahu descendant, during the Third Reading of the 
Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Bill that 'the legal identity of Ngai Tahu was 
established in 1944 and 1946.'30 Thus, Tirikatene-Sullivan negated the primary 
reason for Ngai Tahu wishing to formulate legislation to incorporate structures 
which lay at the core of their legal identity as a tribe, such as the Papatipu 
Runanga. Many would argue, as borne out by the passing of the Te Runanga 0 
Ngai Tahu legislation, that the Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act (1944), the Ngai 
Tahu Trust Board Act (1946) and the subsequent Maori Trust Boards Act (1955) 
did not establish a legal identity for Ngai Tahu. The identity that was established 
30Tirikatene-Sullivan, 1996: 11950 
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by these was an artificial identity, being Crown created, for Crown purposes and 
not Ngai Tahu's. All of these acts were merely Crown impositions. 
The following discussion of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board highlights the 
short-comings of this organisational structure and illustrates Ngai Tahu's desire 
for one which they alone create. The discussion then moves on to Ngai Tahu's 
shift away from the Trust Board structure towards the crafting of their own 
organisational structure by way of the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act (1996), 
which finally imparts a legal identity to Ngai Tahu. 
One Ngai Tahu objection to the Trust Board structure was that it was legally 
accountable to the Crown rather than the Papatipu Runanga of Ngai Tahu, who 
are recognised as 'the representative heart of Ngai Tahu history and culture'31 
and where 'the tino rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu resides.'32 Accountability to the 
Minister of Maori Affairs, and thus to the Crown, was 'based on the belief that 
moneys paid in compensation to Ngai Tahu are public moneys and therefore 
should be subject to Government audit and Ministerial controL'33 This Ministerial 
control was so tight that the Trust Board was unable to spend $200 without the 
Minister's approvaL34 The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board operated along 
government departmental lines rather than being a structure which truly 
represented the iwi and its people. 
Moneys other than compensatory money, that is, deriving from investments may 
not have been subject to the $200 limitation or government audit procedures. 
However, as stated by O'Regan, the Trust Board was still 'limited in the range of 
31 O'Regan, 1991:271 
32Te Kawenata 0 Ngai TahuIDraft Charter, 1993 
330 'Regan, 1989:260 
34Huria, 1996: 4 
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independent enterprise it could engage in and ringed with restrictions imposed 
by past paternalistic Governments. '35 
Thus, within the Trust Board structure there was the belief that, not only should 
the tribe determine its management structure, but this structure 'should be 
accountable to the tribe and not a Minister of the Crown.'36 
Ngai Tahu's Papatipu Runanga, as mentioned above, is recognised as being 
where tino rangatiratanga of the tribe resides. Thus, Ngai Tahu's identity, as 
hapu and iwi, derives from these bodies. The Trust Board structure, in being 
derived from the Crown, was neither representative of Ngai Tahu hapu and iwi, 
or of the 'collective voice' of Ngai Tahu rangatiratanga. 37 
With the Trust Board structure in place, the Crown refused to recognise the 
existence of Ngai Tahu's Papatipu Runanga. Even the Maori Social and 
Economic Advancement Act (1945) that legalised tribal executives, and which 
was enacted prior to the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Act (1946), refused to 
recognise Ngai Tahu runanga. The Crown-derived Ngai Tahu Trust Board 
structure was favoured over Ngai Tahu runanga in the following year. In order to 
cope with their legal non-existence within the Trust Board structure, but at the 
same time enjoy the benefits deriving from the Maori Social and Economic 
Advancement Act, such as marae subsidies, runanga were 'forced ... to pose as 
Maori Committees of the New Zealand Maori Council, itself a creature of 
statute.'38 Other runanga, including Ngai Tuahuriri, became incorporated 
societies in order to secure some measure of autonomy.39 
350 'Regan, 1989: 259 
36lbid: 260 
37Te Kawenata 0 Ngai Tahu/Draft Charter, 1993. 
380 'Regan, 1991: 271 
39lbid. 
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Finally, for an enduring settlement of Ngai Tahu's historic grievances, O'Regan 
points out that a legal identity is necessary for a final and binding resolution. In 
the early 1990's, before the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Bill had been introduced 
to Parliament, O'Regan maintained that through past legislation and the 
persistence of the Trust Board structure the Crown 'in diminishing, and 
subsequently denying the legal personality of the Ngai Tahu tribe ... has 
effectively denied the existence of the Ngai Tahu rangatiratanga guaranteed by 
the Treaty. '40 In turn, this has meant that the Crown has denied itself, an entity 
with which it can negotiate. There was no Ngai Tahu collective body which could 
legally represent Ngai Tahu in court or negotiations. For example, the Ngai Tahu 
Claim was filed with the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986 under Henare Rakiihia Tau's 
name, rather than "Ngai Tahu". Therefore, in the case of a settlement using the 
Trust Board structure, the Crown would have been subject to its 'oft recounted 
nightmare ... [where] Ngai Tahu returning in successive future 
generations ... relitigate old claims under the Treaty and ... press new claims',41 as 
any settlement would not legally represent the iwi and thus the beneficiaries. 
The Waitangi Tribunal published a three-volume report in 1991 covering its 
findings on the Ngai Tahu Claim lodged in 1986. It found in favour of Ngai Tahu 
upholding the main elements of the land claims. The report further mentioned 
that the Trust Board structure was inadequate to manage, administer and 
control new assets resulting from a settlement with the Crown. It stated that: 'the 
existing structure is not appropriate either on cultural and historic grounds or in 
terms of the future needs of Ngai Tahu into the 21 st Century. '42 
40lbid. 
41 lbid. 
420 'Regan, 1991: 272., commenting on the Ngai Tahu Report, para. 24-3 
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Following the Tribunal's Report, at the first meeting of the Ngai Tahu negotiators 
with the Crown, the 'concept of Te Runanganui 0 Tahu was advanced as the 
tribal authority for Ngai Tahu.'43 
As far back as 1981 the Trust Board was 'considering developing a structure 
which would incorporate input from Ngai Tahu runanga.'44 This was as well as 
recognising the traditional preeminance of runanga as the decision-makers 
within the iwi. In 1988 at an Arowhenua hui, the idea was advanced for an 
Incorporated Society of Papatipu Runanga to be known as T e Runanganui 0 
Tahu.4s There was growing dissatisfaction with the legislation controlling the 
Trust Board.46 Te Runanganui 0 Tahu came into being on December 17 1989. 
For Ngai Tahu, the purpose of this body was "to protect, to advance, to develop 
and to unify the interests of Ngai Tahu in the true spirit of tino rangatiratanga 
implicit in the Treaty of Waitangi."47 Another guiding principle of Te Runanganui 
was also to be accountable to the Ngai Tahu Whanui. 48 For the purposes of 
Ngai Tahu's organisational structure it was envisaged that Te Runanganui 
should operate separately from, yet simultaneously to, the Trust Board.49 Te 
Runanganui would liaise with the Trust Board in matters of mutual interest. Te 
Runanganui was a body aiming to autonomously promote Ngai Tahu interests 
via delegates from 19 runanga. It also gave Ngai Tahu a chance to trial a new 
management system based around runanga as the tribal authority. Furthermore, 
Te Runanganui was an expression of Ngai Tahu rangatiratanga over its own 
affairs. 
43T.M. Tau, 1996:7 
44Kelly, 1991: 35-36 
45T.M. Tau, 1996: 7 
46Crofts, 1995: 26 
47lbid. 
48Rules of Te Runanganui 0 Tahu Inc., courtesy of S. Kelly, 1991. 
49Kelly, 1991: 36 
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During the late 1980's and early 1990's the Trust Board was becoming more 
irrelevant to the future direction Ngai Tahu was endeavouring to take. This 
direction aimed at the restoration of the legal identity of Ngai Tahu by statute 
and the establishment of a runanga-based tribal authority. Furthermore, Ngai 
Tahu wished to establish a structure where Ngai Tahu is accountable to itself 
rather than the Crown, O'Regan states 'an essential feature of tino 
rangatiratanga promised in the Treaty.'so 
In 1993, after receiving a tribal mandate by vote at the 1992 Hui-a-Tau at 
Kaikoura, the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Bill was introduced to Parliament, the 
bill languished for the next two and a half years. The Hon. Koro Wetere, 
representative for Western Maori at the time, during the Third Reading of the bill 
stated that the legislation should have been passed by the end of the year in 
which it was introduced.S1 He further maintained that the bill's three year 
gestation period 'is probably the second-longest running piece of Maori 
legislation that I have seen come to this House in my 27 years here.'S2 
Reasons for the delay in passing the bill was that it remained in the Maori Affairs 
Select Committee for what Ngai Tahu management believe was an 
unreasonable amount of time. The Ngai Tahu magazine Te Karaka recognised 
that in a tribe as diverse as Ngai Tahu there will be differing opinions on an 
issue such as the bill. However, Te Karaka maintained that Ngai Tahu 
parliamentarians deliberately employed delaying tactics to prevent the passage 
of the bill: 'it's common knowledge that the Ngai Tahu MPs for Southern Maori 
(Hon. Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan) and Auckland Central (Sandra Lee) are 
opposed to the Bill. Their attempts to subvert the Ngai Tahu Bill have demeaned 
500 'Regan, 1989:260 
51Wetere, 1996: 11947 
52 lbid. 
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themselves and the parliamentary process.'53 Their opposition, as reported in 
the 1996 Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Annual Report was evident 'right up until the 
very last. '54 
Primary reasons discussed for the MPs' opposition included Tirikatene-Sullivan's 
above mentioned disbelief that Ngai Tahu was actually lacking a legal identity. 
There was also the argument put forward by Lee that her hapu (Tai Poutini) 
does not want or need to be part of any centralised structure such as Te 
Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu. 55 Tirikatene-Sullivan also levelled the argument that 
there was a lack of adequate consultation with Ngai Tahu beneficiaries before 
the introduction of the bill to Parliament. This being the case, as asserted by 
Tirikatene-Sullivan, consultation of Ngai Tahu beneficiaries took up much of the 
Select Committee's time. 56 
All three reasons for the MPs' opposition are disputed by Ngai Tahu 
management. The Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act (1944) and the Ngai Tahu 
Trust Board Act (1946) did not establish a legal identity for Ngai Tahu. The Trust 
Board structure was merely a restrictive and alien imposition by the Crown on 
Ngai Tahu, bearing no relation to Ngai Tahu's legal identity except as an 
impediment. Second, the voluntary membership of two Papatipu Runanga from 
Lee's hapu of Te Tai Poutini, Kati Waewae and Makaawhio, seems to outweigh 
the argument that the hapu does not want to be part of a centralised structure. 
Third, Te Karaka magazine asserts that considerable time and effort was 
devoted to consulting and educating Ngai Tahu beneficiaries 'on all aspects of 
the Bill and Charter. '57 This included travelling to ten centres throughout the 
North and South Island for consultations with Ngai Tahu beneficiaries. This 
53Huria, 1996: 6 
540 'Regan and Crofts, 1996: 7 
55Lee, Submission to the Maori affairs Select Committee. 
56Tirikatene-Sullivan, 1996: 11949 
57 Huria, 1996: 6 
50 
effort culminated in Ngai Tahu who attended the 1992 Hui-a-Tau at Kaikoura 
voting 600: 1 in favour of the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Bill.58 
Chairman of the now Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, Charles Crofts, commented in 
the 1995 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Annual Report that the slow passage of 
the bill was a source of constant frustration to himself and his fellow runanga 
representatives. 59 However, Crofts maintained that, rather than remaining 
'hamstrung and at the mercy of the parliamentary system, 'Plan B' is now 
operational.'60 On January 20 1995 Te Runanganui 0 Tahu was placed in 
recess five years after its inception, and Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Limited was 
formed. Plan B involved the formation of this limited liability company. Each of 
the eighteen runanga representatives held one of the eighteen shares of this 
company. Here the idea of each runanga representative being a company 
director was born. Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Ltd., being a company, were given 
powers to own assets. However, this company was still not legally recognised 
as the tribal authority of the iwi while remained the Trust Board, divorced from 
any runanga representation and limited in its ability to own assets. 
Finally, on April 17 1996 the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Bill was read for a third 
time in Parliament. By the time of the Third Reading, bills are usually in the final 
stages of becoming an act, as was the case for the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu 
Bill. With the exception of Tirikatene-Sullivan, comments made by 
parliamentarians discussing the Bill were of a congratulatory tone. The Hon. 
Doug Kidd stated that 'in its passage through the House, Parliament and the 
Crown are re-establishing their recognition of the Ngai Tahu treaty partner. We 
58lbid. 
59Crofts, 1995: 26 
60lbid. 
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are restoring to Ngai Tahu that people's passport to the future.'61 The Prime 
Minister, Jim Bolger, maintained that: 
The Bill provides Ngai Tahu with a clear legal identity .... a 
structure crafted by Ngai Tahu to suit their purposes for both 
economic development and the provision of social services. So 
often commentators, politicians, parliamentarians and even 
Prime Ministers argue for Maori to show leadership in dealing 
with their own affairs. In this instance, I congratulate Ngai Tahu 
on doing exactly that. 62 
When Royal Assent was given on April 24, the Ngai Tahu Bill became an Act. 
On this day also, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board legally dissolved and in its 
place was Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, the runanga-based tribal executive. No 
longer did Ngai Tahu have a structure that was accountable to the Crown. It had 
a completely new organisational structure that was accountable to the Ngai 
Tahu Whanui. Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Ltd. was now just Te Runanga 0 Ngai 
Tahu. 
The 1996 Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Annual Report maintained that Ngai Tahu 
owes a debt of gratitude to Prime Minister Jim Bolger for 'securing the final 
passage of the legislation.'63 The report asserts that Minister for Treaty 
Negotiations, Hon. Doug Graham, 'had been almost completely thwarted by the 
parliamentary process and the Prime Ministerial intervention strengthened his 
arm considerably in moving the bill through the final stages. '64 One may assume 
-------~~~-----
61 Kidd, 1996: 11945 
62Bolger, 1996: 11948 
630 'Regan and Crofts, 1996: 7 
64lbid. 
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that the 'parliamentary process', referred to, was the delay experienced in Select 
Committee. 
Reflecting on securing the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu legislation in 1996, 
O'Regan maintained that this was 'the single most important act of his 
generation.'65 It opens the door to a Ngai Tahu derived representation of itself. 
This legislation allows Ngai Tahu to exercise control over its own assets in its 
efforts to attain tino rangatiratanga. Tino rangatiratanga, O'Regan states, will be 
sought after with the acknowledgment of the surrounding circumstances of New 
Zealand SOciety in the late 1990's.66 
650 , Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
66lbid. 
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This chapter examines the internal expression of rangatiratanga in Ngai Tahu's 
new organisational structure. It begins by outlining the mechanics of the 
organisational structure following its legal inception via the Te Runanga 0 Ngai 
Tahu Act (1996). The internal dynamics of the structure, both in theory and 
practice, are then discussed. The recent emergence of this organisational 
structure has a bearing on its performance. Currently, it is in a transitional phase 
between grievance mode and development mode, and these are intersected by 
preparations for a settlement. The transitional phase gives rationale as to why 
discrepancies exist between the theory and practice of the structure's internal 
dynamics. Since the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act, the new role of Te Runanga 
is to represent the collective rangatiratanga of the Ngai Tahu Whanui. This has 
created a feeling of antagonism for some Papatipu Runanga, who believe their 
rangatiratanga within the organisational structure is being ignored. 
The Mechanics of Ngai Tahu's Organisational Structure: 
A new organisational structure for Ngai Tahu was discussed in the 1980's. In 
April 1996 this structure officially replaced the existing Ngai Tahu Maori Trust 
Board 'which operated under successive governments for 50 years.'1 The new 
structure gave Ngai Tahu not only a legal identity, via statutory acknowledgment 
of the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act (1996), but the opportunity to 'control its 
own destiny.'2 Ngai Tahu iwi management and their governing body, Te 
Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu (Te Runanga), are now accountable to Ngai Tahu 
beneficiaries rather than the Crown Minister of Maori Affairs, as had been the 
case previously. The desire to be accountable to the beneficiaries was 
expressed by Ngai Tahu Social Development manager, Koa Mantell, who 
explained that in 1988 it was felt that the Trust Board had to go in order to 
achieve this. 3 
i Te Runanga a Ngai Tahu Annual Report, 1996: 22 
2lbid. 
3Mantell, Korero: 15-9-96 
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The mechanics of Ngai Tahu's new organisational structure has been presented 
to the Ngai Tahu individuals via annual reports, runanga hui, and within more 
public forums such as a university lecture.4 In diagrammatical form 
presentations reveal the theoretical hierarchy which exists in the structure. 5 The 
order of importance begins from the top down. Placed at the very top of the 
structure are the Ngai Tahu Whanui defined as: 'the collective of individuals who 
descend from the five primary hapu of Ngai Tahu and Ngati Mamoe, namely Kati 
Kuri, Kati Irakehu, Kati Huirapa, Ngai Tuahuriri and Kati Te Ruahikihiki.'6 The 
official census of 1991, as stated by Mantell, estimates the Whanui at 21,000. 
Mantell's working figure as of 1996 was a population of 25-26,000.7 As Rakiihia 
Tau has mentioned, not all Ngai Tahu have registered with Ngai Tahu iwi 
management for various reasons, including the conviction that some Ngai Tahu 
already know who they are and feel it is unnecessary to enrol with some 
seemingly ambiguous structure. 8 
Within the Ngai Tahu Whanui are the eighteen Papatipu Marae and their 
associated runanga. Runanga act to represent their beneficiaries and protect 
their interests. They are formed by beneficiaries connected to the takiwa, or 
district, and each other, by whakapapa. Runanga are incorporated societies, 
structured along what some would say, are Pakeha committee lines. 
Paradoxically, however, they institute and give expression to tikanga, or Maori 
customary law, and te kawa 0 te marae, or the traditional protocols of a specific 
marae. They have a chairman (Upoko Runanga), a deputy chairman (deputy 
4Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Annual Report 1995, 1996; Sewell, Korero: 16-9-96; Mantell, 
Korero: 15-9-96. 
5see Appendix 3. The Ngai Tahu Whanui in the diagram includes the 18 Papatipu runanga. 
60raft Charter, 1993: 3 
7Mantell, Korero: 15-9-96 
8R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-96 
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Upoko), treasurer, secretary and a runanga representative and alternate who 
are one of eighteen directors at T e Runanga. 9 
Stepping down a level, representing the eighteen runanga, is Te Runanga. 
Directors from the eighteen runanga represent and vote on their runanga's 
behalf.lO They are also required to act in the best interests of Ngai Tahu, in 
'good faith and in a manner that the runanga representative believes on 
reasonable grounds is in the best interests of Ngai Tahu Whanui as a whole.'ll 
Te Runanga itself, being the tribal governing body, is the 'repository of the 
collective tino rangatiratanga of the Ngai Tahu Whanui.'12 Te Runanga is the 
legal representative of the Ngai Tahu Whanui's collective interest. 13 It is also the 
legal holder of all Ngai Tahu assets and liabilities. 14 
Flowing directly down from T e Runanga is Ngai T ahu Group Management 
(Group Management). Group Management is the administrative arm of Te 
Runanga and acts on their behalf relaying its directives to the Ngai Tahu 
Development Corporation (Development Corporation) and the Ngai Tahu 
Holding Corporation (Holding Corporation).l5 Group Management encompasses 
the chief executive officer (CEO), whakapapa research, corporate services such 
as accounting and clerical staff, the monitoring of investments and public policy 
affairs. 
Branching out from Group Management are the two operational arms of iwi 
management. These are the Holding Corporation and Development Corporation. 
The official role of the Holding Corporation is 'to use on behalf of T e Runanga 
9, use the word chairman as only men are upoko. 
10Draft Charter, 1993: 5 
11,bid: 11 = notice the conflict between these two requirements. 
12lbid: 8 
13lbid. 
14lbid. 
15lbid: 13 
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the assets of T e Runanga allocated to it and prudently administer them and its 
liabilities by operating as a profitable and efficient business.'16 The Holding 
Corporation's 'direction comes in the main form of the CEO and the investment 
manager.'17 The primary function of the Holding Corporation is to rebuild Ngai 
T ahu's economic base via four major avenues: fisheries, properties, tourism and 
finance. I8 A fifth avenue involving forestry and farming may eventuate as an 
outcome of a settlement deal and as part of corporate Ngai Tahu's evolution. 
Part of the profit made from the companies within the Holding Corporation 
finances the Development Corporation. For example, out of Ngai Tahu 
Properties Ltd, 40% of the profit made is given to Development Corporation and 
the remaining 60% is invested back into property.19 Overseeing the functioning 
of the Holding Corporation is a Board of Directors comprising of six directors. 
These directors are appointed by Te Runanga due to their expertise in certain 
areas. The chairperson of the Holding Corporation directors is Sir Tipene 
O'Regan. 
The official role of the Development Corporation is: 
16lbid. 
to use prudently on behalf of Te Runanga the assets allocated to 
it and to administer them and its liabilities by pursuing in an 
efficient manner such social and cultural development objectives 
as may from time to time be approved by Te Runanga within the 
context of plans for the social and cultural development of Ngai 
Tahu Whanui.20 
17 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Annual Report, 1995: 18 
18Sewell, Korero: 16-9-96 
19lbid. 
20Draft Charter, 1993: 13 
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At the top of the Development Corporation's management structure is the CEO. 
The primary objective of the Development Corporation is the renewal of 
strength, both social and cultural, of the whanau, hapu and iwi. 21 Part of the 
renewal of this strength involves the allocation of finances produced by the 
Holding Corporation. Supplying the Development Corporation with its main 
direction are the two key executives, the Social Development Manager and the 
Runanga Development Manager. The Social Development Manager, oversees 
the delivery of education and health programmes. She also helps create an 
environment which aims to foster all aspects of Ngai Tahu and Maori culture 
both traditional and contemporary. 
One facet of the Runanga Development Manager's function involves relaying 
and developing communications between runanga and iwi management. The 
Runanga Manager also helps promote cultural development at this level. 
Like the Holding Corporation, overseeing the Development Corporation is a 
board of six directors. These directors too are appointed by Te Runanga for 
their expertise in certain areas. The chairperson of these directors is R. Tau. 
The Internal Dynamics of Ngai Tahu's Organisational Structure -
The Theory and The Practice: 
Te Runanga is still an extremely young organisation. It has barely been a year 
since its birth and the dissolution of the Trust Board. It would be a denial of 
reality to expect that all actions and dealings Te Runanga undertakes at this 
stage should be primarily faultless. As R. Tau maintains, 'any new structure will 
make mistakes.'22 From this perspective, then, I believe Te Runanga is 
undergoing a period of transition where new relationships are being forged and 
21 Mantell, Karero: 15-9-96 
22R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
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trialed, such as those between Te Runanga and iwi management. Furthermore, 
old relationships, such as those between runanga and a centralised iwi 
administration, are being re-connected within the design of a new structure. The 
boundaries are being defined and limitations discovered. 
During this transitional phase, T e Runanga has had to deal with many 
challenges, partly due to the recent emergence of the organisational structure. 
The Heads of Agreement, signed on October 5 1996, and the likelihood of a 
Deed of Settlement transpiring from this, is one amongst many. Perhaps the 
challenge issued by the Heads of Agreement may be the biggest Te Runanga 
will have to face for a very long time. 
The transitional phase began with Te Runanga's coming into being in April 
1996. It will continue throughout the time a settlement deal is negotiated and into 
the period where forms of allocation procedures are settled on. This transitional 
phase marks a change of paradigm for Ngai Tahu which entails the shifting of 
mind-sets. O'Regan has mentioned on a number of occasions that the shifting of 
mind-sets for Ngai Tahu means that Ngai Tahu can move 'out of grievance 
mode and into development mode.'23 Grievance mode has existed through the 
Ngai Tahu Claim for almost 150 years. The move into development mode 
involves finally settling the Ngai Tahu Claim and using the resultant financial 
injection to promote the social development of all Ngai Tahu individuals. 
However, before grievance mode can progress into development mode, 
constructive and inclusive debate throughout the iwi needs to occur. In other 
words, debate mode. This will serve to provide Ngai Tahu with a clear and 
relatively unified focus in a specific direction for the future. As O'Regan has 
230 'Regan, Korero: 15-9-96; 1994: 47 
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stated, 'people will only accelerate change if they are committed to principles.'24 
The challenge for Ngai Tahu is formulating those principles. Hence, the need for 
constructive and inclusive debate. Debate must be shared between all levels of 
the organisational structure and needs to take place in all of the appropriate 
forums. If the central administration intends to take the whole tribe into the 
future, the paramount forums for debate will have to be where the people reside. 
Primarily, these forums are runanga, and secondly, the runanga collective of Te 
Runanga. 
The transitional phase has a direct relationship to rangatiratanga. New 
relationships between runanga and Te Runanga will test the boundaries of 
where rangatiratanga, or in this context authority, lies with regards to each 
body's sphere of influence. The internal expression of rangatiratanga is being 
renegotiated and evolved according to the changing needs of Ngai Tahu as an 
iwi, such as its conglomeration of hapu into a single body known as Te 
Runanga. Between Te Runanga and iwi management, the body representing 
the collective tino rangatiratanga of runanga and, thus, the Ngai Tahu Whanui, 
is Te Runanga. They, as the mandated tribal leaders, will have to determine the 
appropriate role of iwi management. 
A shift in paradigm also means a shift of focus in relation to rangatiratanga. For 
Ngai Tahu, grievance mode meant that utu, remedy, was sought for 
rangatiratanga repressed and usurped by the Crown through breach of contract. 
Post-settlement development mode entails that the rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu 
individuals and therefore, of the iwi, is fostered. 
24,bid., 1994: 44 
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The Theoretical Dynamics of the Organisational Structure: 
During my interview with R. Tau, on a number of occasions he referred to how 
the dynamics of the organisational structure are to operate in theory. In the 
1980s R. Tau played a major role, not only in formulating the new structure, but 
in disseminating the theory of the new structure's dynamics to runanga. He 
conceived the idea of the House of Tahu.2S Thus, much of the following 
information on the theory of the organisational structure is gleaned from his 
interview. Outlining the theory of the structure will indicate discrepancies 
between its theory and practice. These are discussed below. 
Within the new structure, the role of runanga exists much as it always has from 
time immemorial in certain respects. The runanga - and its sacred place of 
existence - the marae, is where the rangatiratanga of collective whanau resides. 
It is the place where the rangatiratanga of the hapu is expressed. The runanga, 
and the takiwa in which it exists, has rangatiratanga - or in this context, 
chieftainship - over the district's affairs. This means that the runanga acts as 
kaitiaki, or guardian, and protector of their beneficiaries (that is, the collective 
whanau) rights within the runanga takiwa.26 Within the Ngai Tahu rohe there are 
eighteen such runanga. This translates, therefore, into eighteen relatively 
autonomous spheres of influence with regards to hapu affairs. 
During the 1980s, when preparations were being made to present the Ngai 
Tahu Claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, R. Tau emphasised to runanga that they 
would not lose rangatiratanga over their own local affairs. This was to be so 
even though the House of Tahu was being set up to collectivise all Ngai Tahu 
--... -.--.. ----
25The idea of House of Tahu was conceived by R.Tau in Ngai Tuahuriri's Wharenui during the 
mid-1980s. This was during solitary contemplation on the future of Ngai Tahu (R.Tau, 
Interview: 13-2-97). The House of Tahu is a concept rather than something concrete and 
tangible. The concept is that all Ngai Tahu organisations exist within the various rooms of the 
House. Ngai Tahu assets are then divided into the various organisations eXisting in the rooms. 
26Two definitions of a beneficiary and their inherent rights are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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organisations, including runanga, and the Ngai Tahu Claim was to be tribally 
administered. 
A number of reasons existed for this collectivised approach to the management 
of Ngai Tahu organisations. One was efficiency. It did not make sense to have 
eighteen separate administrative arms. For the eighteen runanga this would 
mean 'heavy administrative strains ... [and] heavy duplication of administrative 
effort. '27 
Another was that with one administrative structure, all efforts could be focused 
on fighting for the Claim. This also meant that one organisation could shoulder 
the financial burdens of running The Claim rather than runanga who do not have 
the resources. 
Furthermore, from the experiences of having one administrative organisation, R. 
Tau foresees that in the future runanga will be able to evolve more successfully 
into fully autonomous regions of administration. However, this will be a gradual 
process for runanga where new skills will have to be acquired to cope with new 
administrative demands. 
Thus, the rangatiratanga of runanga has been limited by the iwi. Administrative 
autonomy resides in Ngai Tahu's centralised organisational structure and not in 
runanga. Matters, such as negotiations with the Crown to settle the Claim, are 
also deemed to be of tribal importance and are conducted by the Negotiating 
Group rather than specific runanga managing specific areas of claim. 
Therefore, the role each of the eighteen runanga is to act as protector of 
beneficial interests within its takiwa in relation to local hapu affairs. This partly 
270'Regan, 1989: 261 
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involves scrutinising any T e Runanga directives and resource management 
actions of local area councils. 
As reflected by the hierarchical diagram of the Ngai Tahu organisational 
structure, the eighteen runanga are placed at the very top indicating that 'they 
are and should be the authority.'28 Theoretically, runanga are paramount in the 
organisational structure as all Ngai Tahu individuals have whanau and can be 
represented by runanga if they so desire. In turn, runanga embody the collective 
rangatiratanga of these whanau as mentioned above. The wants, needs and 
desires of beneficiaries are expressed at this level. A reason for Ngai Tahu's 
restructuring from the Trust Board to Te Runanga was to have greater runanga 
input into tribal policy via Te Runanga, and 'the tribes ... elected representatives 
be accountable to the tribe itself, in the form of the traditional runanga. '29 
Te Runanga, formed by directors representing the eighteen runanga, is the 
parliament that formulates iwi policy.30 Its eighteen directors represent eighteen 
discrete pockets of sovereignty because runanga have rangatiratanga over their 
local affairs. Here, then, Te Runanga illustrates an example of divisible 
sovereignty, where the central governing body is limited by, and must 
accommodate, eighteen other sovereigns. 31 
In theory, Te Runanga has the role of serving the best interests of the Ngai 
Tahu Whanui in which the eighteen runanga are its primary groups. This means 
that Te Runanga administers the assets and liabilities, as kaitiaki, of the Ngai 
Tahu Whanui. This entails that a high level of accountability to Ngai Tahu 
beneficiaries is required. Part of its function is to support and protect the 
28R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
290 'Regan, 1989: 260 
30lbid: 261 
31See Appendix 5 for a discussion of divisible sovereignty as it applies to the Treaty. 
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rangatiratanga of runanga32, as well as being the repository for the collective 
tino rangatiratanga of the Ngai Tahu Whanui, as stated in Section 3(a) of the 
Charter. It does all this by making tribal policy. Part of the support and protection 
of runanga rangatiratanga is in the allocation of resources, be it financial or 
some other form, to serve beneficiaries. 33 On the hierarchical diagram, Te 
Runanga is a step down from runanga, indicating its role, amongst others, of 
servitude to runanga. 
Te Runanga also acts as kaitiaki of, and represents, Ngai Tahu 
whanaungatanga, variously translated as kinship or 'cousinhood.'34 Kin 
relationships within the iwi are strengthened by having one representative and 
relatively uniting body, that is, Te Runanga. This helps Te Runanga to manage 
the relationships between runanga ensuring that no runanga 'unfairly prejudices 
or unfairly discriminates against any particular Papatipu Runanga.'35 Inter-
runanga relationships are managed on the assumption of shared goodwill. 
Iwi management, which includes Group Management, the Holding Corporation 
and the Development Corporation, as indicated by the hierarchical diagram, and 
are the servants of Te Runanga. The Holding Corporation and the Development 
Corporation are operated in line with the principle of clearly separating wealth 
accumulation and wealth distribution arms of the tribe. In this way, conflicts of 
interest between the two corporations roles are kept to a minimum. This 
principle is layed down by Te Kawenata 0 Ngai Tahu's Kaupapa Poutahu, in the 
Charter. 36 Their primary role is to provide information to Te Runanga so that it 
can create the appropriate policies in the interests of the eighteen runanga. 37 Iwi 
32R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
33lbid. 
34Cleave, 1983: 54 
35Draft Charter, 1993: 11 
36Te Kawenata 0 Ngai Tahu embodies six principles by which the Ngai Tahu organisational 
structure operates. It is reproduced in Appendix 4. 
37T. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
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management work for the betterment of the Ngai Tahu Whanui through 
research, monitoring and auditing. They ensure the protection of Ngai Tahu 
capital interests.38 These capital interests are not only financial, but also human, 
reflecting the work of both Holding Corporation and Development Corporation. 
The Practical Dynamics of the Organisational Structure: 
The following section highlights the struggle for the reaffirmation of runanga 
rangatiratanga and Te Runanga's expression of its new role in Ngai Tahu's 
organisational structure. 
While attending both runanga and Te Runanga hui during 1996, I observed an 
antagonistic relationship taking place between some runanga and Te Runanga. 
At the core of the antagonism is the struggle for reaffirmed rangatiratanga of 
runanga and the establishment of authority of Te Runanga as the repository of 
Ngai Tahu Whanui's collective tino rangatiratanga. I believe the antagonism is 
due to the transitional phase and has been exacerbated by the Heads of 
Agreement. The Heads of Agreement, which outlined agreements reached in 
principle between Negotiating Group and the Crown, demonstrated the practical 
dynamics of the Ngai Tahu organisational structure. The following discussion is 
a result of my participant observations at Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga hui, 
observations at 1996 Te Runanga hui, the 1996 Hui-a-Tau, and three interviews 
with different Ngai Tahu individuals. 
By way of introducing the runanga into the discussion of the practical dynamics 
within the Ngai Tahu structure, R. Tau gives a runanga perspective of how they 
regard themselves and the Ngai Tahu structure: 'the maraes are autonomous, 
they always have been and they are inward looking to their region.'39 
38R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
39lbid. 
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Ngai Tuahuriri the has grudgingly accepted centralised administrative concept of 
the House of Tahu. While it is agreed that the House of Tahu is more cost-
effective than having eighteen separate administrative bodies, it takes away a 
degree of autonomy over runanga affairs. Here, then, self-determination, an 
important aspect of rangatiratanga, of runanga and beneficiaries is limited as the 
allocation of finance is controlled by the Holding Corporation. 
For some runanga members, the growing concern is that settlement 
compensation, whether it be directly from the quantum or profit made from 
investments, will remain within the centralised structure of Ngai Tahu. It may not 
be used to actually remedy grievances whanau have harboured for generations, 
but used instead to finance business goals of Ngai Tahu's corporate structure 
and those within it. This concern is fed by the way in which the acceptance of 
the quantum and the Heads of Agreement took place without first consulting 
runanga. 40 The quantum of $170 million was accepted by Te Runanga in a 
closed session of their hui at Otakou. 41 This decision was regarded as one of 
great importance as it decided on a fixed sum to finalise the entire Ngai Tahu 
Claim, however, it received no runanga input. The Heads of Agreement was 
signed prior to any Te Runanga and runanga deliberations over its contents. 42 
This decision too was regarded as one of great importance as it layed down the 
very principles that Ngai Tahu were prepared to negotiate on. 
Reinforcing such concerns is that the quantum of $170 million, which 
collectivises the redress from the Crown, goes into the centralised Ngai Tahu 
40The Heads of Agreement, its contents and process of acceptance, is discussed more fully in 
Chapter 6. 
41 Ngai Tuahuriri hui: 7-9-96 
42R. Tau, Korero: 6-10-96 
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structure, rather than being applied directly to the grievances from the 10 deed 
areas where land was taken last century: 
There's a lot of mistrust against the negotiators, against Te 
Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, that we're building a castle for a selected 
few. It's been said all over the place, a special group of Ngai 
Tahu are getting all the benefits .... the only ones who don't 
believe it are the ones who are sitting there.43 
Thus, for some runanga beneficiaries, the appearance of their place within the 
Ngai Tahu structure is one of exclusion. Their rangatiratanga within their takiwa, 
where part of the Ngai Tahu Claim originates, is seemingly ignored by the 
organisational structure. 
As R. Tau has maintained, traditionally, if anybody tries to deny someone's 
rangatiratanga it is 'the basis for warfare.'44 In today's terms, then, if it is 
perceived by runanga that their rangatiratanga is being ignored, and thus 
denied, by a lack of inclusion in important decisions, this is the basis for some 
kind of radical action. Radical action from where runanga are positioned in the 
Ngai Tahu structure, R. Tau warns, is to break up the House of Tahu. This 
would mean that some runanga would seek to reach a settlement for the 
grievances within their takiwa alone. 45 Furthermore, they would autonomously 
administer themselves separately from the Ngai Tahu organisational structure. 
R. Tau believes that a bid for runanga autonomy at this stage would be 
premature.46 Hence, this underlines the need to include runanga in the 
organisational structure's decision-making processes. 
43R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
44lbid. 
45Ngai Tuahuriri hui: 16-2-97 
46R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
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In this transitional phase, misgivings have been expressed about Te Runanga's 
overall representativeness as 'the repository of the collective tino rangatiratanga 
of the Ngai Tahu Whanui.'47 I see this criticism as being constructive rather than 
destructive. Criticism is healthy and indicates new avenues to be analysed, 
considered and improved upon if perceived as valid and necessary. A 
discussion of this criticism follows. 
One concern I came across during this research is the perception that Te 
Runanga does not adequately fulfil the role of Ngai Tahu's iwi parliament and, 
thus, Ngai Tahu's tribal leaders. This directly impacts on the perceived ability of 
Te Runanga to be Ngai Tahu Whanui's repository of tino rangatiratanga. From 
the very implementation of Te Runanga, runanga representatives have been a 
'board of directors' rather than the representatives of the iwi. 48 Although this 
may seem trifling, as we are just dealing with terms of reference, within these 
terms assumptions can be made. One such assumption is that runanga 
representatives are primarily minders of Ngai Tahu, the corporate entity, rather 
than representatives of the Ngai Tahu Whanui. Section 6.6 of the Draft Charter 
maintains that each runanga representative acts as the runanga representative 
who attends, speaks and votes on the runanga's behalf. 49 This indicates that 
directors primarily represent the Ngai Tahu Whanui rather than corporate Ngai 
Tahu. 
Part of the role of Te Runanga is to be kaitiaki of the assets and liabilities of the 
Ngai Tahu Whanui. This naturally involves a corporate dimension. However, the 
primary role is to be 'representative of the collective tino rangatiratanga of the 
47 Draft Charter, 1993: 8 
48Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board Annual Report, 1995: 16 
49Draft Charter, 1993: 10 
69 
Ngai Tahu Whanui.'5o This involves the creation of tribal policy which not only 
endeavours to harness the majority of Ngai Tahu Whanui's wishes, but also 
involves the ability to give clear directives to primarily Group Management, and 
in turn, the Holding Corporation and the Development Corporation. On this issue 
Te Maire Tau, Director of Ngai Tahu Research Centre, maintains that: 
Once you change an MP [meaning a runanga representative] to 
Director, the whole imagery and illusion changes. They think 
they've got a commercial and fiscal responsibility, which they 
have, but first and foremost they are members of parliament. 51 
Thus, the wrong assumptions can be made out of a term of reference such as 
'director.' 
A number of other factors have been suggested which combine to hinder Te 
Runanga's performance as a tribal parliament. First, the directors themselves 
lack the lUxury of time to spend on issues of importance to Te Runanga. They 
are largely unpaid workers for Ngai Tahu, which means they have other full-time 
work away from iwi issues. The directors have to grapple with large amounts of 
information, involving complex issues, in a limited amount of time. 52 From this 
they not only have to consult and inform their runanga on issues of importance, 
but they also have to be in an informed position to create policy to direct Group 
Management. 
Second, the directors reside throughout Te Waipounamu, many of them hours 
away from Christchurch, where iwi management is conducted. Furthermore, 
they are hours away from each other. Each director is isolated, not only from 
50lbid: 8 
51T. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
52lbid. 
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informal contact and feedback from management structures, but also informal 
debate with a number of other directors. Human and academic resources, useful 
for reference on certain issues, are inaccessible in a short amount of time. 53 
Third is the communication breakdown between directors and their respective 
runanga. R. Tau maintains that with decisions of tribal importance agreed to with 
the Crown, 'there are unclear processes ... that Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu ... must 
go back to their beneficiaries, via their runanga, and get a mandate from their 
runanga to be approved at Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu level,'54 The rationale for 
this is to ensure that directors do in fact represent their runanga and vote 
accordingly at Te Runanga. Directors disseminating information to their runanga 
allow beneficiaries to deliberate over matters of tribal importance and adopt an 
informed position in order to instruct their directors. Observing this practice 
would mean that not only theoretically, but practically the Ngai Tahu Whanui 
would reside at the top of the organisational structure. Thus, the rangatiratanga 
of runanga over their takiwa is able to be expressed within the organisational 
structure. Runanga can also practically fulfil their responsibility of protecting the 
beneficial interests of their people by deciding whether or not to provide their 
director with a mandate for a certain decision. 
When communication breaks down between directors and their runanga, 
runanga are denied, not only critical information, but input into decisions. 
Basically, runanga are left out of the organisational structure. 
A primary factor contributing to a communication breakdown between Te 
Runanga and runanga, as suggested by O'Regan, may be the pressures of 
external timetables placed on directors. 55 As well as having to understand and 
53 ,bid. 
54R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
550'Regan, Commentary at Arowhenua Hui: 15-9-96 
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assimilate information dealing with complex issues in a short amount of time, 
directors are required to inform their runanga so they can help determine 
decisions of tribal importance. Practically, then, when time is unavailable to 
allow for directors to fully understand issues runanga are unlikely to be 
consulted. From a runanga beneficiary's perspective is the following: 
I feel that Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu have in a way failed. I can't 
blame them, its something that's happened. They haven't been 
aware of what was happening. They haven't gone back to their 
runanga to fully discuss all of the issues with nga runanga ... That 
would be partly one of the reasons why Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu 
has failed to ... be the voice of Ngai Tahu runanga.56 
O'Regan has acknowledged the occurrences of communication breakdowns 
with Ngai Tahu's beneficiaries. He warned that if there is no communication, 
Ngai Tahu risks losing the putea through a loss of tribal cohesion. 57 
Furthermore, he maintained that 'inadequate politics' will be the only thing that 
makes Te Runanga falter. 58 This could result from something as simple as a 
lack of communication. 
Te Runanga is now in a role of leadership as they are responsible for creating 
tribal policy, and thus, providing direction for the iwi. Te Runanga assumed this 
role suddenly on April 24 1996 when the Trust Board legally dissolved. Prior to 
that, O'Regan had been Trust Board Chairman since 1983,59 and in effect, he 
was one of two tribal leaders, according to T. M. Tau, who maintains that he 
has 'only seen two leaders in the tribe and that's Dad [R. Tau] and Steven 
56Te Aika, Interview: 7-1-97 
57 O'Regan, Korero: 21-9-96 
58lbid. 
59Melbourne, 1995: 154 
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[O'Regan].'60 In helping to create Te Runanga, O'Regan realised that 'the 
growth of a stable decision-making structure is critical if the iwi's assets are not 
to be placed at risk ... [particularly] when that same polity is carrying the assets 
for the next generation - nga hua mokopuna.'61 O'Regan further stated that one 
reason for dissolving the Trust Board was so that runanga, via Te Runanga, 
could be included in central Ngai Tahu's development plans for the future. 62 
This reinforced the argument for tribal cohesiveness. Through the creation of a 
decision-making structure, tribal direction would be preserved when the core 
decision-makers of O'Regan's generation, within the Trust Board, die out. 
Hence, the new structure would be a self-sustaining one. 
Therefore, following this logic, O'Regan has set about 'weaning' the iwi off his 
leadership. T e Runanga is now expected to evolve and grow into a leadership 
role: 
And that's his analogy .... Steven's trying to move out of the tribe. 
His real desire is to get the baby walking. He's slowly moving out 
but he's still got a baby and baby's don't know anything .... He's 
expecting the leaders to lead. Its an ideal thing where you just 
give them information and let them evolve and grow by 
themselves.63 
As it is still an early stage in Te Runanga's development O'Regan's theory is still 
being trialed. However, growth at present may be somewhat stunted if at the 
very outset various factors, as discussed above, combine to prevent directors 
from being adequately informed to create policy. As T. M. Tau states, with 
60T. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
61 O'Regan, 1994:46 
62Ibid., Karero: 15-9-96 
63T.M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
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regards to O'Regan's theory: 'It doesn't happen like that, you have to support 
and nurture people.'64 
During the development of Te Runanga's leadership skills, a leadership vacuum 
is created. Into this vacuum, logically, would step the next best option for 
leadership, which is Ngai Tahu iwi management. They are well informed on all 
Ngai Tahu issues as their work days are spent dealing with them. They are 
comprise Group Management, the Holding Corporation and the Development 
Corporation who together are the administrative and management structures 
designed to implement the directives of Te Runanga. In other words, as T. M. 
Tau suggests they are 'the bureaucracy.'65 
What seems to be occurring is that Te Runanga, still coming to grips with a new 
leadership role, are at present the passive leaders. In order to maintain the 
momentum of progress towards the goal of settlement of the Ngai Tahu Claim 
and corporate 'business-as-usual' ticking over, iwi management have become 
the active leaders. 
Iwi management have responded pragmatically adapting to the situation where 
tribal leadership, for the time being, is preoccupied with their new roles. Iwi 
management have assumed a substitute leadership role as highlighted by T.M. 
Tau: 
64lbid. 
65lbid. 
Runanga 0 Tahu and the bureaucracy aren't functioning the like 
they should. The bureaucracy's great, really, they're doing a 
stunning job. It's just they're not fettered ... they're not 
controlled .... They're very efficient. I know the bureaucrats there 
and they'll do what they're told. If you give them directions, 
they'll do it. It's just no one's giving them damn directions, so 
they have to create things for themselves. There's nothing 
underhanded going on.66 
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However, if this is the case, iwi management's relationship to the eighteen 
runanga, and thus Ngai Tahu Whanui, is indirect. They work on their behalf, but 
are not the mandated leaders as are Te Runanga. The signing of the Heads of 
Agreement, which works towards a deed of settlement, lends a good example of 
this. 
Spearheading the negotiations with the Crown are the Negotiating Group. They 
are an offshoot of Group Management. In an efficient manner, the goal of 
reaching a settlement in principle before the MMP election was attained on 5-
10-96 with only a week to spare. The desire to achieve this goal was discussed 
months before during a Te Runanga hui on 18-5-96.67 This was the Negotiating 
Group's agenda for the rest of 1996. Before Te Runanga deliberated on the 
contents of the Heads of Agreement, and runanga consulted by their director, 
the Heads of Agreement was signed. R. Tau, one of the principal negotiators, 
gives the process of how the Heads of Agreement came to be signed: 
There are unclear processes at Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu level. in 
terms of natural justice, concerning the beneficiaries. In that 
anything agreed to at the political level with the Crown should go 
back to Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, who in turn, must go back to 
their runanga and get the mandate from their runanga to be 
approved at Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu. Are those processes being 
66lbid. 
67 Goodall, Korero: 18-5-96 
followed? What has happened is that the members of Te 
Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu are making those decisions without 
consultation back to their ... runanga .... we [the Negotiating Group] 
are required to notify [Te Runanga], not by telephone 
conversation, but by a meeting. And then they had to get a 
mandate from each ... runanga. But that process did not take 
place. 
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Seeming to confirm the notion that iwi management, via the Negotiating Group, 
have taken up the role of leadership, submissions by runanga and individual 
beneficiaries in relation to the Heads of Agreement are deliberated on by the 
Negotiating Group. It will be their decision rather than Te Runanga's as to 
whether a submission warrants any action. On this issue Ngai Tuahuriri 
beneficiary, Mahara Te Aika, stated that: 
Whether they [Te Runanga] actually hold the power as far as the 
settlement goes is something else .... 1 rang the Claims Manager, 
Anake Goodall .... specifically, I wanted to know what were the 
procedures for people wanting to put submissions in .... Now I 
was quite interested in his replies which were 
that...submissions ... weren't going to Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu .... 
I said, "Who will make the decisions as to what is put in or left 
out?" 
And he said, "The negotiators will make those decisions".68 
In order to remain within a reasonable time frame, and maintain consistency of 
argument through having an intimate knowledge of what is available for 
negotiation, it seems to make sense that the Negotiating Group should have 
68Te Aika, Interview: 7-1-97 
76 
final arbitration over submissions. However, some believe that the collective 
wisdom of T e Runanga would be more appropriate for decisions which have a 
direct relationship to runanga rangatiratanga within their takiwa. In this way, 
mandated leaders fully accountable to runanga make the decisions rather than 
negotiators who are far less accessible and accountable to runanga. 
Another pOint of concern for some Ngai Tahu is the seeming conflict of interest 
that exists between Te Runanga and iwi management. Two directors of Te 
Runanga are also members of the Negotiating Group: 
There is now another person on that negotiating team who is 
also a member of Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, and yet where is the 
power supposed to lie? With Te Runanga, it doesn't. But a 
couple of members now have gone into where the power lies. Its 
interesting, curious.69 
An advantage of this is that first hand information on negotiations can be shared 
by the negotiating members of Te Runanga with the other directors. A 
disadvantage could be that the Negotiating Group may be able to exert undue 
influence in support of important decisions that have not been fully scrutinised 
by Te Runanga, and in turn, runanga. The fear is that Te Runanga, being a 
relatively new body with inexperienced directors still coming to terms with its 
demands, can be easily 'captured' by iwi management with greater corporate 
savvy. It is not argued that the directors are unwise, just currently vulnerable. 
After all, the Negotiating Group has relative 'heavy weights' working for them in 
regards to leadership skills and credentials. Not only do the two principal 
negotiators, O'Regan and R. Tau, have an inherent leadership legacy deriving 
from the Trust Board days, but 'among its closest strategic advisers [are] the 
69lbid. 
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celebrated Rogernomics exponents C. S. First Boston and ... the best legal brains 
in the country ... Bell, Gully, Buddie and Weir.'70 
Therefore, in an environment where there is a leadership vacuum, Te Runanga 
seems to be relying on those who offer the strongest and most convincing 
arguments. If this is the case, in place of well informed deliberations, and hence 
debate, Te Runanga substitutes the Negotiating Group's agenda of reaching a 
negotiated settlement with the Crown as part of its own policy objectives. At a 
Te Runanga hui, although speaking on a different subject, O'Regan suggested 
that there is a lack of debate at Te Runanga level. He maintained that Te 
Runanga has all the problems of a small nation such as New Zealand: all talk 
concentrates on the distribution of putea. However, there is no debate, and thus, 
a lack of principles formulated to focus on how distribution should take place. 71 
The Negotiating Group's agenda is: 
O'Regan's great theory ... you get the critical mass to take your 
tribe out of dependence ... His thing is you'll never get justice, 
once you accept that then you have to cut the best deal you can 
to get your tribe out of dependence mode.72 
However, achieving the best deals and a preoccupation with deadlines are the 
pitfalls of using the Negotiating Group's agenda in place of policy created by Te 
Runanga. The Negotiating Group are mandated negotiators rather than runanga 
consultants that help to accommodate rangatiratanga. Runanga consultancy is 
the job of Te Runanga. Highlighting the concern that Te Runanga is not creating 
policy R. Tau states: 'I believe that is part of the concerns of here [Ngai 
---------------
70Srett 1992' 58 
710'Re'gan, Korero: 21-9-96 
72T.M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
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Tuahuriri Runanga], that is management...is leading Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu 
and therefore overstepping their boundaries in terms of the rangatiratanga that 
is Tuahiwi's responsibility.m 
From this argument, then, it can be concluded that Te Runanga comply with the 
dictates of Negotiating Group's agenda and timetable. Decisions are not fully 
scrutinised, or measured up against, and checked for compliance with, tribal 
principles. Te Runanga endorse Negotiating Group's plans of action in order to 
adhere to their time frames. Runanga then find out about important decisions 
being made without prior consultation with their directors. This in turn precludes 
any runanga input and denies the organisational structure's recognition of where 
Ngai T ahu rangatiratanga actually belongs - with the people - as maintained in 
Te Kawenata 0 Ngai Tahu's Kaupapa Whakakotahi. 74 
Thus, from this perspective, when considering the hierarchical diagram, the 
internal relationships as described do not reflect reality. Iwi management 
working on behalf of Ngai Tahu have become the surrogate leaders. T. M. Tau 
maintains that O'Regan, whether reluctantly in the position or not, 'at the end of 
the day Steven [O'Regan] still leads. He calls the shots. He aint got no 
structure.'75 This implies that O'Regan's leadership is still apparent, and thus, 
the Negotiating Group's agenda, at present, is paramount. 
The implications of this situation for Ngai Tahu is that the structure designed to 
not only be 'accountable to the tribe itself, in the form of traditional runanga',76 
but led by Te Runanga which acts on behalf of a" runanga is not functioning as 
intended. In terms of rangatiratanga Te Runanga, the 'repository of the 
73R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
74Draft Charter, 1993. See Appendix 4. 
7ST. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
760 'Regan, 1989:260 
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collective tino rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu Whanui' is being denied. 77 
Furthermore, the rangatiratanga of runanga over affairs of importance within 
their takiwa is being ignored. Input by runanga to Te Runanga through their 
director is not operating as rigorous policy formulation by T e Runanga, often 
taking into account runanga perspectives, is not occurring. A beneficiary's 
perspective is summed up by the following statement: 
I'm looking at runanga. They are being told they are the voice of 
Ngai Tahu and that's where a big conflict arises because initially 
when I saw this structure being put up we were clearly told at our 
meetings ... that nga runanga would hold the power. The voice of 
the people would be there at the top. And then it would come 
down to Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu and then the corporate 
structure came underneath. But it's flipped over. And the people 
at runanga level have had the power taken away from them.78 
From this runanga perspective, then, when the Ngai Tahu organisational 
structure is thought to be dysfunctioning, the net effect is that misgivings are 
now being expressed over the Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act (1996) as follows: 
The power has been given to Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu through 
the Ngai Tahu Act. But whether they actually hold the power as 
far as the settlement goes is something else. 
(later) 
I feel that they [Te Runanga] have failed to be our voice. They 
have made deCisions without consulting the people and allowed 
the power to be taken from them by another group [Negotiating 
77 Draft Charter, 1993: 8 
78Te Aika, Interview: 7-1-97 
Group]. They haven't demanded accountability from that group. I 
think they should've .... But they have tended to be bogged down 
by a very Pakeha system/structure that has been placed on 
them .... 1 might be seeing it the wrongly, but this is the way I see 
it, that they have given away their power or allowed it to be taken 
from them as far as the negotiating for a settlement goes.79 
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Such misgivings are disheartening when considering that the Te Runanga 0 
Ngai Tahu Act (1996) gave back to Ngai Tahu its legal identity. Now, the 
opportunity has arisen for this identity to be destroyed again, but his time, 
internally. 
79 lbid. 
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An Overview of the Key Elements of the'Heads of Agreement: 
In an emotionally charged ceremony, on October 5 1996, a non-binding Heads 
of Agreement document was signed, Signatories were Treaty Negotiations 
Minister, Doug Graham, and Ngai Tahu negotiators, Sir Tipene O'Regan and 
Charles Crofts, After 147 years and five generations of Ngai Tahu claimants 
fighting for redress of grievances with the Crown, a non-binding settlement in 
principle was agreed upon between the Crown and Ngai Tahu negotiators, 
Notable in his signature's absence from the document was the other Principal 
Negotiator and Waitangi Tribunal claimant of the Ngai Tahu Claim, Rakiihia 
Tau. 
The absence of a key player's signature may barely raise an eyebrow in the 
public arena, but it does point to divisions within Ngai Tahu that arise out of 
settling the Ngai Tahu Claim along the proposed formula of the Heads of 
Agreement. This formula of will be examined in the first half of this chapter. The 
divisions will be discussed and analysed in the latter half. Finally, the concluding 
section will examine the implications the Heads of Agreement has for Ngai 
Tahu's approach to tino rangatiratanga. 
Far from being the final words of a Deed of Settlement mandated by the Ngai 
Tahu Whanui and ratified by Parliament, the Heads of Agreement records all 
matters agreed to in principle between the Crown and Ngai Tahu negotiators. l 
As has been emphasised at runanga hui and the 1996 Hui-a-Tau, the document 
is still open to negotiation and is not legally binding. Charles Crofts, Ngai Tahu 
B-team negotiator and Chairperson of Te Runanga, maintained (prior to the 
1996 MMP election) that Ngai Tahu are now positioned to continue negotiations 
with the Crown regardless of the shape of the new government. 2 Evidence of 
lWhanui describes the collective of Ngai Tahu beneficiaries 
2Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga hui: 1-10-96 
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the Heads of Agreement's non-binding nature has already occurred in Ngai 
Tahu's proposal to review the settlement's quantum when the new coalition 
government announced it would drop the one billion dollar fiscal cap. 3 Following 
this, negotiations continued between the Crown and Ngai Tahu throughout the 
majority of 1997 drawing up the legal detail for an impending settlement. 
Within the Heads of Agreement formalities to be included in a Deed of 
Settlement is a full, formal, public apology from the Crown in both Maori and 
English. O'Regan stated that 'there will be an apology and full recital of all the 
relevant sins. '4 The apology the Crown will admit that it 'acted unconscionably 
and committed repeated breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi ... [and] express 
profound regret. '5 
For Ngai Tahu's part, there would have to be the acknowledgment that 'the 
Crown has acted honourably and reasonably and the settlement is fair and 
final.'6 For many Ngai Tahu, this acknowledgment includes the most 
controversial statement in the Heads of Agreement that a settlement would be 
considered 'a comprehensive, full and final settlement of Ngai Tahu's historical 
claims.'7 This means that, on enactment of a Deed of Settlement, all historical 
grievances based on loss prior to September 21 1992 'whether or not the claims 
have been researched, registered or notified' are extinguished. 8 These include 
customary rights which were breached or remain directly uncompensated by the 
3 The Press: 14-12-96 
4Keene, The Press: 5-10-96 
5Heads of Agreement Summary, 1996: Nov. 
6Heads of Agreement, 1996: 25 
7lbid. 
8lbid: 21. Claims lodged that deal with breaches after September 21 1992 (even if they are 
Sept. 22 1992) are considered contemporary claims. The significance of this date is due to the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act (1992) coming into force on this day. The 
thinking was that the Government, by using this date as the cut-off point for historical 
grievances, could then off-set the value of the fisheries settlement (approximately $170 million) 
against the fiscal envelope (Crown Proposals, 1994: 9). This date is irrelevant now that the 
fiscal cap has been removed. 
84 
Crown in individual deed areas from the land purchases last century. Such 
grievances are to be redressed by the collectivised Ngai Tahu settlement and 
the benefits arising out of this. The right of any Ngai Tahu claimant seeking 
redress for historical loss will be removed. However, this does not include claims 
related to language or culture. 
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal, or any other redress 
arena, will be removed so as to prevent a review of the settlement legislation 
relating to its validity and adequacy of redress. Finally, the upshot of the 
extinguishment of rights will be that, not only will all Ngai Tahu claims prior to 
September 21 1992 be considered settled, but the Crown will be deemed 
'released and discharged' from any duty of redress for historical claims.9 
It must be added, however, that the Heads of Agreement maintains that the 
settlement does not 'diminish or in any way affect the Treaty of Waitangi or any 
of its articles or the ongoing relationship between the Crown and Ngai Tahu in 
terms of the Treaty or undermine any rights under the Treaty of Waitangi 
including rangatiratanga rights.'l0 Thus, the Ngai Tahu's right to defend 
customary rights from September 21 1992 against future breach has been 
protected in the Heads of Agreement. 
Under a settlement Ngai Tahu receives a quantum of $160 million. This is offset 
against an earlier payment of $10 million on-account which was paid to Ngai 
Tahu on June 17 1996. According to Treaty Negotiations Minister, Doug 
Graham, this was in demonstration of the Crown's goodwill to negotiate a 
9,bid: 22. An entrenched Treaty of Waitangi would prevent the legality of such a clause. The 
riaht of a Ngai Tahu New Zealander to go to court would be safeguarded. 
1 Ibid: 23. Rangatiratanga rights referred to by the Crown means those ongoing rights 
guaranteed by the Treaty. Rangatiratanga is defined in terms of ownership of assets rather 
than an exhaustive definition that includes spiritual and individual dimensions as referred to in 
Chapter 2. 
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settlement. I I The interim settlement, as it became known, also provided that the 
Crown vest in Ngai Tahu all pounamu, greenstone, on the West Coast and the 
Tutaepatu Lagoon at Woodend, North of Christchurch. 12 
A more cynical view of the interim settlement would suggest that, rather than a 
show of the Crown's goodwill, it was an effort to prevent adverse publicity 
condemning Crown actions and the ensuing public outcry. 13 The $10 million was 
used to persuade Ngai Tahu to suspend court proceedings against the Crown 
and resume negotiations. The case of Tau v Durie (Durie is chairperson of the 
Waitangi Tribunal), pending on June 17, might have exposed collusion between 
Durie and a Crown Minister to the disadvantage of Ngai Tahu. This could have 
highlighted the Crown's apparent lack of separation of powers between the 
judiciary and legislature, so the Crown was keen to have the case suspended, at 
a price, and negotiate. 14 
Within the Heads of Agreement two settlement mechanisms were outlined on 
which the quantum could be spent. The first, and probably the more valuable, is 
the Deferred Selection Procedure (DSP) valid for only 12 months after the 
settlement legislation is enacted, and is limited to an agreed list of Crown 
assets. These assets are not surplus assets but are of current value to the 
1110sefa, The Press: 18-6-96 
12The Tutaepatu Lagoon is wahi tapu, or, a place held in reverence according to tribal custom 
and history (Tau and Goodall et al.,1990: 4.25) for Ngai Tahu. Part of the old lagoon was a 
major urupa once adjoining Kaiapoi Pa. 
13This cynical view is justified, as O'Regan at the Hui-a-Tau maintained, one can never rely 
on the Crown to do a certain action because its honourable, it always has to be enforced 
(Korero: 23-11-96). This opinion was undoubtedly formed from the numerous battles O'Regan 
has been involved in with the Crown and on behalf of Ngai Tahu. 
140'Regan, Lecture: 27-5-96. The separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary 
is crucial in order to maintain the principle of the impartiality of the law. This principle lies at the 
very foundation of the legal system (Harris, 1989: 35). The separation of powers is discussed in 
Appendix 5. 
Tau v Durie is still lodged with the High Court as an insurance measure should negotiations fail 
(R.Tau, Interview: 13-2-97). With the draft Deed of Settlement under way the case is less likely 
to be used. If Ngai Tahu choose to renegotiate the case still exists. However, the political 
leverage Ngai Tahu may have had having this case pending before the election would not be 
as great. 
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Crown. Thus, their actual worth is known. Ngai Tahu can spend up to $200 
million ($170 million from the quantum and interim settlement and up to $30 
million of its own funds) purchasing these assets at market value. 
The second mechanism is the Right of First Refusal (RFR) which is already in 
operation and has been used in purchases such as the Wigram Airbase. This 
mechanism gives Ngai Tahu the right of first refusal to largely surplus Crown 
assets within the Ngai T<;ihu rohe. RFR is in operation in perpetuity. 
The Heads of Agreement maintains that a Deed of Settlement will provide a 
relativity clause, which means that if the $1 billion cap is adjusted up or 
removed, Ngai Tahu will receive top-up payments onto its $170 million quantum. 
This appears to inherently accept the fiscal envelope after Ngai Tahu's public 
rejection of it in 1995. Fears that Ngai Tahu has accepted the fiscal envelope 
are increased by reports that the former 'Government is managing to keep within 
its controversial fiscal envelope policy.'IS Since the announcement of the new 
coalition government's policy to remove the fiscal cap, and Ngai Tahu's 
publicised desire to now review the quantum, this clause may already be proving 
useful. 
As outlined by the Heads of Agreement, Ngai Tahu successfully negotiated 
other government concessions. These were, first, title to the Lake Wakatipu 
High Country Stations: Elfin Bay, Greenstone and Routebourne. These come 
with a number of qualifications, however, such as gifting certain areas back to 
the Crown due to their 'high conservation values.'16 
15Keene, The Press: 5-10-96 
16Heads of Agreement Summary, 1996: Nov. This qualification may be illustrating a more 
general malaise in New Zealand society with regards to Maori and conservation. At a public 
meeting with Treaty Negotiations Minister, Doug Graham, members of the public were invited 
to discuss recreational and conservation issues relating to the proposed settlement of Ngai 
Tahu's historic Treaty claims. This meeting was also attended by Principal Negotiators, 
O'Regan and R.Tau. The more outspoken members of the public were mainly from interest 
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Second, Ngai Tahu receives freehold title (ownership) to Rarotoka (Centre 
Island) and the Crown Titi Islands. A Deed of Recognition for Whenua Hou 
(Codfish Island) will be granted to Ngai Tahu, giving them access to, and 
management of, this Island but not the title. 
Briefly, other matters addressed in the Heads of Agreement were: the ownership 
of the Arahura Valley granted to Ngai Tahu, mahinga kai entitlements, formal 
recognition of Ngai Tahu place names such as Aoraki, Ngai Tahu membership 
on conservation boards, and the finalisation of the 33 ancillary claims for 
inclusion in the Deed of Settlement. The ancillary claims are largely where 
individuals have lodged claims as part of the Ngai Tahu Claim. 
Altogether Crown transfers of the conservation estate add up to approximately 
630 hectares. This figure does not include lake beds and riverbeds or the high 
country stations. In his address to the public meeting discussing conservation 
issues (referred to in footnote 16), Doug Graham stated that 'those people who 
thought it would be thousands and thousands of hectares are wrong.'17 In 
reality, Ngai Tahu are receiving small isolated pockets of land due to their 
traditional/cultural and spiritual significance. In this respect, then, the Heads of 
Agreement provides an amount of certainty and dispels any public fears that 
Ngai Tahu will receive vast tracts of land (including private) as part of a 
settlement. Such erroneous public beliefs, such as the aforementioned, directly 
contradict how Ngai Tahu/Crown negotiations are conducted. As has already 
groups such as the Forest and Bird Protection Society. These groups expressed concern about 
Ngai Tahu's 'ability' to protect native flora and fauna. These concerns seemed particularly 
ironic. Ngai Tahu responded by asking the question of why ethnic arrogance pervades many in 
these conservation societies who believe, judging by the concerns raised, that 'only 
conservation people understand conservation' (R.Tau, Korero: 18-9-96). R.Tau pointed out that 
it was Pakeha farmers who originally destroyed the high country and not Ngai Tahu who had 
been practicing conservation in mahinga kai techniques for centuries prior. 
1? The Press: 19-9-96 
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been mentioned, O'Regan made it clear at the 1996 Hui-a-Tau, that any 
concessions Ngai Tahu receive are not through the Crown's honour, but as a 
result of being forced, regardless of the righteousness of the concession. 18 
A requirement within the Heads of Agreement is for T e Runanga, as 
representatives of Ngai Tahu, to obtain a mandate to settle from the Ngai Tahu 
Whanui. In order to achieve this mandate, Te Runanga has currently 
undertaken a six stage consultative process provided in its own summary 
document of the Heads of Agreement. The document is outlined by the 
following: 
Stage 1. On November 2-3, 1996, Runanga representatives and alternates of 
Te Runanga met to discuss the Heads of Agreement in an extraordinary general 
meeting. The Te Runanga directors received the lengthy document during this 
hui and resolved that: 
1. The Heads of Agreement dated October 5 1996, signed by Sir 
Tipene O'Regan, the Chairman of Ngai Tahu Negotiating Group, 
on behalf of TRONT, and the Hon. Doug Graham, Minister in 
charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, on behalf of the 
Crown, be ratified. 
2. The Ngai Tahu Negotiating Group be authorised to enter into 
formal negotiations with the Crown to settle the terms of the 
Deed of Settlement of the Ngai Tahu Claims. 19 
180 'Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
19Resolution fax: 11-11-96 
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Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga members received notification of the ratification of the 
Heads of Agreement by Te Runanga, which occurred on November 2-3, a week 
later on November 11. This was by way of a Resolutions fax circulated by the 
Deputy Upoko of the Runanga, Rakiihia Tau. The dissemination of this 
information was only made possible by virtue of R. Tau's position within the Ngai 
Tahu structure as Principal Negotiator. The rest of Ngai Tahu found out some 
time later that the Ngai Tahu Negotiating Group and Te Runanga were already 
at stage 2. 
Stage 2. The Ngai Tahu Negotiating Group (Negotiating Group) and Crown 
negotiators will take the Heads of Agreement to settlement stage by drafting a 
Deed of Settlement. 20 
During the 1996 Hui-a-Tau, held over the weekend of November 22-24, Ngai 
Tahu members were given the rationale by the Negotiating Group for Te 
Runanga's ratification of the Heads of Agreement. This was also an opportunity 
for the Negotiating Group to present its preferred option to Ngai Tahu members, 
that is, the acceptance of the Heads of Agreement. 
Stage 3. This is when the final contents of the Deed of Settlement will be 
accepted by the Ngai Tahu negotiators and the Crown. Formal negotiations 
between Ngai Tahu and the Crown will have been completed. The Deed will be 
taken on a 'roadshow' throughout the North and South Islands for consideration 
by members of Ngai Tahu. 
Stage 4. Each of the approximately 16,60021 registered Ngai Tahu members will 
be posted information covering the essential elements of the Deed. 
20Heads of Agreement Summary, 1996: Nov. 
21MacFie, 1997: 100 
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Stage 5. Every registered Ngai Tahu member (18 years and over) will cast a 
postal vote for or against the Deed of Settlement. 
Stage 6. Te Runanga will consider the Deed of Settlement taking into account 
the results of the postal ballot and any feedback from the road shows as reported 
by the Negotiating Group. Te Runanga will then make the final decision as to 
the acceptability of the Deed.22 
Divisions Arising from the Heads of Agreement: 
As a result of the 1996 Hui-a-Tau weekend and participant observation at Ngai 
Tuahuriri Runanga hui, I have identified two distinct camps which favour 
different settlement alternatives. 23 These two camps exist in an antagonistic 
relationship within Ngai Tahu at present. One camp, the negotiation camp, 
favours a negotiated settlement which provides for a collectivised redress of 
beneficial rights to the Ngai Tahu Claim. The core of the Ngai Tahu 
organisational structure are in this camp. Naturally, with the backing of the tribal 
parliament (Te Runanga), iwi management, Principal Negotiator and visionary 
leader - Sir Tipene O'Regan - this camp is prevailing. By this I mean that the 
Ngai Tahu organisational structure is fully resourced towards, and currently 
working on, a draft Deed of Settlement with the Crown.24 
The other camp favours renegotiating with the Crown to establish direct 
remedies for each of the ten deed areas in which the Crown breached contract 
last century. Ngai Tahu beneficial rights, that is, the right of Ngai Tahu 
individuals to benefit, are directly addressed according to the Ngai Tahu Claim 
-------- ----
22Heads of Agreement Summary, 1996: Nov. 
231 am aware that not all Ngai Tahu align to a specific camp I have identified. Some may align 
to either depending upon which point is at issue. In the absence of a survey of all registered 
Naai Tahu members, these are my general observations. 
2 Smith, Christchurch Mail: 27-1-97 
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area in which they belong. If renegotiation breaks down, then the option of 
litigation will be taken up. In this case, a deed (or deeds) of settlement under 
court order with the Crown will take place. For ease of reference I refer to this 
camp as the litigation camp. Within each of the ten deed areas beneficial rights 
align to specific runanga, which form from a hapu or a number of hapu within its 
takiwa. Runanga represent the hapu conglomerate and act in the interests of its 
beneficiaries. In this camp are a number of individual runanga beneficiaries, that 
is, the 'flax root' Ngai Tahu. 2s Support for this camp comes from the other 
Principal Negotiator, Upoko of Ngai Tuahuriri and 'Father of The Claim',26 
Rakiihia Tau. These two camps identified are ones I have artificially created to 
enable the conceptualisation of two dominant perspectives in Ngai Tahu. 
In an article released in July this year by North and South magazine findings 
were generally similar to the major divisions within Ngai Tahu identified above. 
This article distinguishes between those who support the negotiated settlement 
along the lines of the Heads of Agreement, and those who would rather 
prosecute the claim through the courts. Supporters (who I have named the 
negotiation camp) regard that the Heads of Agreement proposals, as stated by 
O'Regan, as a 'sufficient foundation on which to build a future.'27 Detractors (the 
litigation camp) regard that the Heads of Agreement proposals are inadequate in 
terms of utu, or remedy, brought to bear on the Crown and demand litigation for 
a just outcome.28 
Immediately represented in these two camps are the opposing views of the 
Principal Negotiators, O'Regan and R. Tau. Each has a differing philosophy with 
respect to rangatiratanga, and each can claim they have as much right on their 
250'Regan, Karero: 21-9-96 
26Te Aika, Interview: 7-1-96 
27McFee, 1997: 100 
28lbid. 
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side as the other. For O'Regan his approach is coloured by the notion that 
rangatiratanga must now take into account the reality of the surrounding 
circumstances of modern New Zealand society. This includes using modern 
circumstances, such as New Zealand's market economy, to Ngai Tahu's 
advantage where possible. For R. Tau, while wanting to embrace the realities of 
a modern society, believes that actions of the centralised Ngai Tahu structure 
must still observe tikanga, or traditional Maori law. Such fundamental 
differences divide these two camps. 
An illustration of the divisions arising over the Heads of Agreement are outlined 
in this section. These divisions indicate the existence of differing approaches to 
tino rangatiratanga in Ngai Tahu which are analysed in the final section of this 
chapter. 
A major issue of division is the issue of the extinguishment of beneficial rights. 
The negotiation camp represents the collectivised beneficial rights of Ngai Tahu 
iwi. It defines a Ngai Tahu beneficiary as anyone who can 'trace at least one line 
of descent back to one of the original kaumatua alive at the time of 1848', in 
other words, has Ngai Tahu whakapapa.29 Armed with this definition, which is 
inclusive of all Ngai Tahu members, the negotiation camp negotiated the Heads 
of Agreement with the Crown for the collective benefit of Ngai Tahu iwi.30 
Distinctions are not made according to the relative loss of particular hapu, as 
proven by the Waitangi Tribunal, nor are losses compensated directly. For 
example, the losses Ngai Tuahuriri incurred for the land the Crown failed to set 
29Caldwell, Whakapapa: 3 
30The collective ownership of assets reminds me of Hardin and Baden's (1977) argument 
behind the 'The Tragedy of the Commons', and aligns to the fears of some Ngai Tahu. This is 
where property held in common is not looked after by anyone. Translated into the current fears 
of some Ngai Tahu, if there are no clearly defined lines of allocation of the putea, or tribal 
assets, then it is more likely to be mismanaged. Mismanagement in this context would be to 
the benefit of Ngai Tahu's management sector rather than the beneficiaries. 
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aside between the Waimakariri and Kawari Rivers receives no direct 
compensation. 
If and when a settlement is achieved, it will extinguish all claims 'founded on 
rights arising in or by the Treaty of Waitangi, the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, statute, common law (including customary law and aboriginal title), 
fiduciary duty or otherwise' prior to September 21 1992.31 Possibility for direct 
redress for Ngai Tahu claims of beneficiaries relating to specific runanga, such 
as Wairewa and Ngai Tuahuriri, though proven in the Waitangi Tribunal, will 
thus be extinguished. 
Claims by specific runanga will be redressed indirectly by the $170 million 
quantum. As mentioned at the 1996 Hui-a-Tau by Claims Manager, Anake 
Goodall, once the quantum is at their disposal, it will then be up to Ngai Tahu's 
internal structures to 'sort out an equitable allocation' for runanga. 32 This 
process then has the possibility of taking into consideration the relative losses of 
each runanga. The form in which the allocation of compensation will take place 
is unknown at this stage. On the understanding that the quantum will be used to 
purchase Crown assets, via the settlement mechanisms, compensation may 
take the form of an allocation of shares to each runanga. 33 There is also the 
likelihood of grants to runanga beneficiaries who apply to the social 
development arm of Te Runanga, thus keeping much the same allocation 
system that exists at present. 
The negotiation camp gives priority to the common good of the iwi rather than 
individual beneficiary interests. At the 1996 Hui-a-Tau Goodall maintained that 
Ngai Tahu 'ten or fifteen years ago agreed that the Claim would be run as a 
31 Heads of Agreement, 1996: 21 
32Goodall, Korero: 23-11-96 
33T. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
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tribal claim ... ruling out deed by deed compensation.'34 One reason for this is a 
practical one: due to multi-hapu, and thus runanga, affiliation of many Ngai Tahu 
members 'iwi is the only thing you can get a ring around.'35 By this reasoning, 
individuals' whakapapa often cross the boundaries of various hapu, thus 
complicating compensatory measures for runanga beneficiaries. 
A fear O'Regan has spoken about on various occasions, which also sheds light 
on why he rejects direct settlement compensation to beneficiaries, is the plight 
of an Alaskan tribe. After this tragic settlement, in only 7 years $16.8 billion was 
whittled away due to tribal division leading to separate investments. 36 This 
Alaskan experience supplies O'Regan with proof that if there is a loss of 
cohesion within the tribe there is also a loss of money. More importantly, the 
vision of new potential for the tribe is lost. Thus, O'Regan admits that he is 
'scared about what building can be done ... [as there is] never more opportunity 
but never more risk. '37 
For the litigation camp, beneficial rights exist by virtue of those handed down by 
one's parents and, before them, tipuna. They are inherited property rights giving 
interests in a certain area (or areas) of land. These rights give one 
turangawaewae, or speaking rights on the marae by virtue of property 
ownership in the hapu takiwa. Like the property rights Pakeha are familiar with, 
beneficial rights lodge in the senior members of a whanau, such as the parents. 
They are owned by the parents until death at which time they are passed on to 
their children who then hold the beneficial rights. A number of whanau can hold 
beneficial rights in an area of land as whakapapa nets, or family trees, naturally 
spread. Thus, rather than a Ngai Tahu beneficiary being defined as any person 
34Goodall, Korero: 23-11-96 
350 'Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
360 'Regan, Korero: 15-9-96; 23-11-96. 
37lbid: 21-9-96 
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who can whakapapa back to an 1848 kaumatua, as defined by the negotiation 
camp, beneficial rights are dependent on inherited property ownership in a 
certain runanga takiwa. This definition is exclusive. As maintained by R. Tau, 
some kaumatua in 1848 had no ownership rights in deed areas. Hence, their 
descendants also have no property rights. The litigation camp's definition of a 
beneficiary was given at Ngai Tahu's Waitangi Tribunal hearing in R. Tau's 
statement of claim.38 
Whether renegotiating the Ngai Tahu Claim or taking it to court to settle deed by 
deed area using the findings of the Waitangi Tribunal, runanga beneficiaries 
receive direct redress for their losses. Beneficial rights are not collectivised and 
equalised but redressed according to the merits of each set of beneficiary cases 
as presented by runanga. The beauty of litigation, if resorted to, is that all 
mechanisms used to reach a certain finding are transparent and spelt out. This 
is unlike negotiations, where deals may be struck, in what appears to those 
outside the Negotiating Group to be ambiguous ways. With favourable findings 
for the benefactors, justice in court can be seen to be done. Loss in terms of 
property rights are quantifiable for this purpose, so those beneficiaries who 
suffered greater property losses will receive more compensation than those who 
suffered less property loss. 
In answer to the negotiation camp's argument of the common good, the litigation 
camp asks 'can an individual who has no rights in a certain area extinguish the 
rights of beneficiaries who do?'39 To this question the litigation camp answer 
with an emphatic 'no.' The situation where non-beneficiaries to a certain area 
extinguish beneficiary rights within that area will prevail if Ngai Tahu reach a 
38R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
39Ibid., Korero: 18-11-96 
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settlement along the lines of the Heads of Agreement. Settlement involving 
collectivised beneficial rights for the common good can not do otherwise. 
Postal voting for every Ngai Tahu member will bring this concern of the litigation 
camp into fruition. Not only will beneficiaries be able to vote in areas where they 
possess no ownership rights, but Ngai Tahu members who do not have 
ownership rights to any area will be able to vote on a settlement. In R. Tau's 
estimation, and in that of other beneficiaries, it is offensive that non-owners to a 
certain deed area can vote to extinguish rights of owners. As he stated, this 
situation is 'undemocratic, unconstitutional and contrary to Treaty principles. '40 
R. Tau maintains that for a just settlement there needs to be a remedy applied 
to the specific deed area. Beneficiaries to the deed area should then be able to 
vote on whether the remedy is acceptable or not. Thus, rights of individual 
beneficiaries to the appropriate deed area are expressed and not infringed 
upon.41 Ngai Tahu iwi cannot give away the rights of beneficial owners, allowing 
non-owners to vote, when these rights do not belong to the iwi but to the 
individual. 
For the litigation camp, the Heads of Agreement will do what the Sealord Deal 
did in relation to beneficiary rights. One reason why R. Tau refused to sign the 
Heads of Agreement harks back to his signing of the Sealord Deal, which he 
now regards as a mistake.42 It collectivised beneficial rights into a pan-Maori 
settlement (the Heads of Agreement is pan-hapu, but the parallel is clear), 
extinguishing the rights of individual beneficiaries. Now Ngai Tahu beneficial 
rights to commercial fishing assets are tied up in court due to the ensuing 
distribution battles between Ngai Tahu, some northern iwi and Urban Maori 
40Ibid., Interview: 13-2-97 
41 lbid. 
42Ibid., Korero: 24-11-96 
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Authorities (UMAs).43 Even though the Heads of Agreement is pan-hapu, R. 
Tau refuses to make the same mistake twice. 
Another source of division is the settlement quantum of $170 million. Through 
breaches of contract which ended in Ngai Tahu losing approximately 1.38 million 
hectares 'estimates have put the loss to the tribe ... at $20 billion.'44 It was 
conceded by the negotiation camp on a number of occasions that the value of 
the agreement is not just. 45 Justice would mean the Crown compensating '$16-
$20 billion.'46 The negotiating camp accept, however, that $170 million is a 
'sufficient base to build upon ... [and] it's as good as we're going to get.'47 
O'Regan himself concedes that he 'hates giving up on utu but wants Ngai Tahu 
to have a future.'48 As has already been stated by Te Runanga Chairperson, C. 
Crofts, 'only a fool would suggest they [the full value of the tribe's losses] should 
be met. We have no wish to bankrupt or damage the society and economy in 
which we want to prosper.'49 
The negotiation camp's vision of the future for Ngai Tahu is, as stated by 
O'Regan, "to recapitalise my tribe within its own landscape', win sufficient 
compensation from the Crown ... in order to rebuild the tribe's economic base."50 
Thus, developing a sustainable base for the social development of the iwi and 
its members. This vision is not only one for the future but a means of survival at 
present. As mentioned above Ngai Tahu is embroiled in a battle with some 
northern iwi and UMAs over the distribution of fisheries assets, most of which 
43The distribution battles in court between iwi in the wake of the Sealord Deal may be 
foretelling the distribution battles in court Te Runanga may face without clear methods of 
allocation to runanga and beneficiaries. 
44Keene, The Press: 5-10-96 
45Mead, Korero: 23-11-96; Goodall, Korero: 23-11-96; O'Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
460'Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
47lbid. 
48lbid. 
49Keene, The Press: 20-4-95 
50Srett 1992' 59 , . 
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exist in the Ngai Tahu rohe. The High Court has ruled in favour of allocation 
according to a traditional tribal property basis, as Ngai Tahu argued, as this is 
consistent with the Treaty. However, if the UMAs appeal against this decision 
for a population basis of allocation succeeds, this would mean Ngai Tahu would 
lose the majority of fisheries assets within its own rohe. Recapitalisation of Ngai 
Tahu within its own landscape would be that much harder to achieve. 
At the 1996 Hui-a-Tau, O'Regan argued that if Ngai Tahu owns its own assets 
the future is secure for building and developing the iwi economically, and thus, 
socially. This is so even though Ngai Tahu are a minority in New Zealand and in 
Maoridom.51 Greater freedom of choice exists when one owns one's assets and 
dependency on another's, such as the Crown's, is cancelled out. Ngai Tahu's 
future is insecure without ownership of its own assets as it will be unable to 
deliver social benefits to its people. With the $170 million enabling Ngai Tahu to 
purchase Crown assets, Ngai Tahu's future ability to supply social benefits will 
be more secure. This would be so even if most of the fishing assets are lost 
through the UMAs appeal. 
The litigation camp opposes, not future vision and benefits Ngai Tahu can win 
through compensation, but the amount of compensation that is being accepted. 
After 147 years of struggling to seek a just settlement to the Claim, all Ngai 
Tahu has been able to win is a deal worth $170 million that Negotiating Group 
admits is not just. As stated by Ngai Tuahuriri beneficiary Mahara T e Aike, 'Our 
ancestors fought for justice. Now we have to accept an agreement that is 
acknowledged as unjust... I feel cheated, disillusioned and angry.'52 As R. Tau 
has indicated at Ngai Tuahuriri hui, the $170 million quantum (the interim 
settlement plus the major settlement) was accepted by Te Runanga and 
51 O'Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
52Te Aike, Interview: 7-1-97 
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O'Regan in approximately July of 1996. Though R. Tau is a Principal Negotiator, 
he was not privy to this information until after the fact. 53 This quantum was fixed 
and the Heads of Agreement drawn up around the quantum. R. Tau maintains 
that once the quantum was set, the rest of the Ngai Tahu settlement was tied 
into its fixed amount. 54 This means that compensation for individual deed areas 
would either be collectivised and redressed indirectly, as is the case at present, 
or if deed areas were redressed directly, compensation for all ten would fall 
within the $170 million. Estimates have put Ngai Tuahuriri losses alone (minus 
potential for economic gain) at approximately $1.3 billion. 55 
To this end, then, the litigation camp feels a settlement closer to justice can be 
won through renegotiating and going to court even recognising that $20 billion 
can never be awarded. The negotiating camp themselves admit that more 
economic compensation might be won via litigation; However the risk with 
litigation is the possibility that less economic compensation may also be 
awarded. 56 In fact, this is the great advantage the negotiation camp has over 
the litigation camp: It already has a known quantity through the Heads of 
Agreement. If the claims of various runanga go to court and the Heads of 
Agreement lapses, Ngai Tahu will lose the lucrative settlement mechanisms, 
mahinga kai redress on the Crown owned Islands (Rarotoka, Whenua Hou and 
the Titi Islands), and redress to the ancillary claims. 57 Court settlements may 
prove to be of greater economic value, but the risk is they may also prove to be 
less. Redress for taonga, mahinga kai and other cultural values will be unknown. 
53R. Tau, Korero: 4-8-96; 16-2-97. 
54lbid: 16-2-97 
55lbid: 11-11-96 
56Mead, Korero: 23-11-96 
57The Heads of Agreement may lapse after 6 months at which time 'the parties [Ngai Tahu and 
the Crown] will jointly review the continued operation' (Heads of Agreement,1996: 8). For Ngai 
Tuahuriri, it was argued that the ancillary claims do not redress their grievance of land not set 
aside between the Waimakariri and Kawari Rivers anyway (Hui: 16-2-97). 
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Divisions between the two camps also focus on the fiscal envelope with its 
billion dollar cap to settle all Maori Treaty of Waitangi claims. The litigation camp 
accuses the negotiation camp of selling out and accepting the fiscal envelope. 
The negotiation camp claim they 'have not buckled on one dimension' of Ngai 
Tahu's rejection of the policy. 58 
During the consultation round ministers of the Crown held fiscal envelope hui 
around New Zealand. Ngai Tahu's hui was at Tuahiwi Marae, and there the 
fiscal envelope was openly rejected. Primarily, Ngai Tahu rejected the fiscal 
envelope for its principle of relativity where compensation was to be 'consistent 
and equitable between claimant groups. '59 The rationale for the rejection of this 
principle was 'how does the Crown relate to the huge scale of the deprivation of 
the Ngai Tahu tribe of the South Island, which had millions of acres taken by the 
stroke of a pen, with the one million acres confiscated from Tainui at the barrel 
of a gun?.'60 O'Regan asserted at the 1996 Hui-a-Tau, that Ngai Tahu still reject 
historical comparison of loss between iwi imposed by the fiscal envelope. How 
can the Crown maintain that land taken by gun was somehow worse than if it 
was taken by fraud?61 In other words, how can the historical grievances of the 
Ngai Tahu Claim be compared to those of the Tainui Claim? 
It is argued by the negotiation camp that the Ngai Tahu settlement deal makes 
the fiscal envelope and its billion dollar cap 'irrelevant.'62 Although $170 million 
is used to publicly describe the value of the quantum, its actual worth is much 
more. The public quantum does not take into account the potential value of the 
settlement mechanisms, that is, the RFR and DSP. These will push the value of 
the quantum far beyond $170 million. 
580'Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
59Gardener, 1996: 34 
60 Ibid. 
61 0' Regan, Korero: 24-11-96 
62 lbid. 
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It was published in The Press that 'the agreement is on a par with the other big 
settlement achieved so far - the Tainui settlement also worth $170 million.'63 
This is an inaccurate statement according to the negotiation camp's argument 
as Ngai Tahu's settlement deal is worth far more than Tainui's. According to 
O'Regan, Tainui has no RFR mechanism which Ngai Tahu have in perpetuity. 
Tainui must also purchase Crown assets from a limited list with set valuations. 
The DSP and RFR mechanisms are far more flexible. Furthermore, O'Regan 
argued that for proof of the value of the settlement mechanisms one only needs 
to look at how Pakeha made wealth out of Ngai Tahu. It was through the 
Treaty's preemption clause which gave the Crown a monopoly on buying Ngai 
Tahu lands. The Crown had an RFR mechanism written into the Treaty. Now 
Ngai Tahu have the opportunity to use the RFR mechanism to their benefit. 
Thus, the historical impact of last century's land losses are revisited on the 
Crown, but this time the Ngai Tahu purchasers are acting within the law. 
The negotiation camp argue that they have proved themselves more than 
capable of maximising the benefits offered by the settlement mechanisms. Ngai 
Tahu's investment management record speaks for itself. In 1990 Ngai Tahu's 
net worth was approximately $100,000. Through business competency, Ngai 
Tahu's net worth at the close of 1996 was well over $30 million.64 That was built 
out of Ngai Tahu's own funds with no outside funding assistance. 65 Thus, at the 
1996 Hui-a-Tau it was urged that the Ngai Tahu Whanui have trust in the people 
whose job it is to drive investment and development. 
63Keene, The Press: 5-10-96 
64Th is assertion is sUbstantiated by Ngai Tahu's financial report for 1996 (Te Runanga 0 Ngai 
Tahu Annual Report, 1996: 33). 
650 , Regan, Korero: 23-11-96 
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The litigation camp argues that, no matter how the negotiation camp choose to 
justify their acceptance of $170 million, it still falls within the rejected fiscal 
envelope. By signing the Heads of Agreement Ngai Tahu is actually validating it. 
Proof that this is so is highlighted by the relativity clause in the Heads of 
Agreement. The negotiation camp maintains that the relativity clause is a mere 
insurance measure where Ngai Tahu does not lose out, in regards to the value 
of the quantum, for settling now rather than later. By having the relativity clause, 
no advantage will be gained through waiting for the fiscal cap to be raised or 
removed altogether. Now that the Coalition Government have removed the 
fiscal cap, C. Crofts has maintained that Ngai Tahu want to renegotiate the 
quantum.66 If a renegotiation does not occur and the Heads of Agreement as it 
stands becomes an accepted Deed of Settlement, the relativity clause will come 
into effect. However, as argued by the litigation camp, the relativity clause is 
working within the fiscal envelope boundaries and, thus, highlights its inherent 
acceptance by the negotiation camp. This was another reason why R. Tau did 
not sign the Heads of Agreement. 
A further area of division involves the consultation process. For the litigation 
camp, the key principles in the Heads of Agreement involved no consultation 
with the Ngai Tahu Whanui, who are meant to be the primary benefactors of the 
settlement. The Heads of Agreement, although promoted as only 'a bus stop on 
the way to accepting a settlement' by the negotiating camp, forms the core 
principles of a Deed of Settlement. 67 None of the core principles in the Heads of 
Agreement were debated by runanga before it was signed. Furthermore, Te 
Runanga did not deliberate on the Heads of Agreement before it was signed. 
The Heads of Agreement was presented to Ngai Tahu Whanui as signed and 
----~-------
66The Press: 14-12-96 
67 C. Crofts, Korero: 23-11-96 
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sealed principles. O'Regan and C. Crofts had signed the Heads of Agreement 
before Te Runanga and runanga had full knowledge of its contents. 
There are possible explanations why there was such a hurry to sign the Heads 
of Agreement. Even Principal Negotiator, R. Tau, has 'no idea' why there was a 
rush given the importance of the take, or issue, to Ngai Tahu. In his view, all the 
rush has achieved is tying Ngai Tahu into the fiscal envelope which was still in 
operation when the Heads of Agreement was signed. 68 
One obvious reason for the hurry was getting an agreement on the table before 
the uncertainties of the MMP election swept through the country. The election 
fell exactly a week after the Heads of Agreement was signed. On this point, R. 
Tau recalls that he maintained in letters to his colleagues that MMP would 
create an environment more responsive to settlement negotiations.69 The 
evidence suggests R. Tau was correct for the fiscal cap no longer exists. 
Another reason was that the Negotiating Group, the mandated negotiators, 
achieved an agreement in accordance with their goal of reaching a general 
settlement before the election. This goal had been discussed at a Te Runanga 
hui months prior. 70 Although the Negotiating Group effectively reached their 
goal, one criticism levelled at this achievement was that it illustrated a 'classic 
case of bureaucracy driving things because that's their mandate. t71 In this view, 
then, the momentum of the bureaucracy within Ngai Tahu to reach a deadline 
came at the expense of effective deliberations from Te Runanga and runanga 
consultation before signing the Heads of Agreement. 
68R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
69lbid. 
70Goodall, Korero: 18-5-96 
7iT. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
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The litigation camp argued that, although there is no actual statement in the T e 
Runanga Charter or Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu Act (1996) where it is maintained 
that Te Runanga will enter into deliberations before any settlement document is 
signed, it can be inferred that this would be the appropriate strategy. The 
Charter states under 3. Objects (b) that Te Runanga is 'the representative of the 
collective interest of Ngai Tahu Whanui and the legal representative in relation 
to that collective interest.';72 In a settlement deal the collective interest of Ngai 
Tahu Whanui is at stake. Thus, one would assume that Te Runanga, 
representing the collective interest, would playa key role in deliberations on the 
Heads of Agreement. In turn, these deliberations would involve the consultation 
of the runanga whom they represent. All this should take place before the actual 
signing. The apparent neglect of these processes by the Negotiating Group also 
led to R. Tau's refusal to sign the document. He maintains that if one does 
things the correct way, then one avoids confusion because 'when you rush into 
things you end up with confusion, discontent and mistrust. 073 
The Heads of Agreement provided that the Deed of Settlement contain an 
apology as discussed earlier. As O'Regan maintained, there will be a full recital 
of the relevant sins. The inclusion of this apology is accepted by the negotiation 
camp. However, when this apology is looked at in light of the Heads of 
Agreement the litigation camp has expressed concern over what it actually 
achieves. The negotiation camp have admitted that the settlement is not just. 
Furthermore, as related by C. Crofts, 'realistically the $170 million doesn't come 
anywhere near the tribe's loss since 1840.'74 Though the apology will be the 
closest thing Ngai Tahu will get to an act of redemption, some Ngai Tahu argue 
that it will be merely an apology in name and not necessarily by nature. Rather, 
the apology will just be empty words with the specific agenda of discharging the 
72Draft Charter, 1993: 8 
73R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
74Crofts, The Press: 14-12-96 
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Crown of its duties. The Prime Minister or even just a Crown Minister will go 
through the motions of the apology. The Queen will not feature as she did in the 
Waikato Deed of Settlement.75 Therefore, a question asked by Te Maire Tau, 
Director of Ngai Tahu Research, is that if the settlement is not just and there is 
no real act of redemption by the Crown before Ngai Tahu, then what is the deal 
settling? Furthermore, can it be durable? He stated that, 'the problem with the 
Heads of Agreement is it's not based on justice ... [or] on the Crown redeeming 
itself in front of us. Its just a deal .... There's no rationale to this one, it's just a 
figure plucked out of nowhere, and that's the problem with it.. .. We can't justify it 
to ourselves.06 
Economic Sovereignty vs Inalienable Rights: 
At the very core of the divisions arising from the Heads of Agreement, are the 
negotiation and litigation camps' differing approaches to rangatiratanga. In fact, 
the Heads of Agreement is the catalyst highlighting these different approaches. 
Both camps, in the final analysis, agree on what rangatiratanga is but not on 
how it is to be achieved. Both camps also have different starting points in 
reaching the fullest possible expression of rangatiratanga within New Zealand 
society. 
To a certain extent the two camps' approaches to rangatiratanga are 
complementary. For the negotiation camp, O'Regan maintains that 
rangatiratanga is 'a concept limited now by circumstance but still potent.. .. it 
means control of our assets.'77 For the litigation camp, the primary elements of 
rangatiratanga, as expounded by R. Tau, are 'owning your own voice, 
maintaining your autonomy, maintaining your independence.'78 The 
75She might not have featured in that deed either if CHOGM did not happen to fall at the same 
time as the signing. 
76T. M. Tau, Interview: 29-2-96 
770'Regan, 1994:53 
78R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
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complementarity between these two perspectives is that if one controls one's 
own assets, as O'Regan maintains, then one can achieve autonomy and 
independence, as R. Tau states. 
Both camps also have large and small-scale aspects within their approaches 
necessary in achieving rangatiratanga. For example, both camps to a degree 
accept that assets be collectively administered in the House of Tahu. The 
House of Tahu is a reality, as Ngai Tahu assets are currently managed using 
the House of Tahu concept. 
Second, both camps have a future vision for the evolution of autonomous 
runanga. O'Regan has stated that 'the prospect of sub-dividing the tribal 
administration into autonomous regions is also being considered.'79 Enlarging on 
this point, O'Regan maintained that 'my dream is that our marae and the life of 
the marae will be funded by our own assets, our own resources. Tino 
rangatiratanga at the end of the day means basically owning your own assets 
and paying for your own kai. '80 
R. Tau, on considering the future development of Ngai Tahu believes that 
runanga will gradually evolve into autonomous regions: 'I have faith that our 
putea, or any form of settlement, will grow', he said, 'It will be big ... and important 
to break down then, because we would have had years of experience at the 
local level to be able to imitate the overall structure as it is now.'81 
However, the point of departure in approaches to rangatiratanga for both camps 
is where one should begin to attack the problem of achieving and maintaining 
rangatiratanga. I will first consider the negotiation camp's approach. 
790'Regan, 1989:261 
80lbid, 1994: 53 
81 R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97. Putea refers to tribal assets, usually financial ones. 
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The negotiation camp believe that by developing the economic sovereignty of 
the iwi through a centralised administration rangatiratanga can be greatly 
achieved. Economic sovereignty for the negotiation camp involves the right to 
generate and control one's wealth to the same level as other private citizens and 
companies within New Zealand society.82 Furthermore, there should be no 
structural impediments preventing the development of economic sovereignty, 
such as were imposed on the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, which, 'although 
elected by tribal members was legally accountable to the Minister of Maori 
Affairs, limited in the range of independent enterprise it could engage in, and 
ringed with restrictions imposed by paternalistic Governments. '83 
For the negotiation camp, then, the opportunity for developing economic 
sovereignty of the Ngai Tahu iwi is offered by the Heads of Agreement. This 
involves a settlement package combining a quantum and investment 
opportunities via the settlement mechanisms. Through the economic 
sovereignty of the iwi, and hence collectivised structures for generating and 
accumulating wealth, rangatiratanga is fulfilled. 
When considering the negotiation camp's approach to rangatiratanga, it would 
be wrong to over-generalise. It is true that rangatiratanga for them 
predominantly means the economic sovereignty of the iwi. However, 
rangatiratanga also means that, through the economic sovereignty of the iwi, 
Ngai Tahu beneficiaries can receive social benefits. This involves identifying 
and aiding areas of social life where many Ngai Tahu individuals lag behind 
much of Pakeha New Zealand. O'Regan's vision for social assistance involves 
setting up 'tribally subsidised superannuation and medical schemes, to build 
820 'Regan, Lecture: 5-8-96 
830 'Regan, 1989:259 
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schools (Ngai Tahu Boys, Ngai Tahu Girls), to establish salvage education 
programmes, to train young people, to help Ngai Tahu into their own housing 
and employment. '84 
Providing the opportunity for social assistance to Ngai Tahu beneficiaries 
implies that there is an individual, as well as collective, dimension within the 
negotiation camp's definition of rangatiratanga. Ngai Tahu Chief Executive 
Officer, Sid Ashton, in response to criticism that there is too much emphasis on 
money-making and not enough on people, maintained that 'we need putea in 
order to nurture the people.'8S Hence, while generating and accumulating 
assets to achieve economic sovereignty is important, it is a means to an end 
and not an end in itself, the end being rangatiratanga of the iwi and those within 
it. 
The negotiation camp support, not only individual advancement, but the 
eventual development of autonomous runanga. O'Regan's above-mentioned 
prospect of creating autonomous regional administration means that the 
centralised structure collectivising not only capital but beneficial rights may 
eventually be scaled down and/or dismantled. Beneficiaries will be able to 
manage the affairs of their own runanga. 
According to the litigation camp, the major problem with the negotiation camp's 
approach to rangatiratanga is that beneficiary compensation is collectivised 
through a wide definition of who constitutes a Ngai Tahu beneficiary being 
applied. As explained in the section above, anyone who has Ngai Tahu 
whakapapa is considered a beneficiary. There is no distinction between Ngai 
84Brett, 1992: 59. O'Regan has made it clear that this does not mean substituting state welfare 
with Ngai Tahu welfare schemes from the centralised structure. He rejects the notion of the iwi 
having to provide state welfare to Ngai Tahu beneficiaries. Thus, social benefits involve 
womoting individual advancement free from the bonds of state or any other form of welfare. 
5Ashton, Korero: 23-11-96. 
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Tahu who hold ownership rights to land, passed down for generations, and Ngai 
Tahu who have no ownership rights. As highlighted by the Heads of Agreement, 
all Ngai Tahu beneficiaries, and all rights to compensation, are equalised 
because of this. 
In distinguishing between approaches to rangatiratanga of the negotiation and 
litigation camps, R. Tau mentioned the basic philosophical difference between 
himself and O'Regan. This difference captures, in essence, why there are two 
different approaches at the outset. R. Tau stated that 'I'm dealing with people 
[R. Tau lives in Tuahiwi and is Upoko of Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga], Steven's 
dealing with the concept .... Rangatiratanga belongs to the living people, and they 
don't see themselves fitting into an iwi because they can't touch it.'86 Hence, R. 
Tau believes that rangatiratanga exists in the individual, the individual's whanau 
and representing collective whanau, the hapu. His point being that 
rangatiratanga resides at the local level only; 'at iwi level there is no such 
thing.'87 Therefore, the negotiation camp's approach to rangatiratanga, the 
economic sovereignty of the iwi, is a concept having no direct relation to f1ax-
root Ngai Tahu. 
According to R. Tau, and others within the litigation camp, rangatiratanga 
originates with one's tipuna and continues for generations. It is indestructible 
and inalienable. However, rangatiratanga is capable of being repressed by 
external circumstances, as it resides in the individual. For example, if one's only 
means of survival is taken away, such as land for food gathering, regardless of 
the rangatiratanga one may possess, hunger will still result. Thus, although 
one's rangatiratanga remains intact even though this act has occurred, the 
86R. Tau, Interview; 13-2-97 
87 lbid. 
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potential for its expression via self-determination has been removed and, thus, 
repressed. 
The litigation camp's interpretation of rangatiratanga is that, rangatiratanga, in 
its original state is mana. Mana is derived first from one's whakapapa, which 
imparts status, and second, from one's authority and prestige, which can be 
gained or lost over time. When a person is alive, they have mana, a dynamic 
state. When a person dies, it converts to rangatiratanga, which is static. 88 The 
rangatiratanga of the deceased is then passed on to their descendants. 
Rangatiratanga handed down from tipuna is regarded as a treasure and 
described as part of nga taonga tuku iho or treasures handed down.89 This 
perspective of rangatiratanga is also illustrated by Cleave who states that an 
individual must live-up-to their inherited rangatiratanga, thus confirming its static 
nature. The efforts of proving one's rangatiratanga denotes the mana of the 
individual. This can fluctuate, a dynamic state, throughout one's lifetime.90 
In that individuals have different ancestry, and tipuna themselves had differing 
amounts of mana, rangatiratanga is passed on to individuals and their whanau 
in varying amounts. One individual and their whanau may have a lot of 
rangatiratanga because of their prestigious tipuna of high status. Another 
individual and their whanau may have less rangatiratanga due to their tipuna not 
having a lot of status and prestige. However, while individuals are born with an 
unchanging amount of rangatiratanga, they can add or subtract mana in their 
own lifetime. 
As Kawharu stated. in Chapter 2, Maori in 1840 would have associated the 
Treaty's rangatiratanga, as it was a newly constructed term, with rangatira, or 
88lbid. 
89 lbid. 
90c leave, 1983: 56 
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chief, which imparts evidence of breeding and greatness. The litigation camp's 
interpretation of rangatiratanga carries with it close associations to chiefly status 
or mana. Prior to 1840, then, the term mana would have been used to describe 
the qualities that rangatiratanga now possesses for the litigation camp. 
Directly related to rangatiratanga are beneficial rights. Beneficial rights, as 
discussed in the previous section, involve ownership rights to certain areas of 
land. These rights, too, are handed down from tipuna. When an individual and 
their whanau has beneficial rights to land, then rangatiratanga, which has been 
passed down from their tipuna also, can be exerted in the interests of preserving 
this land. This exercise of ancestral rangatiratanga is then projected onto the 
individual's own mana for better or worse depending on the individual's 
perceived competence. 
Another important aspect to rangatiratanga is that it can only be exerted within 
the region of individual's beneficial rights. 91 Only where an individual has 
ownership rights and connections of whakapapa can rangatiratanga be 
expressed. A place such as this would be within one's hapu area(s). For 
example: 
My rangatiratanga here [in Tuahiwi] comes from my ancestors 
because they're all in the cemetery here. I don't have 
rangatiratanga in places I don't have ancestors .... 1 have very little 
[rangatiratanga] on the West Coast, where I don't have any 
ancestors. My rangatiratanga there declines. Now rangatiratanga 
and mana are virtually the same thing.92 
91 R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
92T. M. Tau, Interview: 29-1-97 
112 
Therefore, for the litigation camp, rangatiratanga not only varies according to 
one's whakapapa but exists to protect inherited beneficial rights within certain 
areas. 
Viewed from this angle, it is easy to see why the litigation camp rejects the 
Heads of Agreement. The beneficiaries whose tipuna's rights were breached 
last century by the Crown in the deed areas are not being directly addressed. 
Last century's grievances are not being removed but merely displaced by 
collective compensation. In this case, then, the grievances still exist. According 
to the litigation camp, fears are that central management of the iwi will be 
receiving Crown compensation. Thus, the iwi does not in itself possess 
rangatiratanga as they define, or the right to collective ownership over all deed 
area compensation. A direct remedy in R. Tau's estimation would involve Crown 
compensation, both financial and land where possible, allocated to each of the 
ten deed areas. The compensation's acceptability could then be voted on only 
by beneficiaries to the deed areas. Runanga themselves would manage 
beneficiary voting, having a roll of eligible voters. 93 
Relating this back to rangatiratanga, it is a matter of mana for whanau to seek 
redress for the Crown's disrespect and repression of tipuna rangatiratanga. As 
rangatiratanga is inherited, so too is the disrespect and repression it suffered. 
For the litigation camp, the Heads of Agreement does nothing to directly remedy 
this. Although the quantum offered by the Heads of Agreement is a concern, as 
it is far less than the actual losses incurred and cannot be disassociated from 
the fiscal envelope, that is of minor importance. Of major importance is the 
beneficiaries receiving direct remedy for grievances which have been in 
existence for approximately 150 years. Addressing the beneficial rights of 
today's generation serves to restore the losses suffered by the tipuna: 
93R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
The Claim belongs to our ancestors .. .it is their honour that we're 
talking about, their contracts that we're talking about, and 
therefore, we must give credibility and honour and remedy those 
contracts. Then the descendants are the beneficiaries to it. ... We 
must recognise the wairua of these things and the wairua goes 
back to the ancestors.94 
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Therefore, direct remedy involves compensating today's generation, which in 
turn addresses the spiritual dimension of restoring the integrity of tipuna. This 
implies that, with beneficial rights receiving redress, the rangatiratanga of tipuna, 
now passed down to beneficiaries, is enhanced and expressed to a fuller 
potential. 
In consideration of the litigation camp's approach to rangatiratanga, it would be 
an oversimplification to maintain that it is purely individualistic and of benefit only 
to beneficiaries as opposed to Ngai Tahu as an iwi. The notion of the common 
good of all Ngai Tahu is not lost in the litigation camp. 
When compensation by the Crown to the ten deed areas has been accepted by 
the beneficiaries, then management of the compensation goes to the House of 
Tahu, the collective Ngai Tahu management concept. 95 Preliminary suggestions 
as to how beneficiary compensation and Ngai Tahu members' social assistance 
could be divided have been as percentage splits. For example, 30% of all 
finance available is allocated to members on application for specific assistance, 
94 lbid. 
95Many Ngai Tuahuriri beneficiaries reject the concept of the House of Tahu, as it is believed 
runanga should have full autonomy away from centralisation (R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97). This 
is part of realising hapu rangatiratanga where runanga have the authority and ability to 
represent whanau beneficiaries interests. However, the House of Tahu may be supported if 
runanga can gradually evolve into an autonomous and independent role as forseen by both the 
negotiation and litigation camps. 
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such as education grants, 40% is allocated to beneficiaries by right and the rest 
used for investment. No specific policy dealing with such issues has yet been 
worked on. 96 
A possible reason for such different approaches to rangatiratanga between the 
litigation and negotiation camps is highlighted by R. Tau. He points to an 
antagonism between the pa Maori and the pan-hapu Maori.97 The pa Maori are 
those who live and/or still strongly identify with their ancestral land, the pa being 
the traditional hapu village such as Ngai Tuahuriri's Tuahiwi. Due to stronger 
cultural connections, the pa Maori adhere more to traditional practices of 
tikanga, or customary law, and live accordingly. Pa Maori, then, more likely align 
with the litigation camp's perspective as it claims to adhere more closely to 
tikanga, for example, the definition given to rangatiratanga. Pan-hapu Maori do 
not identify as strongly with their ancestral land, and thus their hapu, possibly 
due to a lack of ownership rights. Hence, pan-hapu Maori are more open to the 
concept of iwi, where beneficial rights belong in common to all Ngai Tahu. Pan-
hapu Maori are more likely to be found in the negotiation camp. 
96R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
97lbid. 
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The research for this thesis has produced an examination of Ngai Tahu's 
contemporary approach to, and internal expression of, tino rangatiratanga. Ngai 
Tahu's approach primarily consists of the translation of tino rangatiratanga into 
the economic sovereignty of the iwi. However, Ngai Tahu does have an 
alternative approach to tino rangatiratanga, and it is that adhered to by the 
litigation camp. This approach translates tino rangatiratanga into individual, 
whanau and hapu autonomy. The internal expression of rangatiratanga is 
currently undergoing a transitional and evolutionary phase. Some runanga 
struggle to reaffirm their rangatiratanga in an environment where, Te Runanga 
have established themselves as the repository of the collective rangatiratanga 
for the entire tribe. Te Runanga's ability fulfil this role as the repository and, 
thus, be the tribal leader has been questioned by some beneficiaries. 
The implications of this research arise primarily out of chapters five and six. 
Briefly, however, in recapping the rationale behind Chapters Two, Three and 
Four, these chapters were introductory and preparatory to the discussion of 
Ngai Tahu's approach to, and internal expression of, tino rangatiratanga. They 
provided the necessary background to the analysis. Chapter Two contexualised 
tino rangatiratanga, its meaning, its politicisation in the debate over indigenous 
rights and its future development within state mechanisms. Chapter Three 
discussed the nineteenth century Crown land purchases from Ngai Tahu, and 
how through fraudulent land deals Ngai Tahu's rangatiratanga was destroyed. 
Chapter Four traced the development of Ngai Tahu iwi's organisational structure 
from a Crown created Trust Board to the current tribally determined structure. 
This chapter illustrated how a degree of self-determination was recaptured 
creating the potential for the attainment of rangatiratanga, or economic 
sovereignty, within modern New Zealand society. 
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In concluding Chapter Five, rather than offering hard and fast solutions to 
problems identified, what is offered instead are some suggestions on ways the 
organisational structure could enhance intra-tribal communication. This, as 
suggested below, promotes not only the role of Te Runanga as the repository of 
the Ngai Tahu Whanui's collective tino rangatiratanga, but also the expression 
of runanga rangatiratanga. I consider the current problems identified in Chapter 
Five as symptoms of the transitional phase, not, as some may believe, the 
results of an insidious conspiracy where iwi management are 'building a castle 
for the selected few.'I 
When considering the internal expression of rangatiratanga during this 
transitional period and between runanga and Te Runanga, a time of discovery 
prevails over who should have absolute authority over certain issues of 
importance such as the settlement. Should the rangatiratanga of runanga or the 
statutory authority of T e Runanga, who 'speak' on behalf of the collective tino 
rangatiratanga Ngai Tahu Whanui, hold sway? There is a blur between what is 
considered to be local affairs of runanga and tribal affairs of Te Runanga. Issues 
that cut across the boundaries of each body's sphere of influence by being both 
local and tribal, such as the Heads of Agreement and the eventual settlement, 
highlight this blur and cause friction. The key to eliminating this blur within the 
organisational structure is Te Runanga regularly consulting with runanga. In this 
way, the rangatiratanga of runanga is acknowledged by allowing for their direct 
input into decisions. Furthermore, Te Runanga, learning of runanga 
perspectives, can make decisions which accurately represent the wishes of Ngai 
Tahu Whanui. Through this, Te Runanga becomes the repository of the 
collective tino rangatiratanga of the Ngai Tahu Whanui, which includes runanga, 
lR. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97. Here he was commenting on a belief being bandied about. 
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not only in the words of the Charter, but also in actuality. It would also function 
to silence much of the criticism over T e Runanga's leadership abilities. 
The antagonism that exists between some runanga and Te Runanga indicates a 
process of renegotiation and evolution of tino rangatiratanga in Ngai Tahu. This 
is an inherent part of the transitional phase. Tino rangatiratanga is evolving from 
an autonomous expression only existing at the runanga/hapu level. The 
implication being that rangatiratanga is evolving according to the changing 
circumstances of the iwi, such as the implementation of a new organisational 
structure that is required to deal with pan-hapu issues. Rangatiratanga is 
expressed in a new collectivised manner at the Te Runanga/iwi level, where 
each of the eighteen runanga have a 1/18th representation, of equal status, in 
its expression. The enhancement and maintenance of communication is crucial 
to the sense of belonging each of the 18 runanga believe they have in Te 
Runanga's new collectivised version of tino rangatiratanga. 
Conclusions arising out of Chapter Five also lead to the following suggestions of 
how to enhance communication. For the directors of Te Runanga themselves, it 
seems that the biggest obstacle in the way of consulting their runanga and 
developing an informed position in order to create policy is the lack of time. The 
most obvious way to create time is to employ directors on a full-time basis with 
the intendant responsibilities of consulting with runanga and creating policy. 
As well as being full-time employees of Ngai Tahu, out-of-town directors could 
relocate to Christchurch, enabling easy access to resources and informal 
contact with other directors and Ngai Tahu's management structures. In this 
respect, a director's occupation would be parallel to that of a member of 
parliament. 
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However, full-time directors and their relocation to Christchurch may not be 
options for either the directors themselves or the Ngai Tahu organisational 
structure at present. Another option for utilising the available time efficiently for 
consultative purposes with runanga is to create further lines of communication 
within the organisational structure. This would involve both members of runanga 
and iwi management. An idea I discussed with Dr. Anne Parsonson of the 
University of Canterbury's History Department was the possibility for wananga, 
or schooling, to be held for elected or appointed members of runanga.2 
Wananga would involve a kaumatua and rangatahi from each runanga attending 
classes to learn about and discuss complex issues of importance to Te 
Runanga and the Ngai Tahu Whanui. Having both a kaumatua and rangatahi 
attending wananga allows different generations of beneficiaries to identify with 
these representatives and be more receptive to the information they have to 
give. Iwi management, via Runanga Development, could co-ordinate these 
sessions. 
The representatives from each runanga could then disseminate the information 
to other beneficiaries at monthly runanga hui. This could be their primary 
function. In this way, not all the responsibility of consulting with runanga would 
fall on the Te Runanga directors. This would increase the time they could spend 
on understanding issues in an effort to create policy. However, their presence at 
runanga hui would still be required to receive the feedback from beneficiaries. A 
positive outcome of this would be that runanga could progress at the same rate 
as the rest of the organisational structure in future development plans. 
Within the Draft Charter, as mentioned in Chapter Five, directors not only 
represent their runanga but are also required to act in the best interests of the 
Ngai Tahu Whanui. This points to a conflict of roles not only for the directors but 
2parsonson, Arowhenua Hui: 15-9-96. 
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for Te Runanga. Te Kawenata 0 Ngai Tahu, Kaupapa Whakakotahi, included at 
the beginning of the Draft Charter, and now the Charter itself, maintains that T e 
Runanga is the collective voice of the tino rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu that 
resides in runanga. Within the Charter itself, however, under Section 3(a) Te 
Runanga is stated to be 'the repository of the collective tino rangatiratanga of 
the Ngai Tahu Whanui. .. [and] ... (b) be the representative of the collective Ngai 
Tahu Whanui.'3 There is an obvious conflict between the two requirements of Te 
Kawenata and the Charter. For example, what if the wishes of the majority of 
runanga, as reported by directors, conflicts with the wishes of the Ngai Tahu 
Whanui at large as the result of a postal ballot? 
In this situation of conflict, which part of Ngai Tahu's constituency would prevail, 
the politically active core of Runanga represented on Te Runanga, or the wider 
Ngai Tahu Whanui? The democratic principle would rule that the majority's 
wishes - the Ngai Tahu Whanui - should prevail. If accepting both Te Kawenata 
and the Charter, one would need to regard runanga and the Ngai Tahu Whanui 
as a single body, though this inherent conflict can occur. Furthermore, if the 
Ngai Tahu Whanui is a single body, there are implications for runanga 
rangatiratanga. Te Runanga is representing not simply the interests of the 
eighteen runanga but also the interests of the wider Whanui. Thus, Ngai Tahu 
tino rangatiratanga does not reside within runanga alone, as Te Kawenata 
states, but collectively within the Ngai Tahu Whanui, as the Charter states. This 
provides no privileged status for rangatiratanga of any runanga. 
Clarity on this point within the Charter needs to be provided. By indicating the 
role of runanga in the decision-making process, an amount of certainty will 
prevail. In this way, Te Runanga would not be claiming on one hand to be the 
3Draft Charter, 1993: 8 
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collective voice of runanga rangatiratanga, and on the other profess to be the 
repository of the collective tino rangatiratanga of the Ngai Tahu Whanui. 
Registration of members of the Ngai Tahu Whanui on voting rolls, which align 
each individual to their runanga/s, would diminish the gap between runanga and 
the Whanui's wishes. This would be the case as runanga would then also be 
encompassing members of the Whanui in their own decision-making processes. 
Turning to the organisational structure, one adjustment could be to define a 
formal process of consultation. This would create stronger communication links 
between Te Runanga and runanga. In the second section of Chapter Five, R. 
Tau referred to the 'unclear processes at Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu level ... that 
anything agreed to at the political level with the Crown should go back to Te 
Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, who in turn must go back to their runanga and get a 
mandate. '4 The key here, then, would be to clarify the processes to establish a 
formal procedure for consultation. In this way, runanga would be included in the 
formulation of top-level political decisions and would not feel excluded from the 
organisational structure. Although some runanga may not agree with the actions 
finally decided upon, at least they would have had an opportunity to make their 
views known. 
A way of formalising the consultation process would be to include it in the 
Charter. 5 Theoretically, this consultation process would need to include the 
following elements. Group management would report to Te Runanga, who in 
turn would consult with runanga. Feedback from runanga to their directors would 
lead to. the occurrence of debate. This debate would act as the catalyst for 
4R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
SHaving a Charter at all indicates an amount of maturity within Ngai Tahu. The parliament of 
New Zealand is still to reach this point having an unentrenched constitution and Treaty of 
Waitangi by which they are not bound. This is elaborated further in Appendix 5. 
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creating policy. Thus, Te Runanga would then be able to supply iwi 
management with directives. 
Another way of developing clear lines of communication could be a code of 
ethics included in the Charter. This code of ethics, as much as giving a guide for 
a standard of performance within the structure, could provide working definitions 
of such words as rangatiratanga, the Ngai Tahu Whanui and Ngai Tahu 
beneficiary. The need for such definitions may seem unnecessary to many Ngai 
Tahu, but this research has demonstrated an inherent definitional conflict in 
these terms. Rangatiratanga is defined differently within the iwi such as the 
different definitions given by the negotiation and litigation camps as discussed in 
Chapter Six. The former party defines rangatiratanga strictly according to that 
used in Article Two of the Treaty, that is the guarantee of ownership over tribal 
assets, or, economic sovereignty. The latter party sees rangatiratanga as 
meaning, not only economic sovereignty, but also ancestrally endowed rights 
which impart varying amounts of status accordingly. Ngai Tahu beneficiary and 
Ngai Tahu Whanui are also defined differently by the two camps, as discussed 
in Chapter Six. The negotiation camp define any person with Ngai Tahu 
whakapapa as a beneficiary, and thus, they belong to the Ngai Tahu Whanui. 
However, according to the litigation camp, beneficiaries are those with 
ownership rights to land only, and these beneficiaries constitute the Ngai Tahu 
Whanui. This being the case, R. Tau points out a method to add certainty to 
definitions commonly used: 
The Charter has to be, perhaps, altered to recognise what was 
intended. What Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu needs is a code of 
ethics based on tikanga and based on whakapapa .... So in terms 
of whakapapa, ahi kaa, turangawaewae, what these things mean 
has got to be in the code of ethics. We lack definition all the way 
through because we can talk past each other in terms of the 
words we use .... you·ve got this word rangatiratanga, what does it 
mean? .... So you need that code of values of what tikanga really 
is about so that it guides Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, so they're not 
captured by the corporate world.6 
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A code of ethics could operate as the foundation for a formalised consultative 
process. For example, the definitional gist of rangatiratanga might be as follows: 
Rangatiratanga is handed down by the ancestors of beneficiaries and resides in 
Ngai Tahu beneficiaries. Their place to express their rangatiratanga is the 
runanga. Hence, in runanga 'resides the tino rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu. Its 
collective voice is Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu.'7 Thus, in order for Te Runanga to 
be guided by the principle of tino rangatiratanga, the consultative process must 
be carried out. 
When defining procedures of consultation with runanga in the Charter, logically, 
the initial step would be to decide upon what sort of issues warrant consultation. 
Obviously not every issue that Te Runanga deals with has relevance to runanga 
affairs and rangatiratanga. Some T e Runanga issues are exclusively theirs, 
such as routine 'housekeeping' tasks. However, some issues, such as the 
settlement, cut across the boundaries between local and tribal affairs and are 
thus relevant to both runanga and Te Runanga spheres of influence. Hence, 
early consultation on this type of issue is required. 
With a code of ethics and a consultative process formalised, the new leaders of 
Te Runanga would have greater support mechanisms for their decisions. It 
would also mean that a large amount of control would be held at the Te 
6R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
7Te Kawenata 0 Ngai Tahu, Draft Charter: 1993 
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Runanga level. A number of positive outcomes could emerge from this. First, 
through having certain consultative procedures to follow, the internal process 
could, to a greater extent, take precedence over the external timetables of 
others. 
Second, time would have to be made available for runanga inclusion in debate, 
would help directors with policy formulation. Te Runanga would become the 
forum for the expression of various view points on major issues throughout the 
Ngai Tahu Whanui. Directors then would always be able to bring to the table 
their runanga's perspective and, via the voting system currently in place, act on 
the majority of Ngai Tahu Whanui's wishes. 
Third, a formalised consultative process and a code of ethics would foster the 
growth of a stable decision-making structure, as deemed necessary by 
O'Regan, for the protection of iwi assets. 8 Feedback to Te Runanga level would 
occur and rigorous policy creation would be the outcome. Directors would be 
given the tools from runanga by which to fashion policy created out of the 
debate which ensued. A relatively stable decision-making structure could 
operate, as runanga would be involved in it. Cohesion of Ngai Tahu iwi would 
thus be maintained. 
Fourth, the development of a stable decision-making structure, would fill any 
leadership vacuum. Te Runanga would be able to supply iwi management with 
policy directives. Iwi management in turn would act in line with their theoretical 
roles as discussed above. They would be the managers of T e Runanga assets 
and liabilities and, at times, suppliers of advice via reports for inclusion in debate 
at Te Runanga and runanga levels. 
80 'Regan, 1994:46 
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Fostering an environment that develops a stable decision-making structure 
would also mean that any potential leaders, other than T e Runanga, would be 
excluded. This would dismiss any fears that another group is leading within the 
organisational structure. 
Reflecting on Chapter Six, one difficulty I see with the litigation camp's approach 
involves their recognition of differing levels of rangatiratanga for individuals and 
whanau. One individual may have a prestigious whakapapa, and another may 
have very few. How should Ngai Tahu, and eventually runanga, allocate grants 
to beneficiaries with differing levels of rangatiratanga? Divisiveness amongst 
beneficiaries may eventuate if Ngai Tahu quantifies tipuna status and then 
awards individuals accordingly. One solution to this problem is to consult with all 
beneficiaries to let them determine a suitable outcome rather than leaving it to, 
what seems from the outside to be, ambiguous management processes. 
In all cases of allocation to individuals, whether it be as envisaged by the 
negotiation or litigation camp, the allocation mechanisms should be transparent. 
A rationale as to why an individual receives X amount and another receives Y 
needs to be provided. This would prevent any misgivings individuals might have 
over the allocation procedures and claims of unfairness. 
Furthermore, I see that the different approaches to tino rangatiratanga between 
the negotiation and litigation camps bring with them different emphases and 
interpretations of the concept as referred to in the Treaty. For the litigation 
camp, tino rangatiratanga is given a wide definition encompassing primarily the 
individual and their whanau, and then the focus is narrowed somewhat to 
encompass the modern adaptation of economic sovereignty for the tribe. 
Undisputably for the litigation camp, tino rangatiratanga is intimately tied to the 
individual, their whanau and hapu. Thus, tino rangatiratanga's link to the 
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individual is of utmost importance. From this perspective, addressing individuals' 
rangatiratanga within the hapu is paramount, and then this will function to 
ensure tribal cohesion. The secondary consideration is the economic 
sovereignty of the iwi. 
As for the negotiation camp, their approach to tino rangatiratanga is completely 
iwi driven. In this way, the focus of tino rangatiratanga is initially narrow 
encompassing the achievement of economic sovereignty of the iwi. It is then 
widened a little by the provision of benefits that economic sovereignty of the iwi 
can impart to the individual. This narrow definition of tino rangatiratanga is 
unapologetically acknowledged as a reality by the negotiation camp. As 
O'Regan pointed out tino rangatiratanga is 'a concept now limited by 
circumstance but still potent. '9 The limiting circumstance is not only modern New 
Zealand society but also the global society of the 1990s. Both Maori and Pakeha 
are now subject to the advantages and disadvantages of cosmopolitan life and 
the commonalities of existence and experience which this brings. 
Economic sovereignty of the iwi and enhancing individual rangatiratanga are 
both apparent in each camp's approach. Hence, working together to 
accommodate elements of both approaches in tribal policies seems the most 
appropriate measure to take. I feel this is important to achieve, as an opportunity 
for consolidating cohesion between Ngai Tahu's administration and Ngai Tahu's 
flax roots has arisen. 
Recent developments in November 1997 has seen 6341 of the Ngai Tahu 
Whanui voting 93.8% in favour of a proposed settlementlO, the principles of 
which were outlined in Chapter 6's discussion of the Heads of Agreement. Just 
90 'Regan.1994:53 
1 0Mathias and Jackson, The Press: 1997. 
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over half of the Whanui eligible to vote in the ballot participated. ll The 
momentum of support for the settlement not only by T e Runanga and iwi 
management, but the Ngai Tahu Whanui has widened the division, illustrated in 
Chapter 6, between the Negotiation camp's philosophy of tino rangatiratanga 
and that of the litigation camp. Ngai Tuahuriri Runanga headed by R. Tau, along 
with a Banks Peninsula runanga, voted against the proposed settlement offer at 
aTe Runanga hui in a 16:2 result favouring the settlement. 
In other recent developments, R. Tau resigned as Principle Negotiator. 
Inferences drawn from this research conclude that conflicts between the 
proposed settlement's outcomes and R. Tau's convictions, expressed in the 
litigation camp's philosophies towards tino rangatiratanga, must have proven too 
great. On November 17th R. Tau sought an interim injunction in the High Court 
to prevent T e Runanga accepting the settlement on November 21 st at the 1997 
Hui-a-Tau at Kaikoura. O'Regan was confident, given the 'massive vote in 
favour', that the settlement would 'withstand any legal challenges.'12 The 
challengers, members of the litigation camp, only constituted a minority of 6.2% 
of those who voted and, thus, it was always doubtful from these figures that an 
injunction would have succeeded. Almost on the eve of the signing of the 
historic Ngai Tahu settlement with the Crown, the legal action was withdrawn for 
reasons as yet unknown. 
Tumultuous events coming to a head, just as Te Runanga are about to accept 
the Crown's offer of settlement, comes as no surprise when reflecting on the 
findings of this research. As my analysis has asserted, and what lay behind the 
legal actions of the litigation camp, are the divisions arising from fundamental 
differences in approach to tino rangatiratanga between the negotiation and 
11lbid. 
12lbid. 
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litigation camps. These approaches are reconcilable to the point that each camp 
are willing to compromise on certain elements of their approach. Perhaps some 
sort of compromise was reached at the last minute with the threat of legal action 
pending. At this point, one can only speculate. However, the recommendations 
that have been discussed above, which aim at enhancing intra-tribal 
communication in the interests of consolidating tribal cohesion, are now made 
even more timely on the eve of a settlement and its future. 
This research also has implications for the state and the future development of 
New Zealand society. The Court of Appeal asserted that the principle of 
partnership was at the heart of the Treaty.13 If this is the case, Treaty 
guarantees of Maori rights qualifies the Crown's exercise of sovereignty in New 
Zealand. Hence, there must be a renegotiation of sovereignty where tino 
rangatiratanga becomes an integral component. As referred to in Chapter Two, 
this entails entering into a dialogue for constitutional reform and power-sharing. 
As a starting point to the renegotiation of sovereignty, and as elaborated on in 
Appendix 5, what I recommend is the revisitation of Treaty entrenchment via an 
entrenched Bill of Rights. In doing so, not only are the guarantees made in the 
Treaty supreme law, but so are the rights of all New Zealanders. In this way, the 
principle of partnership between Maori and Pakeha, embodied in the Treaty, 
would not simply be paid lip service but exist in actuality. 
In taking a step back from the issues raised by this research and reflecting on its 
implications for sociology, there are various avenues apparent for further 
research in this arena. 
13lbid, 1989: 249 
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This thesis sits in the mid-ground of this topic area. By this I mean that my 
research has delved into only one aspect of one iwi within New Zealand. From 
this point one is able to either draw the focus of this thesis out or draw it further 
in. Drawing the focus out could involve an investigation into other iwi, other 
Maori organisations or non-Maori organisations in a comparative study to 
discover their approaches to tino rangatiratanga and social development. For 
example, a comparative study between Ngai Tahu and an Urban Maori Authority 
would not only be a topical inquiry, but one that could uncover implications for 
the further development of Maori in New Zealand. 
Drawing the focus in could involve further study into various runanga 
approaches to, not only tino rangatiratanga, but their individual desires for future 
social development. Research could investigate how they see themselves fitting 
into Ngai Tahu as an iwi. The future development of Ngai Tahu iwi within New 
Zealand society would be indicated. 
In conclusion, the analysis of Maori and Pakeha relations for sociology is 
extremely important. Relations between these two ethnic groups are what this 
society's history is founded upon. The continued development of a mutually 
beneficial relationship, based on respect, is what New Zealand's cohesion as a 
society into the future will depend. 
·R·· ie··F·E·R·E ... IC····· ·ES:·· ~ . ~~ ~ : :". \ :1"11'· ", ~ .'.: 
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Appendix 1 
Th" 1",,1 nf IIIII'I rrA'V "' WnlhHlR' In t~nR"~h 
IIFR MA.lFSTY VI<' IORIA Queen of Ihe Uniled Kingdom of 
Oreat Britain and Ire!ar,d regarding wilh Her Royal Favour the 
Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and anxious to protect 
their jmt Rights and Properly and to secure to them the enjoy-
menl of Pencc and (lood Order has deemed it necell~ary in 
con.~eqllence of the great n,,,,,ber of Iler Majesty's Subjects who 
have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid extension of 
Emigration hoth from Europe and Australia which is still in 
progress to constitllte and appoint a functionary properly 
authorised to treRt with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the 
recognition of lIer Mnje~ty's Sovereign authority over the whole 
or Rny part of thme i~lnllds _.- lIer Majesty therefore belnl!, 
desirous to establish a s'.!lIled form of Civil Government with a 
view to avert tl:e evil I:onsequences which lIlust result from the 
absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the native 
population and 10 Her subjects has been graciously pleased t') 
empower and to authC'rise me William Hobson a Captain In Her 
Maje~1 y's Royal Navy Consul and Lieulenant Governor of wch 
paris of New Zealand AS may be or hereafter shall he ceded 10 her 
Majes' y 10 invil 1'1 he C<lIllederall'd and independent Chiefs of New 
Zenhllld 10 concur in Ihe following Arlicle~ alHl ('ondltions. 
ARTICI,['\ TilE FIHST 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New 
Zealand and the separale and independent Chich who have nol 
become members of the Confederation cede io Iler Majesly Ihe 
Queen of England nbs()hrtely and wilhoul re~ervation ailihe rightll 
and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or 
Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be sup-
posed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territorie~ 
as the sole Sovereign~ thereof. 
ARTICLE TilE SECOND 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees 10 
the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective 
families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their Landll and Estates Forests Fisheries and other 
properties which they may collectively or individually possess so 
long as it j~ their wi,I, nnd desire to retain Ihe sallie in their 
possession; bUI Ihe Chiefs of the Uniled Tribes and the individual 
Chiefs yield to I ler Majesty the exclmive right of Preemption over 
slIch lands as the proprietors thereof lIIay be disposed to alienate 
al such prices as llIay he agreed "pon between the respeclive 
Proprietors and perSOllS appointed by Her Mnje!\ty to trent with 
them in that behalf. 
I\RTICLE TilE THIRD 
In consideration thereor Her Majesty the Queen of England 
extends 10 the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and 
imparts to them all Ihe Rights and Privileges of British Subjects. 
(Signed) W. IlOnSON 
I,iell'enant (lovertlnr 
Now therefore We Ihe ('I:iefs of Ihe COlllederRtlon of the United 
Tribes of New ZeRland being assembled in Congress at Victoria 
in Waitangi ami We thl:' <)eparnte and Independent Chiefs of New 
Zealand c1nlrnlng aUlhorlty over the Tribes and Territories which 
are specified after our respective names, having been made fully 
to understand the Provision!! of the foregoing Treaty. accept and 
enter into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof: in 
witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks al the 
places and the dales respectively specified. 
Done at Waitangi t:115 Six:1I day of February in the year of Our 
Lord One thousand eight hundred and forty. 
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KO WIKITORIA, Ie KlIini 0 Ingarani, i lana lIlahara atawai ki 
nga Rangalira lIle nga HaplI 0 Nil Tiranii lana hiahia hoki kia 
lohllngia ki a raloll 0 ralou rangaliralanga, me to ralou wenua, 
a kia Illall lonu hoki Ie Rongo ki a ratou me Ie Atanoho hoki 
kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tllkua mai tetahi Rangatira hei 
kai wakarile ki nga Tangala maori 0 Nil Tirani kia wakaaetia e 
nga Rangalira maori Ie Kawanatanga 0 te Kulnl kl nga wahlkatoa 
o Ie Wcnlla nei lIle nga MollI na Ie mea hokl he tokomaha ke 
nga langala 0 IIl11a Iwi Kilo noho ki lenei wenlla, a e haere mai nei. 
Na ko Ie Knini c hiahia ana kia wakarilea Ie Kawanalanga kia 
kalla ai nga kino e pilla lIlai ki Ie langala Maori ki Ie Pakeha e 
noho lure kore ana. 
Na, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he 
Kapilana i Ie Roiara Nawi hei Kawalla IllO nga wahi katoa 0 Nu 
Tirani e luklla aianci, allllla alu ki Ic Kllini e mea alu ana la ki 
IIga Hnllgaliro 0 Ic wakal\lillclIga 0 nga hnplI () Nil Tirnnlme era 
Rallgalira alII cllei lure ka korerolia IIci. 
KO TE TUATAHI 
Ko IIga Rangalira 0 Ie Wakmninenga I\le nga Rangatira katoa hoki 
ki hai i urll ki laua wakaminenga ka luku rawa atu ki te Kuini 
o Ingarani ake lonll alllle Kawanalanga katoa 0 0 ratou wenua. 
KO TE TUARUA 
Ko Ie Kuilli 0 Ingarani ka wakarile ka wakaae ki nga Rallgatira 
ki nga hapu ki IIga langala katoa 0 Nu Tirani te lino rangatira-
langa 0 0 ralou wenua 0 ratoll kainga me 0 ratou taonga katoa. 
- allia ko nga Rangatinl ote Wakaminenga me nga Rangalira kaloa 
alll ka tuku ki te Kuinl te hokonga 0 era wahl wenua e pal al Ie 
langata nona Ie Wenua ki te ritenga 0 Ie ulu e wakaritea ai e ralou 
ko te kai hoko e mealia nei e Ie Kuini hei kai hoko mona. 
KO TF TUATORU 
Hei wakaritenga mao hoki lenei mo te wakaaetanga ki te Kawa-
natanga 0 te Kuini ka tiakina e te Kuini 0 Ingarani nga tangata 
maori kaloa 0 N\I Tirani ka lukua ki a ralou nga likanga kaloa 
rite lahi ki ana mea ki nga IRngata 0 Ingarani. 
(Signed) WILLIAM HOBSON 
Consul and Lieulenant-Governor 
Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga 0 nga hapu 
o Nu Tirani ka huihui nei ki Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga 
Rangatira 0 Nu Tirani ka kite nel I te ritenga 0 enei kupu, ka 
langohia ka wakaaetia katoalia e malou, koia ka lohungia ai 0 
llIaloll ingoa 0 llIaloll lohll. 
Ka meatia lenei ki Wailangi i Ie ono 0 nga ra 0 Peril cd i Ie lall 
kotahi mano, e waru rau e wa te kau 0 to tatou Ariki. 
Ko nga Rangatira 0 te wakamlnenga. 
Source: Honouring the Treaty, 1989: pp27-31 
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ARAHURA 
PURCHASE 
1860 
£300 
p Ruapuke 
[Not Sold) 
RAKIURA 
PURCHASE 
1864 
£6,000 
OTAGO 
PURCHASE 
1844 
£2,400 
The Ten Official Purchases ofNgai Tahu Territory, 1844 -1864 
Source: Evison, 1993: 404. 
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Appendix 3 
TRIBA~ (::jOVEflNING BODY REPRESENTING THE 18 RUNANGA 
\ 
Source: Te Runanga 0 Ngal Tahu Annual Report, 1996: 23 
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TE KAWENATA 0 NGAI TARU 
The Kaupapa Whakatuwhe.ra of this Charter is that the 
House of Tahu is set up amongst us to nurture our people, 
to shelter OUf people and to serve our people. It is both 
the symbol of our identity as Ngai Tahu Whanui and the 
Whare Whataraki of that which we together own. 
The Kaupapa Poutokomanawa of this Charter is the 
protection and growth of the N gai Tahu putea. 
The Kaupapa Tahuhu of this Charter is the accountability 
of those charged with responsibility for the putea to our 
Papatipu Runanga, to our people and to future generations. 
The Kaupapa Poutahu is the principle that the assets of 
N gai Tabu will be managed separately from the bodies 
that spend and distribute the income earned from those 
assets. 
The Kaupapa Whakahuataka of this Charter is that all 
those entitled by whakapapa to the benefits of the House 
of Tahu shall be protected in their right to benefit. 
The Kaupapa Whakakotahi is that the poupou of the 
House of Tabu are the Papatipu Runanga of OUf people 
each with their own mana and woven together with the 
tukutuku of our whakapapa. In them resides the tino 
rangatiratanga of Ngai Tabu. Its collective voice is Te 
Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu. 
Source: Draft Charter, 1993. 
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Appendix 5 
Sovereignty in New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
Ngai Tahu Settlement: 
Indivisible Sovereignty: 
The following argument will highlight the fact that the Crown's notion of 
indivisible sovereignty, based on the seventeenth century Hobbesian theory, is 
outdated and inappropriate for New Zealand especially when considering the 
implications of the Treaty of Waitangi. As this is the case, there is a clear need 
for legal sovereignty to be limited and divided within the Crown through the 
entrenchment of the Treaty. Not only would this curtail unbridled parliamentary 
supremacy, but comprehensively fulfil Crown Treaty obligations. 
In setting the context for this argument I will give a brief explanation of the 
Hobbesian notion of sovereignty. 
For political theorist Thomas Hobbes, sovereignty, of an enduring kind, was only 
possible through it being indivisible. Hobbes' justification for indivisible 
sovereignty was that the state is made up of a collection of citizensl with 
'disparate natural wills. '2 In effect these wills would manifest into a myriad of 
concepts of what is just and unjust in certain situations. Hence, there is a 
necessity to reduce these wills into a single artificial will. In the absence of such 
a reduction, infinite conflicts and chaos in society would reign as citizens would 
be following their own wills and, thus, their own brand of justice in regard to one 
another.3 
Therefore, in an effort to avoid such a situation, a single artificial will would be 
imposed by a single sovereign or, at most, a sovereign unit characterised by an 
assembly of citizens. Hobbes preferred a single sovereign as opposed to an 
assembly of citizens, as it removed the possibility of disagreements and division. 
As did Hobbes, I will work with the single sovereign argument. 
1The citizen of Hobbes' time refers to a largely 'ethnically homogenous ... enfranchised political 
class of white propertied males - workers, women, black slaves, aboriginal peoples - found 
themselves excluded from citizenship and thus the nation' (Ignatieff, 1994: 4). 
2Davies and Ewin, 1992: 42 
3Hobbes makes the assumption that negotiation, compromise and agreement is beyond the 
human condition. 
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The sovereign has an artificial will expressed through an artificial decision 
making procedure known as the law. Furthermore, the sovereign's law is 
paramount and binding. All rulings are 'ultimate, unlimited and absolute. '4 In all 
cases of disagreement the sovereign's law provides a single resolution. For 
Hobbes, then, the sovereign is the 'maker, declarer and interpreter of the law' 
which in essence is his own artificial will. 5 The sovereign is omnipotent, a 
Leviathan.6 In theory, no other will supersedes the sovereign's will (bar God's, 
one would imagine), and, in short, the sovereign's will is absolute and indivisible. 
Hobbes' sovereign, then, formed the concentration of legislative, executive and 
judicial in his/her person. 
I use the words 'in theory' when describing the sovereign's will above, as 
underlying Hobbes' absolutist doctrine is the qualification that, in practice, the 
sovereign must rule in the interests of the citizenry. Ruling in their interests 
means aiming at preserving social harmony.7 The sovereign's absolute authority 
depends on this, as citizens' obedience is given on the condition that conflict 
and war is to be avoided and peace promoted. 8 Needless to say, if the 
sovereign does not preserve social harmony and instigates war, be it civil or with 
another state, citizens' submission to his/her authority is forfeited. 
In New Zealand today we see the Hobbesian legacy of indivisible sovereignty 
existing. This was passed on via the 'constitutional genes' inherited from the 
British colonisers of New Zealand. To understand how these 'genes' were 
inherited, a brief history of the origins of New Zealand's constitutional rules will 
follow. 
The main source of New Zealand's constitutional rules is the United Kingdom. 
On May 21st, 1840, British sovereignty was proclaimed over New Zealand by 
virtue of the Treaty of Waitangi. Through this assertion of British sovereignty in 
New Zealand, 'all statutes in force in the United Kingdom ... so far as they were 
40avies and Ewin, 1992: 42 
5lbid: 43. Hobbes assumed a masculine sovereign in his writing. 
6The Leviathan is a great sea monster from the Book of Job by which Hobbes identified 
sovereign power as analogous. The bible excerpt, as reproduced by Sharp, referring to 
Leviathan's omnipotency maintains that: 'There is nothing on earth to be compared with him. 
He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing be/ow him; and he is king of all the 
children of pride ... I (Sharp, 1990: 282) 
7However, the ingredients necessary for preserving social harmony, one can imagine, may be 
as disparate as individuals' wills. 
80avies and Ewin point out that Hobbes recognised that even a Hobbesian sovereign, while 
aiming to preserve social harmony, could not guarantee a permanent end to war (1992: 51). 
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applicable to the circumstances in New Zealand, became part of New Zealand's 
statue law.'9 New Zealand inherited a set of 'ready-made' laws. lO 
From 1840 to 1986 the United Kingdom Parliament retained the capacity to 
enact laws on New Zealand's behalf. The New Zealand General Assembly had 
only limited law-making powers until 1947. The General Assembly itself was 
brought into being by the New Zealand Constitution Act (1852) enacted by the 
United Kingdom Parliament. II In 1947 with New Zealand's adoption of the 
Statute of Westminster (1931) and the United Kingdom's enactment of the New 
Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act (1947), New Zealand's law-making 
powers became unlimited. However, the option for the United Kingdom 
Parliament to enact laws on New Zealand's behalf, if requested and consented 
to by the New Zealand Parliament, remained until the Constitution Act (1986). 
In 1986 the Constitution Act was passed by New Zealand's Parliament which 
reaffirmed in Section 15 (1) that 'the Parliament of New Zealand continues to 
have full power to make laws. '12 Only in 1986 via this Act was the New Zealand 
Parliament the completely independent authority for making laws for New 
Zealand. 
Along with the inheritance of British constitutional forms in New Zealand was the 
Hobbesian notion of indivisible sovereignty. Notwithstanding that, the United 
Kingdom itself was undergoing historical transitions of power from monarchy to 
parliament by 1840. In Britain prior to the eighteenth century the monarch, the 
person who actually wore the Crown, was the focal point of all executive, 
legislative and judicial powers. Thus, fully embracing the Hobbesian ideal of an 
omnipotent sovereign. However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Britain underwent a transitional period where actual institutions of government, 
such as parliament, gradually took over the monarch's functions though 'the 
fiction that they were the monarch's was maintained.'13 This fiction was passed 
on to New Zealand. Today, still the government is administered in Her Majesty's 
name with the Governor-General acting on her behalf (albeit, on the advice of 
Ministers).14 In New Zealand, sovereignty itself is said to locate in 'the Crown' 
9Harris, 1989: 34 
10 lbid 
11 Sections of this Act remained in force until 1986 when it was repealed. 
12Harris, 1989: 39 
1301iver, 1995: 7 
14palmer, 1987: 96 
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and is often used, as Oliver points out, 'as a piece of mystification and a 
bludgeon lawyers and politicians use to silence criticism.'IS 
New Zealand has three major institutions of government which combine to make 
up the Crown. These institutions are: the legislature or parliament where the 
House of Representatives reside; the executive or cabinet where ministers are 
selected from the majority party in parliament to make the key decisions of 
government; and the judiciary or court system which resolves disputes between 
individuals and the Crown and between individuals themselves. 16 The dominant 
feature of the Crown is parliamentary supremacy, where all other institutions, 
such as the public services, and those within the Crown and parliament itself 
'either derive their authority from parliament, or exercise their powers with the 
implied consent of parliament.'17 Parliamentary supremacy is the 'Grundnorm or 
fundamental rule of our legal system.'18 This constitutional rule, like many 
others, is a British import. Hence parliament, being the supreme Crown 
institution, is the indivisible legal sovereign according to the Hobbesian ideaLl9 
This was reaffirmed by the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, Doug 
Graham, who, when referring to parliament, maintained that 'we have one 
country and one indivisible legal sovereign.'2o 
One important doctrine informing the conduct of the three major Crown 
institutions, mentioned above, is the doctrine of the separation of powers. The 
theory behind this doctrine is that the three different arms of the Crown should 
work relatively autonomously, and thus act as a check on each others exercise 
of power.21 This separation entails that the making and the enforcing of laws are 
presided over by different arms of the Crown. This ensures that one arm is not 
subject to the dictates of another arm where, for example, governmental self-
interest in a particular outcome interferes with a just result. Where powers are 
separated successfully, one arm 'acts as a check on the excesses of the 
151995: 7 
16Harris, 1989: 47 
17lbid: 38 
18McHugh,1991:58 
19Though it is of the more undesirable kind for Hobbes, being an assembly of citizens, which 
leaves room for division, rather than a single sovereign 'speaking in a single voice'. 
20Graham, The Press: 19-10-95 
21 Harris, 1989: 47. In mentioning that the Crown should work relatively autonomously I do not 
mean absolutely autonomously as 'some co-ordination of various policies and administration in 
Government as a whole is necessary' (Palmer, 1987: 7). On one hand a complete separation 
would result in extreme inconsistencies and governmental paralysis. On the other hand, a 
complete fusion would 'produce a tyrannical government' as the makers and enforcers of law 
would become one (Ibid) . 
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others. '22 Furthermore, when power is separated and spread amongst the 
different arms of the Crown 'the chance to be free from concentrations of 
arbitrarily exercised power is increased.'23 
Though the theory of the doctrine of the separation of powers is adhered to in 
New Zealand, especially in relation to the impartiality of the court system, in 
practice the Crown has an inbuilt mechanism for amalgamating two arms in 
particular. These two arms are the legislative and executive branches. This 
amalgamation goes against the theory of the separation of powers and 
reinforces unbounded parliamentary supremacy. In this way the Hobbesian ideal 
of an omnipotent sovereign is fulfilled. 
The fusion between the executive and legislative arms leads to excessive 
parliamentary supremacy. There is no clear separation between these two arms. 
The reason for this is that the government or ruling party of the day 'effectively 
controls both the legislative and executive branches. '24 The government not only 
has a majority in parliament but also ruling party members of parliament are 
cabinet ministers. Harris highlights the lack of separation in New Zealand, where 
'the mixing of personnel and functions between the different institutions of 
government is such that the doctrine of the separation of powers and the theory 
of checks and balances have little application in New Zealand.'25 In short, then, 
members of the executive and the legislature are one and the same. 
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy in New Zealand entails that parliament 
can make and unmake laws as suits the government of the day. P.B. Temm 
Q.C. in his closing address before the Waitangi Tribunal gave the classic 
example illustrating parliament's legislative supremacy and power in New 
Zealand. He cited the John Donald McFarlane Estate Administration Act (1918), 
which pronounced the named man to be dead even though all concerned knew 
that he was alive. However, parliament declared the man legally dead and that 
is all that mattered. For any legislation to be passed all that is required is for the 
House of Representatives to have a majority of one in support of the bill. 26 
Furthermore, parliament confers no status of importance to any statute 
regardless of its content. For example, even the Constitution Act (1986), which 
22palmer, 1987: 6 
231bid 
241bid 
251987:47 
26Harris, 1989: 39 
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gives the basis for all forms and structures of government in New Zealand and 
the Human Rights Commission Act (1977) 'have no greater status than the 
Margarine Act 1908. '27 Therefore, it is asserted that parliament has a 'very 
broad law-making authorisation when one bears in mind ... that there is no written 
Constitution or Bill of Rights against which legislation may be measured by the 
courtS.'28 However, in 1982 it was stated by the Court of Appeal that the Court 
has reservations about whether 'parliament can take away the rights of citizens 
to resort to the ordinary courts of law for the determination of their rights. '29 This 
was a strong statement by the courts when one bears in mind that the only 
indivisible legal sovereign resides in parliament. Though this was stated, and it 
may be somewhat comforting to know that the Court of Appeal informally 
reserves such powers, it has yet to be put to the test against parliamentary 
supremacy. 
Not wishing to dwell overlong on the lack of separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative arms of the Crown, the arm in which a separation of 
power is crucial is the court system. According to Harris, the independence of 
the judiciary 'is one of the cornerstones of our constitution.'30 This is because 
public perception of justice from the rule of law can only be attained from the 
maintenance of judicial impartiality.31 Thus, in order for there to be a separation 
between the law makers and the law enforcers, the judiciary do not take part in 
legislative or executive functions. Judicial independence and separation of 
powers is maintained in a number of ways: 
the convention of non-political appointments to the bench; 
immunities from judicial proceedings; protections from 
dismissal except by parliament, and, most importantly, the 
conSistently impartial way in which judges themselves perform 
their functions.32 
In reference, then, to the doctrine of the separation of powers, the judiciary is 
the arm that most closely adheres to the theory as it is required to ensure the 
impartiality of the law. However, it is argued that the common law or judge-made 
law that evolves independently from parliament and developed through the 
271bid 
28/bid 
29Temm, 1989: 17 quoting the Court of Appeal 
3°1989:47 
31 /bid 
32lbid: 47 
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application of the doctrine of precedent and judicial interpretation of statues is 
actually law-making.33 This is said to be more in the arena of the legislature than 
the judiciary. One could also argue, though, that without the courts possessing 
such powers, inconsistency and rigidity that 'flies-in-the-face' of commonsense 
would prevail. 
Therefore, looking at the whole structure of the Crown, at present, one can say 
that the courts are meant to redress the imbalance created by the combined 
legislative and executive arms. However, given that there is no existing higher 
authority, such as a Bill of Rights against which the courts can measure 
legislation, parliamentary power continues to be unbounded. This is the present 
situation, regardless of what the Court of Appear has murmured in the past 
about preserving the rights of citizens. 
Into this scenario we can now consider the Treaty of Waitangi and its status 
within the existing law. 
P.B. Temm Q.C., in his Closing Address before the Waitangi Tribunal (1989), in 
discussing the prinCiples of the Treaty, stated that the most complex and difficult 
principle of all is the principle of the Crown's right to govern New Zealand. 34 This 
principle is gleaned from Article One of the Treaty, where Maori ceded 
sovereignty (English version)/kawanatanga (Maori version) to the Crown. While 
this principle seems straightforward enough, on further analysis it is quite the 
converse. The Article One pronouncement in the Treaty at first appears to be 
affirming the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. In this regard, it is what 
lawyers and politiCians often refer to for justification of the unrestrained 
legislative supremacy of parliament. 35 
However, immediately proceeding the Article One pronouncement granting 
sovereignty/kawanatanga to the Crown, Article Two follows which guarantees te 
tina rangatiratanga 0 0 ratou wenua 0 ratou kainga me 0 ratou taonga katoa 
(Maori version) / the full and exclusive and undisturbed possession of their 
Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties (English version) to 
33lbid: 48. The doctrine of precedent is where the courts are obliged to apply the same 
principles to a case whose material facts are indistinguishable from previous cases (Williams, 
1982: 67). 
34Temm, 1989: 15 
35lbid: 17. Also see Doug Graham's article "Chiefs 'did cede sovereignty' from The Press 19-
10-95. 
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the Maori. 36 The Crown right to sovereignty has the countervailing obligation of 
protecting Maori tino rangatiratanga over their assets. 
The provisions of Article Two create many other principles of the Treaty. 
Notably, the principle of the Crown's duty to act in good faith. The rationale for 
this principle, aside from the Treaty's actual provisions, initially stem from Lord 
Normanby's instructions to Captain Hobson and maintained that: 'all dealings 
with the aborigines ... be conducted on the same principles of sincerity, justice 
and good faith.'37 By this reasoning then, the right to govern is given 'providing 
the act of governing is conducted in the utmost good faith' toward Maori. 38 
Furthermore, there is the principle of the Crown's duty of active protection as 
referred to above. The origin of this principle is that under Article One the 
Crown, through being sovereign, has 'the power to protect the resources of the 
nation. But under Article Two it has 'the duty to protect the rights the Maori New 
Zealanders have in those resources.'39 Once again, by this reasoning, 'the right 
to govern is given provided there is compliance with the duty of protection. '40 
Thus, in a more holistic view of the Treaty, Article Two guaranteeing tino 
rangatiratanga to Maori qualifies Article One where the Crown is granted 
sovereignty over New Zealand. What is more, an indivisible legal sovereign who 
holds absolute power, and hence conforms to Hobbes' notion of sovereignty, is 
inappropriate. This is so in light of the contractual obligations the British Crown 
made with the Maori via the Treaty. 
This balanced view of the Treaty may be all well and good, but the problem 
which deepens the complexity of this principle of the Crown's right to govern is 
that the Treaty alone, in the purest sense, is afforded no legal force by the 
Crown. As stated by Harris: 'the strict legal position is that the Treaty of 
Waitangi by itself is not part of New Zealand law and therefore is not 
enforceable by the courts. '41 The only way the Treaty can be legally recognised 
36Walker, 1989: 316. It is interesting to note how Article One of the English version granting 
sovereignty to the Crown managed to find its way into law legally justifying the Crown's right to 
govern and institute laws, etc., but Article Two's guarantee of tina rangatiratanga never 
received the same attention. What is more, strictly speaking, the Treaty as a whole does not 
even receive the force of law. 
37Temm, 1989: 17 
38lbid: 18 
39lbid: 10 
40 Ibid 
411989:49 
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is through its terms or principles being enacted by a statute. Examples of such 
statutes are the Resource Management Act (1991), the Treaty of Waitangi 
(State Enterprises) Act (1987) and the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) (which, 
incidentally, set up the Waitangi Tribunal). These statutes, can be repealed or 
adjusted by parliament with a majority of only one. Furthermore, by the Treaty 
having no legal status, parliament can choose to ignore (and has done so 
frequently in the past) the rights and obligations, or the principles of the Treaty, 
in legislation42 
Therefore, the question may be asked why has the founding document of New 
Zealand never become supreme law? In a lengthy quote, but worthy of 
reproduction here, Temm a.c. works through the logic of how parliament has 
the right to make laws, and in doing so, attempts to answer this question: 
Maori New Zealanders start the process of explanation by 
asking, how does the New Zealand Parliament have the right to 
govern and make laws? The answer to that question is the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1986. Next they ask, how did our 
parliament get the right to pass the Act? The answer to this 
question is of course a combination of the Statute of 
Westminster Act 1947 and the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852. The next question Is ~ who passed those Acta? That leads 
to the answer that both statutes were enacted by the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom. The fourth question J. obvious· how did 
the British get the right to make laws over us? The response has 
to be - the Royal Proclamation of Sovereignty pronounced on the 
2nd of October 1840. That Inevitably leads to the fifth question -
how did Queen Victoria get the right to make a Proclamation 
affecting New Zealand? Which leads to the equally inevitable 
answer that she was given the power by the Treaty of Waitangl. 
Then comes the last question - so the right of the New Zealand 
Parliament to make laws depends on the Treaty? If the answer is 
yes, as it Is, then Maori New Zealanders say how can It be that 
42When the Crown has chosen to ignore the Treaty, there have been dire consequences for 
Maori. For example, the Public Works Act in force from 1840-1971 permitted the Crown to take 
Maori land for public purposes without compensation. This Act was applied to Ngati Kuri 
reserved land in Kaikoura (amongst others) where land was taken along the coast/ine for 
roading purposes without compensation. Any Pakeha land taken for similar purposes under this 
Act, the owners received compensation (O'Regan, Arowhenua marae: 15-9-96; Graham, The 
Press: 19-10-96). 
the Treaty is not part of our law? A truly satisfactory answer to 
that question has yet to be worked out. 43 
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For the Crown's part there has been the acknowledgment that there is an 
obligation on their behalf to recognise Maori rights as guaranteed in the 
provisions of the Treaty. As the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, 
Doug Graham, expressed last year: 'the New Zealand Government has the 
power to make laws for all New Zealanders but, in doing so, must take into 
account the rights of Maoris to exercise rangatiratanga over matters of concern 
to them.''' The actual sincerity of this statement was borne out by the signing of 
the non-binding Heads of Agreement between the Crown and the Ngai Tahu on 
October 4 1996 for a $170 million settlement package. 
While this is a noble effort on behalf of the executive ministers of parliament, 
parliament is still able to dictate the form to which the recognition of Maori rights 
takes place. 
Even after negotiations and an informal settlement has been reached, as with 
the Crown/Ngai Tahu Heads of Agreement signing, a formal settlement still has 
to be analysed and ratified by parliament. Changes affecting the whole tenor of 
a settlement deal can occur. Though it has been argued that 'parliamenl...will 
most certainly be unwilling to revisit negotiations' with Ngai Tahu4 5 Ngai Tahu 
Principal Negotiator, Sir Tipene O'Regan, is less confident. He maintained that 
when negotiating for a settlement the judiciary and the executive arms of the 
Crown may support it. however, the settlement may be pulled apart by 
constituency perceptions (whether just or unjust) and amateur media 
perceptions influencing parliamentary debate46 Past experience for Ngai Tahu 
seems to bear out O'Regan's view. When the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claim) Settlement Act (1992) was passed in parliament important clauses were 
dropped from the agreement initially settled upon in the Select Committee. The 
clauses were dropped as a result of pressure from lobby groups such as the 
Fish and Game Society47 One outcome was court battles about whether or not 
to allocate assets according to traditional tribal property rights, as guaranteed by 
the Treaty (Ngai Tahu's position), or by a population/needs basis (the position of 
Urban Maori Authorities and some northern iwi leaders). The result being which 
431989: 31-2 
44Graham, The Press: 19~ 1 O~95 
45Editorial, The Press; 9·10-96 
460'Regan, Lecture; 27-5-96 
471bid 
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ever view predominated would receive the majority of Maori fishing assets. The 
High Court ruled in favour of allocation according to traditional tribal property 
rights. However, this decision may be reviewed if the Urban Maori Authorities 
appeal against the decision succeeds. 
Another problem is that the Crown will settle with an iw; only if the iwi agrees to 
the extinguishment of Maori rights enshrined in Article Two of the Treaty forever. 
This was one of the dangers Ngai Tahu experienced in settlement negotiations. 
As stated by O'Regan, one of the big sticking points in negotiations with the 
Crown has been the Crown's desire to extinguish aboriginal rights or Article Two 
rights completely.48 According to O'Regan, protection of aboriginal rights was 
'absolutely fundamental to us' in order to negotiate an adequate settlement. 49 
Though the right to litigate against Crown breaches of Ngai Tahu aboriginal 
rights prior to 1992 will be extinguished by a settlement, Ngai Tahu's 'right to 
defend them against future breach has been protected. '50 Thus, although future 
generations will not be able to litigate against Crown breaches prior to 1992, 
from 1992 onwards a right to litigate against future breaches to aboriginal rights 
has been preserved.Sl However, as was discussed in Chapter Six, for some 
Ngai Tahu beneficiaries, extinguishing rights prior to 1992 is not favoured unless 
each deed area is directly compensated. 
In a situation where Maori rights are negotiated away as part of a settlement 
deal, rights of generations that exist in the future are extinguished by the 
generation at present. Such a settlement deal would prove to be unsatisfactory 
and unenduring. Future generations would be bound to the agreement with no 
option of redress in the courts against future breaches. Taking this line of 
argument I am not suggesting that no settlement can ever be reached finally 
laying to rest past grievances for breaches of Article Two by the Crown. If past 
generations' aboriginal rights are fulfilled to the greatest extent now possible via 
a settlement, such rights can and should be extinguished as redress has 
occurred. After all, this is what a settlement is meant to be providing adequate 
compensation for. This sentiment is also adhered to by Principal Negotiator 
Rakiihia Tau who stated that 'if the settlement is acceptable to the ones that it 
-----------. ---
48Keene, The Press: 5-10-96 
49Keene, The Press: 5-10-96 
50lbid. 
51 Incidentally, this is also a recognition of Article Three of the Treaty. Article Three maintains 
that Maori New Zealanders are accorded the same rights of citizenship. Importantly this 
incorporates the right to resort to the courts to have rights determined be they aboriginal or 
otherwise. 
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concerns it is extinguishable. The important factor being that if there is an 
identifiable grievance, there must be an identifiable remedy.'52 In turn, the right 
of an iwi to relitigate against the Crown for the same set of past breaches which 
have already been redressed would be removed. With adequate iwi consultation 
leading to a mandate for settlement this could be achieved. For Ngai Tahu this 
process is about to begin with a draft Deed of Settlement. 
Furthermore, the Crown can impose a settlement structure on a" Treaty 
settlements, which relativises all Maori claims, as was the case with the now 
abandoned fiscal envelope proposal. Here, a rejected proposal can be doggedly 
clung on to by the government due to the government of the day controlling 
parliament and by virtue of parliamentary supremacy. The Treaty, having no 
legal status, gives Maori no opportunity for redress when the proposal is 
implemented. 
Limited and Divisible Sovereignty: 
As pointed out by McHugh, the Treaty 'reserves a distinct political sovereignty of 
the Maori tribes. '53 He differentiates between Maori political sovereignty 
reserved by the Treaty and Maori legal sovereignty ceded by the Treaty. The 
political sovereignty reserved are those rights and liberties enshrined in the 
provisions of Article Two, namely, tino rangatiratanga. The legal sovereignty 
ceded is where sovereignty/kawanatanga was vested in the Crown. Political and 
legal sovereignty are not mutually exclusive but are interdependent. In other 
words, as I discussed earlier, the provisions of Articles One and Two have a 
qualifying effect on each other. 
In that the Treaty reserves Maori political sovereignty and its provIsions 
necessarily qualify one another, the indivisible legal sovereign (the Crown-in-
Parliament) must be limited and divided in order to fulfil these Treaty obligations. 
The fact that the Crown established absolute, unlimited and indivisible rule 
amounts to a breach of the Treaty. For example, Maori political sovereignty has 
no bearing on legislative outcomes as the Treaty has no legal force. 
Furthermore, last century's Crown land purchases from Ngai Tahu, not only 
breached the actual sale contracts, but disregarded the Treaty guarantees of 
allowing Ngai Tahu tino rangatiratanga over assets they wished to retain. 
Redress to these grievances were disregarded by numerous governments for 
-~--------
52R. Tau, Interview: 13-2-97 
53McHugh,1991:55 
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Tahu from the outset (as with other iwi) but have continually done so until the 
signing of the Heads of Agreement. The mechanism for allowing such easy 
disregard to Ngai Tahu and other iwi grievances is the absolute power for law-
making and law-breaking residing in the Crown-in-Parliament. Once again, 
unbridled parliamentary supremacy allows for such outcomes. 
As mentioned earlier, parliamentary supremacy is the fundamental rule of our 
legal system. It has been in place in New Zealand since the adoption of the 
Statute of Westminster in 1947 and before that, here by proxy, working through 
the United Kingdom's Parliament. One can argue that at the time of its 
implementation to the New Zealand Parliament in 1947, a breach of the Treaty 
occurred. As reasoned above, the application of unlimited parliamentary power 
overrides Maori political sovereignty as guaranteed by the Crown in the Treaty. 
It seems that the local circumstances which made New Zealand unique (as 
opposed to Australia at least) was that a treaty between Maori and Pakeha 
existed. However, this had no bearing on the implementation of unlimited 
parliamentary supremacy. 
In 1984 there was an attempt to address this situation by the introduction of a 
Draft Bill of Rights. It was recognised that parliament's legislative power was 
supreme and functioned unchecked by either a written Constitution or a second 
house to parliament. 54 
The Draft Bill of Rights included provisions containing fundamental rights and 
freedoms of all New Zealanders and the actual terms of the Treaty. This 
affirmed the rights of Maori New Zealanders. The Bill of Rights was to be the 
supreme law in New Zealand. Hence, the Treaty was to be of supreme legal 
status and 'regarded as always speaking' in respect to legislation and official 
actions. 55 The Bill of Rights was to be entrenched. This meant that two-thirds 
(75%) majority vote in parliament (rather than a simple majority of one) or a 
referendum of electors would be needed to repeal it. 
In this way, the Draft Bill of Rights was a limit to the actual procedure and 
format (known as a limitation of manner and form) parliament could take with 
certain statutes. This is differentiated from a limit to the content of parliamentary 
statutes known as a limitation of substance. An example of a limitation of 
54palmer, 1987: 220 
55lbid: 290 
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statutes known as a limitation of substance. An example of a limitation of 
manner and form as opposed to a limitation of substance is that the former 
proposes that Treaty rights cannot be legislated away without two-thirds majority 
vote. The latter proposes that no legislation can be passed that is incompatible 
with the TreatyS6 A limitation of substance may, on first appearance, seem like 
the preferable option but it is inflexible and fails to recognise that 'rights cannot 
be absolute ... [and] must be balanced against others rights and freedoms and 
the welfare of the community.'57 For example, Ngai Tahu's Treaty claim 
recognises that not all the quantifiable loss of resources at the hands of the 
Crown can be recouped lest New Zealand be bankrupted. Estimates have put 
Ngai Tahu's loss at $20 billions, Ngai Tahu's rights here are balanced with 
those of New Zealand society's. As spelt out by Charles Crofts, Chairperson of 
Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu, in reference to a settlement package: 'we have no 
wish to bankrupt or damage society and the economy in which we want to 
prosper.'59 
The eventual document implemented was a far weaker and diluted version of 
the Draft Bill of Rights. It is known as The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990). 
This document is afforded no supreme legal status and can be repealed as 
easily as any other act of parliament. The Treaty was excluded from the final 
version on the grounds that 'inclusion would have diminished its mana.'60 To 
some extent I believe this to be true as the Treaty is New Zealand's founding 
document which affords it a special or supreme status. This supersedes an 
ordinary act of parliament, such as the Margarine Act (1908). Its inclusion into 
such a weak instrument as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, able to be 
repealed with such ease, verges on making the Treaty a parody. Furthermore, 
the Treaty's inclusion would also be more likely to prevent a more 
comprehensive recognition of it in the future, such as its entrenchment. 
•. 
However, I am also aware of McHugh's point of the advantages of bringing the 
Treaty 'more fully into New Zealand's constitutional life' helping to familiarise 
predominantly Pakeha political and legal institutions with the Maori dimension to 
New Zealand society61 Entrenchment of the Treaty would more likely signify its 
56McHugh, 1991: 55 
57palmer, 1987: 221 
58Keene, The Press: 5·10-96 
59lbid: 204-95 
60McHugh, 1991 : 57 
61 Ibid. InCidentally, I think these predominantly Pakeha institutions should already be well 
aware of the Maori dimension in New Zealand society by virtue of Ihis country's founding 
document even though it is afforded no legal force, 
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Since the Constitution Act (1986) that 'located full sovereign authority entirely in 
this country', New Zealand has had the opportunity to develop a more 
indigenous constitution, a constitution that takes into account the local 
circumstances such as the implications of the Treaty.62 New Zealand should 
revisit the entrenchment of the Treaty, along with a Bill of Rights such as that 
drafted in 1984. This would safeguard the fundamental rights not only of Pakeha 
New Zealanders, but also of Maori New Zealanders. However, one important 
change I would make to the Draft Bill of Rights (1984) when revisited is to 
protect Maori Treaty rights from challenges via the equality provision in the Bill 
of Rights. McHugh maintains that this was only 'inferentially present' in the 
Draft.63 This avoids a clash between Article Two of the Treaty and the equality 
provision in the Bill of Rights. It also averts 'redneck litigants' bludgeoning Maori 
Treaty rights with the equality provision. 64 In these cases equality is used as an 
argument to deny Maori rights enshrined in the Treaty. 
The biggest immediate impact of entrenching the Treaty is that it would go some 
way toward addressing the current imbalance that exists in the Crown. As 
mentioned earlier, the government of the day controls the executive and 
legislative arms of the Crown. There is no separation of powers between these 
two arms which would otherwise act as a check on the excesses of 
parliamentary power. With this in mind, then taking into consideration the legal 
systems fundamental rule of parliamentary supremacy, parliament has 'very 
wide powers to take away our most precious rights and freedoms' or simply 
ignore them.65 
Structurally, the entrenchment of the Treaty would effectively divide the legal 
sovereign, that is, the Crown-in-Parliament. The courts would be given the 
power to strike down or refuse to apply any parliamentary enactment which is 
contrary to the Treaty. This is made possible by the Treaty being afforded 
supreme legal status. In this situation, rather than structurally reforming what 
amounts to the amalgamated executive and legislative arms in parliament, 
parliamentary power is simply divided and limited. In short, then, parliamentary 
power is decreased and the courts power is increased creating a better balance 
62McHugh,1991:53 
63lbid: 61 
641bid 
65Palmer, 1987: 220 
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power is decreased and the courts power is increased creating a better balance 
between Crown structures. In such an environment there is less opportunity for 
the erosion of any rights. 
It is worth mentioning that in implementing the Treaty as supreme law, the 
courts are given increased power only in so far as they must apply the Treaty to 
'an Act of Parliament, common law rule, or official action' where appropriate. 66 
The courts are not given the power to tinker with laws or official actions 
arbitrarily. The fundamental rule of parliamentary supremacy still exists, but, the 
rule is shifted from an absolute position to one that is limited. 
Entrenchment of the Treaty would comprehensively fulfil the Crown's Treaty 
obligations. First, when parliament actually drafts new legislation or makes a 
proposal it will be tempered by the existence of the supreme law, the Treaty. 
New laws will be more carefully drafted by the law-makers so as to avoid 
possible contrary enactments. Parliament will be aware that 'certain sorts of 
laws should not be passed, that certain actions should not be engaged in by 
Government.'67 In other words, the Treaty will be an active guide to drafting new 
legislation and governmental procedures. Second, and related to the last point, 
the principles of the Treaty will be more closely adhered to. The Crown's right to 
govern will more likely be carried out with regard to countervailing obligations to 
Maori New Zealanders. The courts being able to actively apply the Treaty will 
ensure this. Governance in good faith in regard to Maori New Zealanders' rights 
and active protection of those rights will be seen to be done. Third, with regard 
to settlement deals between iwi and the Crown, the Crown will be unable to 
extinguish Maori rights into the future as part of any deal. The Treaty, as a 
supreme legal force, would automatically prevent such an occurrence. 
Negotiations could be carried out that do not turn on the issue of whether the 
Crown will be able to extinguish Treaty rights into the future. 
Finally, the constitutionalisation of the Treaty by entrenchment would bring it 
fully 'into the legal fabric of New Zealand sOciety.'68 Political and legal 
institutions would have to adapt their processes to Maori Treaty rights and 
specific Crown obligations. 
66,bid: 221 
67'bid. 
68McHugh, 1991: 61 
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current situation where the Treaty has no legal force. In the event of a deed of 
settlement, which is imminent now the non-binding Heads of Agreement has 
been signed, Ngai Tahu will contract with the Crown in a settlement, this was 
done in Tainui's settlement in 1995.69 In that Ngai Tahu will contract with the 
Crown, the settlement will fall under the law of contract and the common law. 
This way the settlement is enforceable in the courts and will bind the Crown. In 
other words, a 'Clay tons' limit to parliamentary supremacy will be constructed. 
Parliament will be unwilling to repeal any sections of the eventual settlement act 
for fear of being sued for a breach of contract. Furthermore, if the law of 
contract is tinkered with a myriad of other societal contracts will fall apart as they 
are based on the same contract principles.70 
The danger still exists, however, that before the deed of settlement becomes an 
act, the bill can be changed and adjusted by parliament. The actual negotiated 
settlement may, after going through a parliamentary Select Committee, come 
out looking like a different 'creature' altogether, as happened with the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act (1992). Therefore, having an 
entrenched Treaty would be an advantage. The settlement bill could be 
scrutinised in relation to the Treaty during parliamentary deliberations. The final 
act of parliament would then have to embrace Article Two of the Treaty rather 
than undermine it. With an entrenched Treaty also, parliament could not prohibit 
litigation on the deed of settlement act when it departs from what was actually 
agreed to in negotiations. With the Treaty being supreme law, the courts could 
ensure this. 
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